Three essays on environmental economics: externalities and policy implications by Chen, Tengjiao
 
 
 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS:  
EXTERNALITIES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
TENGJIAO CHEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Agricultural and Applied Economics 
in the Graduate College of the  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2020 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
  
 Assistant Professor Erica Myers, Chair 
 Assistant Professor Eyal Frank 
 Professor Don Fullerton 
 Assistant Professor Daniel Karney 
 Professor Madhu Khanna 
 
 
  
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three studies in applied environmental and energy economics, 
using both applied theoretical models and empirical approaches. Externalities, especially issues 
that are unanticipated or have been largely overlooked, are the primary focuses throughout the 
whole thesis.  
The first chapter, based on joint work with Daniel Karney, investigates the general 
equilibrium welfare effects of an environmental tax to correct a pollution externality given 
imperfect competition and price discrimination. In a Harberger-style analytical general equilibrium 
model, oligopolistic firms produce energy for residential consumers as final goods, but that energy 
can also be sold to the industrial sector as intermediate goods. The energy firms engage in third-
degree price discrimination across residential consumers and industrial firms. Then, the welfare 
change from an exogenous environmental tax change is decomposed into three effects: externality, 
output, and price discrimination. The well-known concern arises that increasing an environmental 
tax for a sector with market power further reduces output and increases the production distortion. 
However, in addition to the gains from the externality correction, environmental tax combinations 
may also be able to offset the increased output distortion by reducing the price discrimination. 
The other two papers implement modern empirical strategies to reveal causal effects. The 
second study investigates the impacts of sizable wind farms on local crop yields and farm 
operations. I develop an instrumental variables approach that exploits local wind potential and 
aviation safety restrictions as sources of exogenous variation in the development of wind energy. 
I find positive effects of wind turbines on nearby crop yields and then probe two possible 
mechanisms. First, using farm-level data, I explore changes in farm operations and find no 
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measurable increases in operating expenses after wind turbines are installed despite the fact that 
landowners might be receiving royalties. Rather, my results reveal that most of the benefits from 
the yield increases are realized through higher operator returns. Second, I estimate the causal 
effects of wind turbines on local meteorological variables and find significant impacts, suggesting 
that the induced microclimate changes are likely important contributors to higher yields. 
Economic sectors that operate in the same space might generate spillovers from one to the 
other. In the context of pollution, discharges and emissions from industrial plants can have 
negative impacts on the environmental quality that acts as an input in other production functions. 
The third chapter, based on joint work with Eyal Frank, tests whether ecosystem functions can also 
act as a channel through which such spillovers occur. Specifically, we explore the impacts of 
sizable wind farms on local insecticide use, potentially intermediated by wind-turbine induced 
mortality of natural predators of pests. Since scientific literature indicates that wind turbines kill 
large amounts of bats and birds, this decline in natural pest-control has lowered the predatory 
pressure on insects. Using the gradual construction of wind farms across counties, we find that 
sizable wind farms have resulted in an increase in insecticide use nearby. 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
My deep gratitude goes first to Erica Myers, who has expertly guided me through my doctoral 
program. I have benefited greatly from her expertise in the fields and professional attitude to 
research, and more importantly, she has strongly supported my own research ideas and helped me 
to develop as a scholar. I feel very lucky and honored that she chose me as her first doctoral student. 
To my coauthors, Eyal Frank and Daniel Karney, and my committee, Don Fullerton and Madhu 
Khanna, I am extremely grateful for their guidance, suggestions, and patience throughout my 
project.  
I would like to thank Peter Christensen, Benjamin Crost, Tatyana Deryugina, Benjamin 
Gramig, Daniel Kaffine, Nicholas Paulson, Michel Robe, Gary Schnitkey, Paul Stoddard, Yilan 
Xu, Bradley Zwilling, and many other mentors and staff in my department for their advice and 
help. In particular, I want to thank Hayri Önal, who encouraged and supported me to pursue a 
Ph.D. degree in economics, when I was an engineering student seven years ago. My appreciation 
also extends to James Sallee, Daniel Sullivan, Steve Cicala, and my teachers and colleagues at the 
University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy. I also wish to thank Bowen Chen, Luoye 
Chen, Zhangliang Chen, Jiarui Li, Liqing Li, Yijia Li, Rebecca Martin, Chiyu Niu, Bryan Parthum, 
Sarah Sellars, Mateus Souza, Chi Ta, Juo-Han Tsay, Eric Zou, and many other friends for all 
helpful discussions and suggestions.  
I am grateful to Alex Winter-Nelson, Suzana Palaska-Nicholson, and my colleagues for the 
unique and memorable experience in the ACES Office of International Programs. I also want to 
thank Schuyler Korban, John Santas, Kuan Chong Ting, Xinlei Wang, Yibin Ying, Yuanhui 
Zhang, and all ISIP (International Summer Immersion Program) mentors and mentees. Under the 
v 
 
background of the current coronavirus crisis and as an applied economist, I sincerely hope that the 
young generation of the U.S., China, and many other countries will not “quarantine” themselves 
henceforward. Instead, we should establish strong connections, mutual trust, and understandings, 
through exchange programs like ISIP, to promote human well-being and to prevent conflicts in the 
future.  
Finally, I am fully indebted to my family for their support and understanding. I am very proud 
of my wife, Shuxin, who sacrificed her previous career for the family but has just earned her second 
Master’s degree. Our son, Feng-Yu, has made the journey more enjoyable since the summer of 
2018. To my parents and grandparents, I am extremely grateful for their support and 
encouragement, without whom I would never have succeeded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM UNDER 
MARKET POWER AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION ................................................................ 1 
1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Model ................................................................................................................................. 6 
1.3 Welfare ............................................................................................................................ 15 
1.4 Analytical Solutions ........................................................................................................ 21 
1.5 Numerical Analysis ......................................................................................................... 27 
1.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 36 
1.7 Tables .............................................................................................................................. 38 
1.8 References ....................................................................................................................... 44 
CHAPTER TWO: WIND ENERGY AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION: EVIDENCE 
FROM FARM-LEVEL DATA ..................................................................................................... 48 
2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 48 
2.2 Background ..................................................................................................................... 54 
2.3 Data ................................................................................................................................. 56 
2.4 Empirical Strategy ........................................................................................................... 61 
2.5 Results ............................................................................................................................. 69 
2.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 80 
2.7 Figures and Tables ........................................................................................................... 82 
2.8 References ....................................................................................................................... 94 
CHAPTER THREE: DO WIND FARMS CAUSE HIGHER INSECTICIDE USE? .................. 99 
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 99 
3.2 Background ................................................................................................................... 103 
3.3 Data ............................................................................................................................... 106 
3.4 Empirical Strategy ......................................................................................................... 110 
3.5 Results ........................................................................................................................... 112 
3.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 119 
3.7 Figures and Tables ......................................................................................................... 121 
vii 
 
3.8 References ..................................................................................................................... 130 
APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER ONE ............................... 135  
A.1 List of Parameters ......................................................................................................... 135 
A.2 Long-Run Marginal Cost of Energy Production .......................................................... 136 
A.3 Welfare Expression Derivations ................................................................................... 138 
A.4 Theorem Proofs ............................................................................................................ 140 
A.5 General Equilibrium Solutions ..................................................................................... 143 
APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER TWO .......... 148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM    
UNDER MARKET POWER AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Energy markets are typically not perfectly competitive due to natural monopolies, barriers to entry, 
or government regulations, and thus firms in those markets enjoy market power (Baumol 1977; 
Borenstein and Bushnell 2015; Ma and He 2008; Posner 1969). Empirically, market power is a 
significant issue in many energy sectors (Karthikeyan, Raglend, and Kothari 2013; Murry and Zhu 
2008). Furthermore, third-degree price discrimination arises with respect to the sale of energy 
sector goods or services whereby an otherwise homogenous output such as electricity is sold to 
different market segments at different prices.1 The U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA 2017) 
reports that in 2018 the average residential consumer in the contiguous states paid approximately 
60 percent more for their electricity than industrial users. A similar pattern arises in the heating oil 
and natural gas markets with 55 and 90 percent differentials between residential and industrial 
users, respectively. Simultaneously, emissions generated from the energy sector create significant 
negative externalities in the form of local pollutants, such as PM2.5 or NOX, as well as greenhouse 
gases including carbon dioxide (CO2). A large literature has examined the regulation of 
environmental externalities in many applied theory contexts including environmental taxes under 
monopoly power (e.g., Buchanan 1969; Barnett 1980), oligopoly settings (e.g., Ebert 1991), price 
                                                 
1 For example, the average price of electricity in Ohio in November 2016 is ¢12.42/kWh for residential, ¢10.14/kWh 
for commercial, ¢6.88/kWh for industrial, and ¢7.99/kWh for transportation, though Ohio has mostly deregulated 
energy markets (EIA 2016). Similarly, the average natural gas prices of Ohio in 2016 are 9.03, 5.74, and 4.81 dollars 
per thousand cubic feet for residential, commercial, and industrial sectors, respectively. 
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discrimination (e.g., Adachi 2005), and in general equilibrium (e.g., Fullerton and Metcalf 2002; 
Fullerton and Heutel 2007). To the best of our knowledge, this is first to study the effect of 
environmental taxes under oligopoly with price discrimination in general equilibrium. The 
existence of market power along with price discrimination complicates the analysis of 
environmental policies and leaves unclear consequences on the welfare effects of changing 
environmental policies.  
Earlier studies pay more attention to the extreme monopoly case, and use partial equilibrium 
models and thus cannot analyze the effects of environmental taxes on other markets (Fullerton and 
Metcalf 2002). Buchanan (1969) first finds the contradiction under the monopoly that the policy 
designed for adjusting the monopolistic distortion encourages production, while environmental 
taxes imply less production.2 Asch and Seneca (1976) and Misiolek (1980) figure out the optimal 
tax rate to achieve the socially-efficient output level under monopoly and externalities in the case 
of linear demand and cost. Barnett (1980) derives general Pigouvian tax rules under monopoly 
without a linearity assumption, indicating that corrective taxes may reduce social costs due to 
externality correction but also could increase welfare loss from the underproduction of the final 
products. Other studies deal with various environmental policies and their effects under different 
market structures using a partial equilibrium model (Baumol and Oates 1988; Conrad and Wang 
1993; Ebert and Hagen 1998; Misiolek 1988; Smith 1976). However, due to the limitation of 
partial equilibrium models, they cannot analyze the effects on factor prices or intermediate goods 
markets.  
More recent studies investigate tax incidence and welfare consequences by using general 
equilibrium models. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the prior paper considers the 
                                                 
2 Mansur (2007) finds empirical evidence that firms with market power in the energy sector increase prices by 
distorting output decisions, which causes production inefficiencies but contributes to pollution reductions. 
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price discrimination issue. Fullerton and Heutel (2007) study the incidence of environmental taxes 
in a two-sector analytical general equilibrium model. These clean and dirty producer sectors are 
competitive and parallel, so their model does not involve market power nor distinguish the impacts 
on upstream and downstream sectors. With issues of imperfect competition, Browning (1994, 
1997) shows interactions among labor tax and welfare costs. Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) then 
use a general equilibrium model to evaluate the welfare impact of implementing a cap and trade 
program with pre-existing labor tax distortions, and find that the existence of monopoly reduces 
the welfare gain from environmental restrictions. Other researchers attempt to derive optimal tax 
rules with dynamic models. Chang et al. (2009) propose a socially optimal tax policy approach for 
pollution externalities under market imperfections with specific Cobb–Douglas production 
function forms. Golosov et al. (2014) try to identify an optimal-tax formula using a dynamic 
stochastic general-equilibrium model with an externality. Although a dynamic model is an 
appropriate approach to develop an optimal tax schedule by considering long-run environmental 
impacts, the main purpose of this paper is to explore the responses to a change in environmental 
taxes under general equilibrium and market power with price discrimination rather than to develop 
an optimal environmental tax.  
In addition to its imperfect competition, price discrimination, and externalities, the energy 
sector is relatively huge, roughly 6 to 9 percent of total GDP in the U.S., and it can essentially 
affect consumers’ utility directly as well as through costs of producing other goods. Therefore, a 
general equilibrium model is a valid and appropriate choice to do the analysis. This paper 
investigates the effects of changes in environmental taxes or tax combinations on energy products, 
production factors, or emissions and pollutions in a general equilibrium model under market power 
with price discrimination. Our model is based on the general equilibrium models developed in 
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Baylis, Fullerton, and Karney (2014), Fullerton and Heutel (2007), and Fullerton and Metcalf 
(2002), which use a log-linearization approach that is extended from the original Harberger's 
(1962) model. Different from two competitive and parallel sectors setting in these papers, we have 
an oligopolistic energy sector, which can implement third-degree price discrimination to two end-
use sectors – residential consumers and industrial firms. We model the energy sector as running 
all the way from mining or production through distribution to end-users. Our model can specialize 
to monopoly or perfect competition via exogenously changing the equivalent number of 
oligopolistic firms in the energy sector.  
We find closed-form solutions for the effects of a tax change in the presence of market power 
and price discrimination in our general equilibrium model. In our model, energy products are final 
goods to the residents but also intermediate goods to other industrial firms, which allows us to 
explore the effects on the intermediate goods market and its pass-through effects on residents. The 
impacts of changing different taxes on welfare contain three main categories: externality correction 
effects, production distortion effects, and price discrimination effects. To achieve a certain goal in 
pollution or emission reduction, the tradeoff of a new policy is among the gain from negative 
externality correction, the change from price discrimination distortion, the cost from enlarged 
distortion from the underproduction of oligopolistic goods, and even with their corresponding side 
effects with pre-existing tax distortions. The numerical analysis provides cases to further explain 
the tradeoffs. Although the results can be altered with different parameters, the numerical analysis 
clearly shows the advantage of tax and subsidy policy combinations with an implement of the 
double-dividend feature under the presence of market power in certain circumstances. 
This analysis contributes to the literature in three important ways. First, it develops a new 
modeling technique to allow for an oligopolistic production sector with price discrimination to be 
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embedded within an analytical general equilibrium framework. Furthermore, this sector can be 
specialized to either a pure monopoly or perfect competition, and thus allowing one model to 
consider the full range of competitive production settings. The prior literature either assumed a 
production sector exhibited perfect competition or monopoly, and no model allowed for price 
discrimination. This modeling innovation can be used in other settings besides environmental taxes 
but in general equilibrium setting where oligopoly market power in one or more production sectors 
is an important consideration. 
Second, the study derives a welfare formula in general equilibrium that separately identifies 
an oligopoly (or monopoly) output distortion from the potential price discrimination distortion.3 
The formula shows welfare improvement if the oligopolistic energy firm to sell output at the same 
price and thus eliminates the price discrimination distortion but the output distortion remains (as 
well as distortion from a sub-optimally regulated externality). Prior analytical general equilibrium 
models have not simultaneously considered this combination of features and thus this study is the 
first to formally identify these separate welfare distortion terms. 
Third, this study finds feasible economic conditions that ameliorate the concern of additional 
output distortions from tightening an environmental tax due to an offsetting effect from a reduced 
price discrimination distortions. That is, parameter conditions are found where changes in the 
output and price discrimination distortions have opposite signs when an environmental tax 
changes.  
The paper process as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model setup along with the log-linear 
equations. Then, Section 1.3 derives and explains the welfare effects. Next, Section 1.4 provides 
                                                 
3 The same formula identifies the distortion from sub-optimally regulated environmental externalities but this has been 
previously achieved in the literature. 
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the closed-form solutions to the model. Section 1.5 conducts the numerical analysis. Finally, 
Section 1.6 briefly concludes and discusses the policy implications of the results. 
 
1.2 Model 
1.2.1 Setup 
The model consists of an oligopolistic energy sector, a competitive industrial (or commercial) 
sector, and many identical residential consumers. The energy sector has ݊ identical producers that 
use capital ሺܭாሻ  and pollution ሺܼሻ  to produce energy ሺܧሻ  via the constant returns to scale 
production function ܧ ൌ ܧሺܭா, ܼሻ , where "ܧ"  is output and "ܧሺ⋅ሻ"	 is a function. 4  The 
homogenous energy is sold under third-degree price discrimination due to market power.5 The 
industrial sector incurs price ݌ா௑ while the residents are charged price ݌ாோ, but generally ݌ா௑ ്
݌ாோ. Pollution is discouraged by a pre-existing, positive per unit tax (i.e., ݐ௓ ൐ 0). However, a 
result of market power is that the energy sector secures rents and thus net positive economic profits 
(i.e., Пா ൐ 0).  
The competitive industrial sector uses capital (ܭ௑) and energy (ܧ௑) to produce final goods (ܺ) 
via the constant returns to scale production function ܺ ൌ ܺሺܭ௑, ܧ௑ሻ. The output is sold to the 
residential consumers at price ݌௑. The per-unit energy cost paid by industrial firms is ݌ா௑, but ݐா௑ 
is a per-unit commodity tax on energy products sold to the industrial sector such that the 
oligopolistic energy firms receive (݌ா௑ െ ݐா௑) for every unit of output sold to the industrial sector. 
Similarly, the energy price paid by consumers is ݌ாோ, but the energy sector receives (݌ாோ െ ݐாோ) 
where ݐாோ is the per-unit tax on energy products sold to the residents.  
                                                 
4 This model follows the common practice in the literature of moving pollution from the output side of the production 
frontier to the input side such that more pollution “input”, all else equal, allows from more output.   
5 Alternatively, the price discrimination can occur from Ramsey pricing. The setup would be similar but requires a 
fixed level of profits as opposed this model that allows the profit level to vary. 
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The many identical consumers own a fixed total amount of “capital”, denoted by ܭ, which 
can be interpreted more generally as labor, capital, land, or a composite of any limited resources. 
Thus, the capital resource constraint becomes ܭா ൅ ܭ௑ ൌ ܭ, where ܭா and ܭ௑ denote the amount 
of capital employed in energy and industrial sectors, respectively. Since capital is not sector 
specific and thus perfectly mobile, then the gross, pre-tax price of capital (ݍ௄) is the same in both 
energy and industrial sectors. However, the model includes (potential) sector-specific factor taxes 
such that the net, after-tax prices of the capital in the energy and industrial sectors are given by 
݌௄ா ൌ ݍ௄ ൅	ݐ௄ா	and ݌௄௑ ൌ ݍ௄ ൅ ݐ௄௑	, respectively, where the per-unit capital taxes are ݐ௄ா on 
ܭா and ݐ௄௑ on ܭ௑. 
The residents consume energy products directly (ܧோ) as final goods, as well as the output (ܺ) 
from the industrial sector. The utility function of the representative consumer is given by 
ܷሺܺ, ܧோ; ܼሻ  and it is assumed that ߲ܷ/߲ܺ ൐ 0 , ߲ܷ/߲ܧோ ൐ 0 , and ߲ܷ/߲ܼ ൏ 0 . The level of 
pollution is taken as exogenous in utility maximization problem by the atomistic consumer and 
thus ܼ is offset by a semicolon in the utility function. All net tax revenue is returned to consumer 
via a lump-sum rebate (ܶ) and thus the aggregated budget constraint of residents becomes ܫ ≡
ݍ௄ܭ ൅ Пா ൅ ܶ ൌ ݌௑ܺ ൅ ݌ாோܧோ.  
In this long-run model, all energy produced is consumed according to the supply-demand 
condition ܧ ൌ ܧ௑ ൅ ܧோ. Following Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) and the related literature, this 
model assumes perfect certainty, no transaction costs, and availability of lump-sum transfers.   
 
1.2.2 Log-Linear System 
The model is log-linearized to analyze how changing in the exogenous taxes – such as increasing 
the pollution tax or subsidizing the clean input to energy production – affects the equilibrium 
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outcomes. That is, the log-linear version of the model provides the changes in prices and quantities 
from one long-run equilibrium to another long-run equilibrium as a result of policy changes, but 
does not analyze the transition path. 
To start, totally differentiate the capital resource constraint to find: 
߱ாܭ෡ா ൅ ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻܭ෡௑ ൌ 0, (1.1)
where ߱ா ≡ ܭா/ܭ is the share of total capital employed in the energy sector. The “hat” over a 
variable indicates a proportional change (e.g. ܭ෡ா ൌ ݀ܭா/ܭா). Mechanically, a capital use increase 
in the energy sector must lead to a proportional decrease in the industrial sector, and vice versa.  
Next, define ߪ௎ ൐ 0 as the elasticity of substitution between final goods ܺ and ܧோ to reflect 
the representative consumer’s preference.6 Then, totally differentiate the definition of ߪ௎ to find 
residents’ demand response to price changes and given by: 
෠ܺ െ ܧ෠ோ ൌ ߪ௎ሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ, (1.2)
such that an increase in the relative price of energy to the residents, ሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ ൐ 0, leads to an 
increase in the relative consumption of industrial output compared to energy, ൫ ෠ܺ െ ܧ෠ோ൯ ൐ 0. 
Continuing, let the elasticity of substitution in the production of the industrial goods be given 
by ߪ௑ ൐ 0. Then, totally differentiating the definition of ߪ௑ yields: 
ܧ෠௑ െ ܭ෡௑ ൌ ߪ௑ሺ݌̂௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ. (1.3)
Also, the firms in the industrial sector maximize their profits, but those maximized profits are zero 
due to competition and the constant returns to scale assumption. Standard to the literature, 
substitute the first-order conditions (FOCs) derived from the profit maximization problem of the 
industrial sector into the totally differentiated production function and rearrange to get: 
                                                 
6 All parameter definitions are provided in Appendix A.1. 
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෠ܺ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻܭ෡௑ ൅ ߠா௑ܧ෠௑ (1.4)
where ߠா௑ ≡ ݌ா௑ܧ௑/݌௑ܺ is the share of the total revenue of the industrial firms that is spending 
on energy input ܧ௑ . The zero-profit condition is ݌௑ܺ ൌ ݌௄௑ܭ௑ ൅ ݌ா௑ܧ௑ , and totally 
differentiating it leads to: 
෠ܺ ൅ ݌̂௑ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻ൫ܭ෡௑ ൅ ݌̂௄௑൯ ൅ ߠா௑൫ܧ෠௑ ൅ ݌̂ா௑൯. (1.5)
Recall that the energy firms produce the homogenous energy product (ܧ) that is sold to 
industrial firms as intermediate goods (ܧ௑) or residents as final goods (ܧோ). Thus, the supply-
demand, market clearing condition becomes ܧ ൌ ܧ௑ ൅ ܧோ and totally differentiating it yields: 
ܧ෠ ൌ ߮௑ܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோ, (1.6)
where  ߮௑ ≡ ܧ௑/ܧ is the share of total energy products sold to the industrial sector as intermediate 
goods. Similarly, define ߮ோ ≡ ܧோ/ܧ as the share of total energy products sold to the residents, and 
thus ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோ ൌ 1. 
Energy is produced via the two-input production function ܧ ൌ ܧሺܭா, ܼሻ and thus let ߪா ൐ 0 
be the elasticity of substitution for firms in the energy sector. Then, totally differentiating the 
definition of ߪா provides: 
መܼ െ ܭ෡ா ൌ ߪாሺ݌̂௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ. (1.7)
Since the model assumes an existing pollution tax ݐ௓ ൐ 0 levied on emissions for the energy sector 
and then define the proportional change in the tax be represented as ̂ݐ௓ ≡ ݀ݐ௓/ݐ௓. The change in 
the pollution tax rate is the primary, exogenous policy of interest. 
At this point, the model departs from the standard methodology in the literature and merges 
oligopolistic firm behavior into a log-linear analytical general equilibrium model. Furthermore, 
this new modeling technique is flexible with respect to the number of firms such that both pure 
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monopoly and perfect competition are special cases. To our knowledge, this is the first analysis to 
make this methodological advancement.  
Let the production function for firm ݅ ∈ ሺ1,… , ݊ሻ in the oligopolistic energy sector be given 
as ܧ௜ ൌ ܧ௜ሺܭா௜, ܼ௜ሻ. Assume firms engage in quantity completion via the Cournot model.7 Define 
the inverse demand function of the residential consumers as ݌ாோ ൌ ோ݂ሺܧோሻ, where ܧோ ൌ ∑ ܧோ௜௡௜ୀଵ  
such that ܧோ௜ is the amount sold by firm ݅ to the residents. Similarly, define the industrial sector’s 
inverse demand function as ݌ா௑ ൌ ௑݂ሺܧ௑ሻ, where ܧ௑ ൌ ∑ ܧ௑௜௡௜ୀଵ , and note that ܧ௜ ൌ ܧ௑௜ ൅ ܧோ௜. 
Then, firm i has a profit maximization problem: 
maxா೉೔,ாೃ೔,௄ಶ೔,௓೔		ሾ ௑݂ሺܧ௑௜ ൅ ܧି௑௜ሻ െ ݐா௑ሿܧ௑௜ ൅ 	ሾ ோ݂ሺܧோ௜ ൅ ܧିோ௜ሻ െ ݐாோሿܧோ௜ െ ݌௄ܭா௜ െ ݐ௓ܼ௜ 
ݏ. ݐ.		ܧ௑௜ ൅ ܧோ௜ ൌ ܧ௜ሺܭா௜, ܼ௜ሻ, 
where ܧି௑௜ and ܧିோ௜ represent the total production from the other firms. The subsequent FOCs 
are: 
ሾܭாሿ: ݌௄ ൌ ߛ௜ ߲ܧ௜߲ܭா௜,  
ሾܼሿ: ݐ௓ ൌ ߛ௜ ߲ܧ௜߲ܼ௜,  
ሾܧ௑௜ሿ: ௑݂ሺܧ௑௜ ൅ ܧି௑௜ሻ െ ݐா௑ ൅ ߲ ௑݂ሺܧ௑௜ ൅ ܧି௑௜ሻ߲ܧ௑௜ ܧ௑௜
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
ெோ
ൌ ߛ௜ฎ
ெ஼
,  
ሾܧோ௜ሿ: ோ݂ሺܧோ௜ ൅ ܧିோ௜ሻ െ ݐாோ ൅ ߲ ோ݂ሺܧோ௜ ൅ ܧିோ௜ሻ߲ܧோ௜ ܧோ௜
ᇩᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇪᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇭᇫ
ெோ
ൌ ߛ௜ฎ
ெ஼
,  
                                                 
7 A two-stage oligopoly model could be constructed whereby firms choose production capacity at the first stage, and 
then process a price competition. However, the results of the two stage model under efficient rationing would be the 
same as those generated from the Cournot model directly (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983).  
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where ߛ௜  is the Lagrange multiplier for firm i and can be interpreted as the marginal cost of 
producing one more unit of output. Observe the ሾܧ௑௜ሿ and ሾܧோ௜ሿ FOCs equate the marginal cost 
(MC) and marginal revenue (MR) of producing energy and then selling it to either the industrial 
sector or residential consumers.  
Next, every firm i produces ܧ௑௜∗  and ܧோ௜∗  at the Cournot equilibrium. Summing the ሾܧ௑௜ሿ FOC 
over the ݊ firms leads to: 
݊ߝா௑ሺ݌ா௑∗ െ ݐா௑ሻ ൅ ݌ா௑∗ ൌ ߝா௑෍ߛ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
, 
where ݌ா௑∗ ൌ ݂ሺܧ௑∗ሻ is the equilibrium price of energy products as intermediate goods. Also, define 
ߝா௑ ≡ ሺ߲ܧ௑/ܧ௑ሻ/ሺ߲݌ா௑/݌ா௑ሻ is industry ܺ’s uncompensated price elasticity of demand for the 
energy input ܧ௑. Then, totally differentiating with respect to the model variables and rearranging 
the above equation yields: 
݌̂ா௑ ൌ ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑ ൭݊
ݐா௑
݌ா௑ ̂ݐா௑ ൅෍
௡
௜ୀଵ
ߛ௜
݌ா௑ ߛො௜൱,  
where ̂ݐா௑ ൌ ݀ݐா௑/ݐா௑ is the proportional change of per unit tax on intermediate goods. The “*” 
notation has been removed since ܧ௑௜ and ݌ா௑ come from the equilibrium conditions.  
However, since all oligopolistic firms are identical, then ߛ ൌ ߛ௜, and the proportional change 
in marginal cost must also be the same among all energy firms as ߛො ൌ ߛො௜,	so substituting and 
rearranging the last equation leads to: 
݌̂ா௑ ൌ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑ ൬
ݐா௑
݌ா௑ ̂ݐா௑ ൅
ߛ
݌ா௑ ߛො൰. (1.8)
Similarly, summing the ሾܧோ௜ሿ  FOC over the ݊  firms, totally differentiating, rearranging, and 
substituting returns gives: 
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݌̂ாோ ൌ ݊ߝாோ1 ൅ ݊ߝாோ ൬
ݐாோ
݌ாோ ̂ݐாோ ൅
ߛ
݌ாோ ߛො൰, (1.9)
where ̂ݐாோ ൌ ݀ݐாோ/ݐாோ is the proportional change of per unit commodity tax on energy product 
consumed by residents, and ߝாோ ≡ ሺ߲ܧோ/ܧோሻ/ሺ߲݌ாோ/݌ாோሻ is the residents’ uncompensated price 
elasticity of demand for energy. It must hold that ߝா௑, ߝாோ ൏ െ1/݊ at the prevailing prices and 
quantities.8 Interestingly, in both equations (1.8) and (1.9), the number of firms in the energy sector 
(݊) is a parameter. Thus, if ݊ ൌ 1, then the energy sector is served by a monopolist, but as ݊ → ∞ 
the previously oligopolistic sector tends towards perfectly competitive outcomes. 
Note that the parameters ߪ௎ and ߝாோ are not independent with between them governed by the 
equation ߝாோ ൌ െߠாோ െ ሺ1 െ ߠாோሻߪ௎ , where ߠாோ ≡  ݌ாோܧோ/ܫ  is the share of total consumption 
residents spend on energy. This relationship implies that ߪ௎ ൐ 0 and ߝாோ ൏ 0 have opposite signs, 
whereby the elasticity of substitution is positive while the own-price demand elasticity is negative.9 
Similarly, it can be shown that ߝா௑ ൌ െߠா௑ െ ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻߪ௑ with ߪ௑ ൐ 0 and ߝா௑ ൏ 0, where ߠா௑ ≡
݌ா௑ܧ௑/݌௑ܺ is the share of total revenue industrial firms spend on energy. 
Continuing, due to symmetry, all of the other inputs and outputs for the energy firms must be 
identical too: ܧ෠௜ ൌ ܧ෠௝  and መܼ௜ ൌ መܼ௝  for all firms ݅, ݆ ∈ ሺ1,… , ݊ሻ . Therefore, ܧ෠ ൌ ∑ 	௡௜ୀଵ ா೔ா ܧ෠௜ ൌ
∑ 	௡௜ୀଵ ଵ௡ ܧ෠௜ ൌ ܧ෠௜, and ܭ෡ா ൌ ܭ෡ா௜, መܼ ൌ መܼ௜, ܧ෠௑ ൌ ܧ෠௑௜ and ܧ෠ோ ൌ ܧ෠ோ௜; that is, knowing the proportional 
changes for a given firm in the energy sector reveals the proportional changes for the entire sector. 
                                                 
8 Suppose all firms in the energy sector are identical, then ݊ߝா௑ሺ݌ா௑∗ െ ݐா௑ሻ ൅ ݌ா௑∗ ൌ ߝா௑ ∑ ߛ௜௡௜ୀଵ ൌ ݊ߝா௑ߛ௜, rewrite to have 0 ൑ ሺ݌ா௑∗ െ ݐா௑ െ ߛ௜ሻ/݌ா௑∗ ൌ െ1/݊ߝா௑ ൏ 1. 9  In the partial equilibrium with fixed ܫ  and ݌௑ , we have ݀ܫ ൌ 0  and ݀݌௑ ൌ 0 . Since ܫ ൌ ݌௑ܺ ൅ ݌ாܧ , totally differentiating the income constraint gives ݀ܫ ൌ ܺ݀݌௑ ൅ ݌௑݀ܺ ൅ ݌ா݀ܧ ൅ ܧ݀݌ா , then െ݌௑݀ܺ ൌ ݌ா݀ܧ ൅ ܧ݀݌ா . 
Rearranging the above equation gives െ ෠ܺ ൌ ௣ಶா௣೉௑ ݌̂ா ൅
௣ಶா
௣೉௑ ܧ෠ . Moreover, since ߪ௎ ൌ
௑෠ିா෠ೃ
௣ොಶೃି௣ො೉  and ߝாோ ≡
డாೃ/డ௣ಶೃ
ாೃ/௣ಶೃ , 
rearranging the expression of ߪ௎ shows ߪ௎ ൌ ௑෠ିா෠௣ොಶ ൌ
௑෠ିா෠
ா෠ ߝா, then  
ܧ෠ߪ௎ ൌ ሺ ෠ܺ െ ܧ෠ሻߝா ൌ ቀെ ௣ಶா௣೉௑ ݌̂ா െ
௣ಶா
௣೉௑ ܧ෠ െ ܧ෠ቁ ߝா ⇒ ߪ௎ ൌ െ
௣ಶா
௣೉௑ െ ߝா ቀ
௣ಶாା௣೉௑
௣೉௑ ቁ  
⇒ ߝா ൌ െ௣ಶாூ െ
௣೉௑
ூ ߪ௎ ൌ െߠாோ െ ሺ1 െ ߠாோሻߪ௎. 
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Then, totally differentiating firm i's production function, ܧ௜ ൌ ܧ௜ሺܭா௜, ܼ௜ሻ, and substituting the 
remaining FOCs, and switching the firm-to-sector proportional changes leads to: 
ܧ෠ ൌ ݌௄ாܭாߛܧ ܭ෡ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
ߛܧ መܼ. (1.10)
Note that the zero-profits condition does not apply since the energy firms have market power. 
However, the constant returns to scale assumption (as discussed in Appendix A.2) implies that 
total production costs equal the input costs, ߛ௜ܧ௜ ൌ ݌௄ாܭா௜ ൅ ݐ௓ܼ௜, and then totally differentiating 
provides and again switching the firm-to-sector proportional changes yields: 
ߛො ൅ ܧ෠ ൌ 	݌௄ாܭாߛܧ ൫݌̂௄ா ൅ ܭ෡ா൯ ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
ߛܧ ൫̂ݐ௓ ൅ መܼ൯. (1.11)
Finally, recall the capital tax relationships, ݌௄ா ൌ ݍ௄ ൅	ݐ௄ா	and ݌௄௑ ൌ ݍ௄ ൅ ݐ௄௑, such that 
total differentiation yields: 
݌̂௄ா ൌ ߚாݍො௄ ൅ ̂ݐ௄ா, (1.12)
݌̂௄௑ ൌ ߚ௑ݍො௄ ൅ ̂ݐ௄௑, (1.13)
where ߚா ≡ ݍ௄ ݌௄ா⁄  and ߚ௑ ≡ ݍ௄ ݌௄௑⁄ , and define ̂ݐ௄ா ≡ ݀ݐ௄ா ݌௄ா⁄  and ̂ݐ௄௑ ≡ ݀ݐ௄௑ ݌௄௑⁄  
instead of using the prevailing definition of the “hat” notation so that both pre-existing ݐ௄ா and 
ݐ௄௑ can be assumed to be zero if necessary. That is, pre-existing capital taxes are not required in 
the model setup, but they can be analyzed if desired. The system is closed by setting capital as 
numeraire. Specifically, let ݍ௄ ൌ 1 such that: 
ݍො௄ ൌ 0, (1.14)
and as a result, equations (1.12) and (1.13) simplify to ݌̂௄ா ൌ ̂ݐ௄ா and ݌̂௄௑ ൌ ̂ݐ௄௑, respectively. 
Thus, the alternative specification for ̂ݐ௄ா and ̂ݐ௄௑, along with the numeraire definition, enables 
the elimination of parameters ߚா and ߚ௑ from the closed-form solutions.  
14 
 
Therefore, equations (1.1)-(1.14) define a system of linear equations in 14 endogenous 
variables ൛ܭ෡ா, መܼ , ܧ෠, ܧ෠ோ, ܧ෠௑, ܭ෡௑, ෠ܺ, ݌̂ாோ, ݌̂௑, ݌̂ா௑, ݌̂௄௑, ݌̂௄ா, ߛො, ݍො௄ൟ  and 5 policy variables, 
ሼ̂ݐ௓, ̂ݐாோ, ̂ݐா௑, ̂ݐ௄ா, ̂ݐ௄௑ሽ, given by the exogenous taxes that can increase, decrease, or hold constant. 
The initial policy analysis explores the impact of an increase in the pollution tax ሺ̂ݐ௓ ൐ 0ሻ holding 
the other policies constant ( ̂ݐாோ ൌ ̂ݐா௑ ൌ ̂ݐ௄ா ൌ ̂ݐ௄௑ ൌ 0). However, the impacts of other tax 
policies are also considered, such as taxing energy products, along with policies that combine taxes 
and subsidies that can address multiple distortions under a balanced-budget condition.  
Finally, the three additional log-linear equations below are not needed to solve the system but 
they are useful when assessing outcomes. The total profit obtained by these oligopolistic producers 
can be written as: Пா ൌ 	 ሺ݌ாோ െ ݐாோ െ ߛሻܧோ ൅ ሺ݌ா௑ െ ݐா௑ െ ߛሻܧ௑.  Totally differentiating the 
profit function yields: 
П෡ா ൌ ܧோПா ൣሺ݌ாோ െ ݐாோ െ ߛሻܧ
෠ோ ൅ ݌ாோ݌̂ாோ െ ݐாோ̂ݐாோ െ ߛߛො൧ 
൅ ܧ௑Пா ൣሺ݌ா௑ െ ݐா௑ െ ߛሻܧ
෠௑ ൅ ݌ா௑݌̂ா௑ െ ݐா௑̂ݐா௑ െ ߛߛො൧. 
(1.15)
To satisfy the budget balance condition, the lump sum transfer must be equal to all net tax revenue 
collected by the government, that is, ܶ ൌ ݐா௑ܧ௑ ൅ ݐாோܧோ ൅ ݐ௄ாܭா ൅ ݐ௄௑ܭ௑ ൅ ݐ௓ܼ . Totally 
differentiate the budget balance condition to obtain: 
෠ܶ ൌ ߠா௑் ൫̂ݐா௑ ൅ ܧ෠௑൯ ൅ ߠாோ் ൫̂ݐாோ ൅ ܧ෠ோ൯ ൅ ߠ௄ா் ൬ܭ෡ா ൅ ݌௄ாݐ௄ா ̂ݐ௄ா൰ 
൅ߠ௄௑் ቀܭ෡௑ ൅ ௣಼೉௧಼೉ ̂ݐ௄௑ቁ ൅ ߠ௓் ൫̂ݐ௓ ൅ መܼ൯, 
(1.16)
where ߠா௑் ≡ ݐா௑ܧ௑/ܶ, ߠாோ் ≡ ݐாோܧோ/ܶ, ߠ௄ா் ≡ ݐ௄ாܭா/ܶ, ߠ௄௑் ≡ ݐ௄௑ܭ௑/ܶ, and ߠ௓் ≡ ݐ௓ܼ/ܶ are 
the shares of total tax revenue from the unit tax on energy product (ܧ) sold to the industrial sector, 
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or the residents, and the share from capital tax, respectively. Totally differentiating the utility 
function ܷሺܺ, ܧோ; ܼሻ and rearranging provides: 
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠா
ோሻ ෠ܺ ൅ ߠாோܧ෠ோ െ ߤ ܼܫ መܼ, (1.17)
where ߣ is the Lagrange multiplier on the consumer’s income constraint such that the left-hand 
side of equation (1.17) becomes the percentage change in welfare. Also, ߤ ≡ െሺ߲ܷ/߲ܼሻ/ߣ ൐ 0 is 
the monetary value of utility from reducing one more unit of emissions or pollutions such that 
decreasing emissions raises consumer welfare, all else equal. 
 
1.3 Welfare 
This section derives welfare change formulae in the standard Harberger-triangle formulation. To 
start, totally differentiate the representative consumer’s utility function and substitute in the FOCs 
from the utility maximization problem to find: 
ܷ݀ ൌ ߲ܷ߲ܺ ݀ܺ ൅
߲ܷ
߲ܧோ ݀ܧோ ൅
߲ܷ
߲ܼ ܼ݀ ൌ ߣ݌௑݀ܺ ൅ ߣ݌ாோ݀ܧோ ൅
߲ܷ
߲ܼ ܼ݀. 
Then, Appendix A.3 further derives equations (1.18)-(1.20) in the Harberger style. Assume ݌௄௑ ൌ
݌௄ா  (implicitly ݐ௄ா ൌ ݐ௄௑ ൒ 0) for now, and find the change in welfare as a function of the 
proportional changes of energy sold ൫ܧ෠௑, ܧ෠ோ൯ and pollution ൫ መܼ൯: 
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ ቎ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ
ܧ௑
ܫ ܧ෠௑ ൅ ሺ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ
ܧோ
ܫ ܧ෠ோᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ெ௔௥௞௘௧	௉௢௪௘௥
቏ ൅ ሺݐ௓ െ ߤሻ Zܫ መܼᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௧௘௥௡௔௟௜௧௬
. (1.18)
As presented, equation (1.18) contains two types of distortions. The first distortion in brackets is 
an aggregated market power effect when price does not equal marginal cost. For example, if the 
price of energy sold to the industrial sector is more than the marginal cost of production  
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ሺ݌ா௑ ൐ ߛሻ, then the price is above the perfectly competitive outcome and too few transactions 
occur and so welfare increases when more output is sold ൫ܧ෠௑ ൐ 0൯, all else equal. The second 
distortion is the pollution externality effect. For this term, welfare improves when pollution falls 
൫ መܼ ൏ 0൯ if the prevailing pollution tax is less than the marginal damage from pollution ሺݐ௓ ൏ ߤሻ. 
Furthermore, this term shows that pollution can be overtaxed ሺݐ௓ ൐ ߤሻ  such that too much 
abatement occurs in the initial equilibrium compared to the social optimum and thus further 
reductions in pollution lead to welfare losses. Finally, if all the distortion effects on the right-hand 
side are zero (i.e., ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ ൌ ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ ൌ ሺݐ௓ െ ߤሻ ൌ 0), then current policies have achieved 
the first-best and no further change can increase welfare. 
Moreover, the aggregated market power effect in equation (1.18) can be decomposed into an 
oligopoly output effect and a price discrimination effect as shown in equation (1.19). The oligopoly 
output effect arises because imperfect competition allows oligopolistic firms to increase prices and 
reduce output. Output would be set at the monopoly level in the case of one firm (i.e., ݊ ൌ 1). A 
separate price discrimination effect occurs as the homogenous output is sold at different prices to 
residential consumers and the industrial sector. The three-effect form is given as: 
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ
ܧ
	ܫ ܧ෠ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ை௟௜௚௢௣௢௟௬	ை௨௧௣௨௧
൅ ሺ݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ሻܧோܧ௑ܧܫ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௉௥௜௖௘	஽௜௦௖௥௜௠௜௡௔௧௜௢௡	
൅ ሺݐ௓ െ ߤሻ ܼܫ መܼᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௧௘௥௡௔௟௜௧௬
, (1.19)
recalling that changes in energy production and sales are related by ܧ෠ ൌ ߮௑ܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோ. Indeed, 
the difference between the weighted average of the energy prices ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோሻ  and the 
marginal cost of production ሺߛሻ determines the size of the oligopoly output effect. Thus, increasing 
production raises welfare when the weighted average price is higher than the marginal cost. 
Regarding the price discrimination effect, assume the residential price is higher than the industrial 
price ሺ݌ாோ ൐ ݌ா௑ሻ due to relatively inelastic demand. Then, a relative increase in residential use 
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൫ܧ෠ோ ൐ ܧ෠௑൯ raises welfare as the energy buyers with the comparatively higher price, thus more 
distorted, will consume more.  
Consider the special case where price discrimination does not occur for either technical or 
legal reasons so that the homogeneous product has the same price across buyers (i.e., ݌ாோ ൌ ݌ா௑ ൌ
݌ா ). Then, the price discrimination distortion effect becomes zero since ݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ ൌ 0 . In 
equation (1.19), the oligopoly output effect simplifies to ሺ݌ா െ ߛሻሺܧ ܫ⁄ ሻܧ෠ where to size of the pre-
existing distortion is fundamentally determined by the gap between price and marginal cost. Also, 
one can show the market power effect in equation (1.18) simplifies to the same expression when 
the residential and industrial buyers face the same energy price. However, a different initial 
equilibrium would arise if price discrimination occurred (or not), and thus the welfare gains or 
losses across those two cases cannot be directly compared simply using equation (1.19).  
Next, put aside the externality effect for now, another essential question is when the price 
discrimination effect can offset output effect, if they can go oppositely. Theorem 1.1 provides 
conditions when the output and price discrimination distortions as defined in equation (1.19) have 
opposite signs with respect to the endogenous variables. To start, assume the normal case where 
environmental tax changes lower total output from the energy sector ൫ܧ෠ ൑ 0൯. That is, the perverse 
case – but possible situation in general equilibrium – where the possibility of tax combinations 
that reduce emissions but lead to energy output expansion is excluded. Then, reducing energy 
output lowers welfare since energy prices higher than marginal cost implies too little energy output 
at the initial equilibrium, all else equal. Also, it must be that energy sales to both end-user groups 
fall, or sales to one group rises and the other falls. Theorem 1.1 then formalizes the combinations 
of price and quantity conditions that would lessen the distortion from price discrimination. The 
intuition for this reduction in price discrimination distortion is that the more distorted submarket, 
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which is the less elastic one, can achieve either an increase from the initial equilibrium, or a smaller 
relative decrease than the other submarket, leads to a more efficient allocation of the output and 
thus a welfare gain.       
 
Theorem 1.1 Assume a policy lowers total energy sector output ൫ܧ෠ ൑ 0൯. If so, then the output 
distortion lowers welfare. Furthermore, without losing the generality, assume the residential 
consumers are less elastic and thus face a higher energy price (i.e., ݌ாோ ൐ ݌ா௑). If ܧ෠௑ ൏ ܧ෠ோ (note 
that we must have ܧ෠௑ ൏ 0, but ܧ෠ோ can be either positive or negative), then the price discrimination 
distortion lessens and has the opposite sign to the output distortion, and thus increasing welfare.  
Proof. See Appendix A.4 for all proofs. 
 
Continuing, Theorem 1.2 finds a necessary condition whereby welfare gains from reducing 
the price discrimination effect outweighs additional losses from output distortions under a policy 
such as increasing the environmental tax. That is, Theorem 1.2 says that the promotional change 
of the energy output to the less elastic submarket must be positive to yield a possible net welfare 
gain with respect to just the output and price discrimination effects under a change in policy. 
 
Theorem 1.2 Assume a policy lowers total energy sector output ൫ܧ෠ ൑ 0൯. Without losing the 
generality, assume the residential consumers are less elastic and thus face a higher energy price 
(i.e., ݌ாோ ൐ ݌ா௑). Then, a necessary condition to yield a net welfare gain with respect to the price 
discrimination and output effects is ܧ෠ோ ൐ 0 (implying ܧ෠௑ ൏ 0). 
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Although Theorem 1.2 is not that obvious from equation (1.19) directly, the economic intuition 
is straightforward. When total outputs decrease, we can still increase net welfare from reducing 
market distortions only if the more price-distorted submarket receives more outputs.  Furthermore, 
Theorem 1.3 provides a sufficient condition to yield a net welfare gain from the first two terms in 
equation (1.19) under the same conditions as in Theorem 1.2. 
 
Theorem 1.3 Assume a policy lowers total energy sector output ൫ܧ෠ ൑ 0൯. Without losing the 
generality, assume the residential consumers are less elastic and thus face a higher energy price 
(i.e., ݌ாோ ൐ ݌ா௑). Then, a sufficient condition to yield a net welfare gain with respect to the price 
discrimination and output effects in addition to ܧ෠௑ ൏ 0 is ܧ෠ோ ൐ ఝ೉ሺ௣ಶ೉ିఊሻఝೃሺ௣ಶೃିఊሻ ൫െܧ෠௑൯, or equivalently, 
ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ݀ܧ௑ ൅ ሺ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ݀ܧோ ൐ 0. 
 
The above sufficient condition means that the partial profit gain from the higher sale in the 
residential sub-market needs to override the partial profit loss due to the decreased energy products 
sold to the industrial sector, with the energy prices and marginal cost remain unchanged. To see 
this more clearly, we can totally differentiate the profit of the energy sector and have: 
݀Пா ൌ 	ܧோ݀ሺ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ ൅ ܧ௑݀ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ ൅ ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ݀ܧ௑ ൅ ሺ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ݀ܧோ. 
Although energy firms always attempt to maximize ݀Пா given any policy changes, the sufficient 
condition in Theorem 1.3 basically says that the portion of the profit changes resulted from quantity 
changes (the last two terms), in which the initial price and marginal cost remain fixed, need to be 
positive, and note that only quantity changes (i.e., ݀ܧ௑ and ݀ܧோ) affect utility directly as shown in 
equation (1.18). 
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Finally, assume different capital taxes, ݐ௄ா ് ݐ௄௑, and these differential taxes induce a pre-
existing distortion in the input market since ݌௄௑ ് ݌௄ா . In this case, the pre-existing capital 
distortions can be decomposed from the effects in equation (1.19) leading to: 
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ
ܧ
	ܫ ܧ෠ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐଵ
൅ ൬ݐ௄ா െ ݐ௄௑݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧ
ܫ ܧ෠ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐଶ
൅ ሺ݉ாோ െ ݉ா௑ሻܧோܧ௑ܧܫ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐଷ
൅ ሺݐாோ െ ݐா௑ሻܧோܧ௑ܧܫ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐସ
൅ ሺݐ௓ െ ߤሻ Zܫ መܼᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐହ
൅ ൬ݐ௄௑ െ ݐ௄ா݌௄ா ݐ௓൰
Z
ܫ መܼᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐ଺
, 
(1.20)
where ݉ாோ ≡ ݌ாோ െ ߛ െ ݐாோ and ݉ா௑ ≡ ݌ா௑ െ ߛ െ ݐா௑ are the pure profit portions of the energy 
prices after removing marginal cost and per unit commodity tax. The first term (ܹ1) is the direct 
oligopoly output effect due to market power. The second term (ܹ2) is a production distortion 
effect through pre-existing capital taxes. Thus, in the positive but differential capital tax case, 
ܹ1൅ܹ2 is a total market power effect. Similarly, the fifth term (ܹ5) is the direct externality 
effect and the sixth term (ܹ6) is externality correction effect through pre-existing capital tax 
distortion. If the capital tax structure favors the energy sector ሺݐ௄௑ ൐ ݐ௄ாሻ, then the energy sector 
employs more capital inputs than it would do so otherwise relative to pollution, and thus increasing 
pollution in the energy production process actually increases welfare with term ܹ6. Both terms 
ܹ2 and ܹ6 are zero when ݐ௄ா equals ݐ௄௑, such that the intensive margin capital distortion across 
sectors is eliminated.10  
                                                 
10 The total amount of capital is fixed and thus the model does not contain an extensive margin distortion unlike 
(Fullerton and Metcalf 2001).  
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Meanwhile, the third term (ܹ3) is the price discrimination effect through profit margins, and 
the fourth term (ܹ4) in equation (1.20) is an additional price discrimination effect induced through 
pre-existing commodity taxes (as distinct from the capital taxes). Even though the per-unit 
commodity taxes ݐாோ and ݐா௑ might be uniform on ܧோ and ܧ௑, respectively, the presence of price 
discrimination means the effective tax per unit differs across markets. Terms (ܹ3) and (ܹ4) will 
cancel out given uniform prices. The numerical analysis below mainly uses equation (1.20) when 
assessing welfare. 
 
1.4 Analytical Solutions 
This section presents the analytical solutions to the model presented in section 1.2 and where some 
of those endogenous variables apply to the welfare formulae identified in section 1.3. The system 
of linear equations (1.1)-(1.14) is solved to find the endogenous variables as a function of the 
policy variables (see Appendix A.5 for full solution details). Recall the numeraire definition 
ሺݍො௄ ൌ 0ሻ means that ݌̂௄ா ൌ ̂ݐ௄ா and ݌̂௄௑ ൌ ̂ݐ௄௑. However, the general solutions as functions of 
all the exogenous taxes are quite complicated, and thus to build intuition specialized results are 
first presented holding all the non-pollution taxes fixed. Then, general results are presented and 
analyzed to determine the sign changes of the endogenous variables. 
  
1.4.1 Environmental Tax Change 
Specialize the analytical solutions by holding the non-pollution tax policies constant relative to the 
numeraire such that ݌̂௄ா ൌ ̂ݐ௄ா ൌ 0 and ݌̂௄௑ ൌ ̂ݐ௄௑ ൌ 0 along with ̂ݐாோ ൌ ̂ݐா௑ ൌ 0. Also, assume 
the pollution tax exogenously increases ሺ̂ݐ௓ ൐ 0ሻ. Then, the closed-form solution for the marginal 
cost change becomes: 
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ߛො ൌ ߩ௓ா̂ݐ௓ ൐ 0,  (1.21)
and, thus the marginal cost of energy production ሺߛሻ always increases. This marginal cost increase 
in mediated by the share of pollution tax relative to total energy production costs ሺߩ௓ா ≡ ݐ௓ܼ ߛܧ⁄ ሻ. 
Since the cost share is less than one, then marginal cost increases by a smaller percentage than the 
pollution tax increase ሺߛො ൏ ̂ݐ௓ሻ. 
In this scenario, the energy prices too always increase relative to the numeraire (i.e., capital) 
and simply to: 
݌̂ா௑ ൌ ൬ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑൰ ൤
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ா௑ܧ൨ ̂ݐ௓ ൐ 0, (1.22)
݌̂ாோ ൌ ൬ ݊ߝாோ1 ൅ ݊ߝாோ൰ ൤
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ாோܧ൨ ̂ݐ௓ ൐ 0. (1.23)
These price changes are mediated by modified cost shares in the bracketed terms. However, the 
market power effects in the parenthesis terms also impact the energy price changes. From Section 
1.2 recall that ߝா௑, ߝாோ ൏ െ1/݊ and ݊ ൒ 1, and thus the terms in parenthesis are greater than one. 
Therefore, the energy price increases may be a greater percentage increase than the pollution tax 
depending on the strength of the market power effects ሺ݌̂ா௑ ≶ ̂ݐ௓, ݌̂ாோ ≶ ̂ݐ௓ሻ. 
The proportional price change for the industrial goods is given by: 
݌̂௑ ൌ ߠா௑݌̂ா௑ ൌ ߠா௑ ൬ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑൰ ൤
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ா௑ܧ൨ ̂ݐ௓ ൐ 0, (1.24)
where the bracketed term in equation (1.24) is the same as found in equation (1.22). The industrial 
price is also mediated by ߠா௑ ≡ ௣ಶ೉ா೉௣೉௑ , the share of the total revenue of the industrial firms that is 
spending on input ܧ௑. The price change for the final, industrial goods is always smaller than the 
energy input price change for the industrial sector since the energy input is subject to market power 
effects while the industrial goods are sold under perfect competition ሺ݌̂௑ ݌̂ா௑⁄ ൌ ߠா௑ ൏ 1ሻ. 
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The change in pollution is provided recursively according to: 
መܼ ൌ െሾߪ௎ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ߮ோሿሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ 
														െሾߪ௑ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሿ݌̂ா௑ 
								െ ൤ߪா ൬1 െ ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ൰൨ ̂ݐ௓. 
(1.25)
By inspection of equation (1.25), pollution necessarily falls as the price changes on the right-hand 
side as the bracketed terms are all positive, as long as ሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ ൐ 0, which is implied by ߪ௑ ൐
ߪ௎. The other quantity variables for this specialized scenario can be analyzed in a similar manner. 
However, not all of the quantity variables yield a definitive sign change.   
 
1.4.2 General Tax Changes 
If all the taxes are allowed to vary, then the closed-form, general equilibrium solution for the 
change in the marginal cost of energy production is given as: 
ߛො ൌ ߩ௓ா̂ݐ௓ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩ௓ாሻ̂ݐ௄ா. (1.26)
Here, the marginal cost of energy cost is positively related to the pollution tax and energy sector 
capital tax. However, the sign of ߛො can be negative when the capital tax sufficiently falls despite 
an increase in the pollution tax. 
Next, equations (1.27) and (1.28) provide the change in energy prices as a function of multiple 
taxes. Similar to the specialized results in equations (1.22) and (1.23), the number of oligopolistic 
firms (݊) and demand elasticities ሺߝா௑, ߝாோሻ mediate the energy prices changes as provided below: 
݌̂ா௑ ൌ ൬ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑൰ ൤
ݐா௑
݌ா௑ ̂ݐா௑ ൅
݌௄ாܭா
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௓൨, (1.27)
݌̂ாோ ൌ ൬ ݊ߝாோ1 ൅ ݊ߝாோ൰ ൤
ݐாோ
݌ாோ ̂ݐாோ ൅
݌௄ாܭா
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௓൨. (1.28)
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Again, the energy prices are increasing in the taxes. Importantly, the solutions in equations (1.27) 
and (1.28) remain valid for the entire range of competitive settings in the energy sector that can 
range from monopoly ሺ݊ ൌ 1ሻ to perfect competition ሺ݊ → ∞ሻ. 
Continuing, the price of the industrial sector output is recursively given by ݌̂௑ ൌ ߠா௑݌̂ா௑ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻ̂ݐ௄௑, and then equation (1.29) provides the closed-form solution as: 
݌̂௑ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻ̂ݐ௄௑ ൅ ߠா௑ ൬ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑൰ ൤
ݐா௑
݌ா௑ ̂ݐா௑ ൅
݌௄ாܭா
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௓൨, (1.29)
recalling ߠா௑ ≡ ௣ಶ೉ா೉௣೉௑  is the share of total revenue (and total expenditure) industrial firms spend on 
the energy input. Equation (1.29) demonstrates that the oligopolistic nature of the energy sector 
impacts output prices in other sectors through the input market (as mediated by ݊ and ߝா௑).  
Next, define the relative price changes as follows: ܣመ ≡ ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑, ܤ෠ ≡ ݌̂ா௑ െ ̂ݐ௄௑, and ܥመ ≡
̂ݐ௓ െ ̂ݐ௄ா  to simplify solutions for the endogenous quantity variables. Observe that term ܣመ 
represents relative price changes of ܧோ and ܺ. These are the two final products consumed by the 
residents and thus ܣመ must be associate with the elasticity of substitution in utility ሺߪ௎ሻ. Similarly, 
term ܤ෠  measures relative price changes of two inputs in the industrial sector, while term ܥመ 
provides the same for the energy sector.11 Therefore, ܤ෠  is associated with ߪ௑, and ܥመ with ߪா, in all 
solutions. 
The full set of endogenous quantity solutions are provided in Appendix A.5. Meanwhile, the 
focus below turns to the variables found in the welfare equations from section 1.3; specifically, 
መܼ , ܧ෠௑, ܧ෠ோ, and ܧ෠. Recall ܧ෠ ൌ ߮௑ܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோ where ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோ ൌ 1, and thus ܧ෠ is omitted below. To 
start, pollution as a function of the relative input prices is given by: 
                                                 
11 Note that ݌̂௄௑ ൌ ̂ݐ௄௑ and ݌̂௄ா ൌ ̂ݐ௄ா, and ݐ௓ is the price of pollution. Therefore, ܤ෠  and ܥመ  are relative changes of input prices in the industrial sector and energy sector, respectively.  
25 
 
መܼ ൌ െߪ௎ሾሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ߮ோሿܣመ 
																												െߪ௑ሾሺ1 െ ߱ாሻሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሿܤ෠  
																െߪாሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻߩ௓ாሿܥመ. 
(1.30)
Thus, equation (1.30) has a similar structure to the specialized result in equation (1.25), but in the 
general solution, all the terms on the right-hand side have ambiguous signs. Similarly, the 
ambiguous changes in energy sales and consumptions are provided by: 
ܧ෠ோ ൌ െߪ௎ሺ1 െ ߱ா߮ோሻܣመ െ ߪ௑ሾߠா௑ െ ߱ாሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሿܤ෠ െ ߪா߱ாߩ௓ாܥመ, (1.31)
ܧ෠௑ ൌ ߪ௎߱ா߮ோܣመ െ ߪ௑ሾ1 െ ߱ாሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሿܤ෠ െ ߪா߱ாߩ௓ாܥመ. (1.32)
The next section provides an analysis of the signs of the endogenous variables as well as the signs 
of the constituent terms. 
 
1.4.3 Policy Impacts on Pollution 
A major focus of this analysis is to investigate the effects of changing environmental taxes (or tax 
combinations) on emissions in a general equilibrium context given oligopolistic energy producers 
and price discrimination. To start, rewrite the proportional change emissions ൫ መܼ൯ as follows: 
መܼ ൌ ൫߮ோܧ෠ோ ൅ ߮௑ ෠ܺ൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
୓୳୲୮୳୲
୉୤୤ୣୡ୲
െߪ௑߮௑ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻܤ෠ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ୗ୳ୠୱ୲୧୲୳୲୧୭୬
୉୤୤ୣୡ୲ ୧୬ ଡ଼
െߪாሺ1 െ ߩ௓ாሻܥመᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ୗ୳ୠୱ୲୧୲୳୲୧୭୬
୉୤୤ୣୡ୲ ୧୬ ୉
. (1.33)
The first term in equation (1.33) is an output effect from weighted changes in final goods consumed 
by residents eventually. The proportional change in pollution is directly related to the proportional 
changes in total outputs produced by both producer sectors. 
The other two effects in equation (1.33) are substitution effects in the industrial sector and 
energy sector, respectively (noting that ߮௑ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻ and ሺ1 െ ߩ௓ாሻ must be positive by definition). 
Here, tax policy changes the relative input prices and induces substitution in production mediated 
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by elasticity parameters. For instance, a positive term ܤ෠  implies that energy becomes more 
expensive relative to capital in sector ܺ. As a result, firms in the industrial sector substitute from 
energy products into capital, this is from a “dirty” input to a “clean” one, and thus reduces 
emissions. Similarly, if the proportional change in the pollution tax is higher than the capital tax 
for the energy sector ൫ܥመ ൐ 0൯, then energy firms will shift to use more “clean” inputs to reduce ܼ 
through the elasticity of substitution ሺߪா ൐ 0ሻ.  
Since the terms ܣመ, ܤ෠ , and ܥመ contain multiple possible combinations of exogenous changes in 
different taxes, then the net effects tax policy is difficult to identify without the help of numerical 
analysis. Suppose that residents are less elastic in demand for energy products than the industrial 
firms (i.e., ߝாோ ൐ ߝா௑ or |ߝாோ| ൏ |ߝா௑|, and ߪ௑ ൐ ߪ௎), and the industrial sector ܺ is sufficiently 
large enough.12 Under these assumptions, Table 1.1 provides the signs of effects on these relative 
price-change terms if only one tax at a time is adjusted. For instance, if ̂ݐ௓ ൐ 0 then all pairs of 
relative input prices increase as defined. However, if ̂ݐா௑ ൐ 0, then ܣመ ൏ 0 but ܤ෠ ൐ 0 while the 
input price ratio in the energy sector is unchanged ൫ܥመ ൌ 	0൯. 
Next, Table 1.2 shows the effects of relative input price pair changes on inputs and outputs. 
(Appendix A.5 provides closed-form solutions for all inputs and outputs in the model with a format 
of linear combinations of terms ܣመ , ܤ෠  and ܥመ .) For example, equation (1.31) has three terms as 
functions of the input price pairs that determine the overall proportional changes in ܧ෠ோ . By 
                                                 
12 If ̂ݐ௓ ൐ 0 and all other taxes remain constant, then term ܣመ becomes:	
ܣመ ൌ ݊ߝாோ1 ൅ ݊ߝாோ
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௓ െ ߠா
௑ ݊ߝா௑
1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௓ ൌ ൬
݊ߝாோ
1 ൅ ݊ߝாோ
߮ோݐ௓ܼ
݌ாோܧோ െ
݊ߝா௑
1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑
߮௑ݐ௓ܼ
݌௑ܺ ൰ ̂ݐ௓. Also, if ߝா௑ ൏ ߝாோ ൏ െ1/݊, then:  ݊ߝாோ
1 ൅ ݊ߝாோ ൐
݊ߝா௑
1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑ ൐ 0. Thus, if the industrial sector ܺ is large enough (݌௑ܺ ൐ ߮௑݌ாோܧோ/߮ோ ൌ ݌ாோܧ௑), then: ߮ோݐ௓ܼ
݌ாோܧோ ൐
߮௑ݐ௓ܼ
݌௑ܺ ൐ 0. 
Under these conditions, ܣመ ൐ 0 when ̂ݐ௓ ൐ 0, and similarly it can be shown that ܣመ ൐ 0 when ̂ݐ௄ா ൐ 0. 
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inspection, ሺ1 െ ߱ா߮ோሻ and ߱ாߩ௓ா  are positive by definition and therefore ܧ෠ோ  moves inversely 
relative to ܣመ  and ܥመ , respectively. Also, increasing ܤ෠  results in decreasing of ܧ෠ோ  if and only if 
ሺ1 െ ߱ா߮ோሻߠா௑ ൐ ߱ா߮௑. This “normal” case holds under the following conditions: (i) the energy 
sector is not too big with respect to capital use; (ii) the industrial sector purchases sufficient energy 
as an input. Table 1.2 records these relationships for all inputs and outputs and shows that only 
pollution ൫ መܼ൯ and total energy production ൫ܧ෠൯ have negative signs for all terms. 
 
1.5 Numerical Analysis 
This section assigns plausible parameter values to the model to numerically explore relative 
magnitudes of effects on inputs, outputs, and welfare. The purpose of this numerical analysis is to 
explore the relative magnitudes of the theoretical effects derived from the general equilibrium 
model rather than to estimate or even predict the realistic effects of changes in environmental 
policies. 
  
1.5.1 Parameter Values 
The parameters selected reflect the U.S. economy in 2015. The pollutant selected for regulation is 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions although any pollutant or similar externality could be 
parameterized in the model. Unfortunately, some parameter values need to be assumed as those 
estimated by empirical literature may not fit the structure or assumptions of the model, or the data 
necessary to calculate the necessary parameters are unavailable. However, the numerical analysis 
is mainly for expositional purposes so the need to assume some parameters does not invalidate the 
exercise. 
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The current version of the State Energy Data System (SEDS) maintained by the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration's (EIA) provides the majority of data necessary to calculate the non-
elasticity parameters (EIA 2017). These data include consumption and prices by production and 
use sectors. However, since the analytical model only has one energy sector, all the various sources 
of energy sectors, like electricity generation or petroleum production, are collapsed to a single, 
composite energy sector. The energy consumption (and production) aggregation occurs using the 
energy content of the sources13 The price aggregation is the weighted average of the sector prices 
by total energy consumption (or production) of the sectors.  
Table 1.3 records the relevant SEDS data and subsequently calculated parameter values 
needed for the numerical analysis including energy consumptions and prices, and emissions. A 
national CO2 emission tax does not exist in the U.S., although, state and regional policies 
regulating emission from the electricity sector exist in such places as California and a Northeastern 
conglomerate of states under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).  The model requires 
an existing, initial tax and thus a $15 per metric ton CO2 tax is assumed following (Fullerton and 
Karney 2018). The marginal cost of energy production varies dramatically across energy sub-
sectors and thus it is assumed that the marginal cost is $13.76 per million Btu or 85 percent of the 
prevailing industrial energy price ሺ݌ா௑ሻ for the benchmark case. However, sensitivity analysis on 
this assumption shows that the main results hold when the percentage is varied by 10 percent in 
either direction. The gross domestic product of the U.S. in 2015 represents total income. Total 
                                                 
13 The full list of energy sources is summarized in Section 7 of the 2017 SEDS documentation. SEDS summarizes 
overall energy expenditure and price information for the country regardless of energy types. Thus, to calculate 
expenditure for each sector, SEDS adjusts energy consumption estimates to remove process fuel and other energy 
consumption (EIA 2017). To be consistent with SEDS’s estimates, all energy consumption values used in this 
numerical analysis are after SEDS adjustments and therefore the total here are smaller than total real consumptions. 
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capital endowment and shares of capital used in energy and other industrial sectors are calculated 
based on the constant return to scale production function. 
Although many studies provide empirical estimates of the price elasticity of demand for 
energy for both residential and other sectors, these estimates have wide confident intervals 
(Bernstein and Griffin 2006; Taylor 1975). Bernstein and Griffin (2006) summarize the results and 
indicate that the range of statistically significant estimates is from 1.1 to -1.87. Recent studies 
generally provide long-run estimates with mean estimates greater than -1 (and thus provide indirect 
evidence that current U.S. energy firms do not have perfect monopolistic power). Recall the 
relationship between residential and industrial prices, and associated elasticities, must be related 
according to the following identity:  
݊ሾሺ݌ா௑ െ ݐா௑ሻ െ ሺ݌ாோ െ ݐாோሻሿ ൌ െ݌ா௑ߝா௑ ൅
݌ாோ
ߝாோ . 
It is assumed the long-run price elasticity of demand for residential ߝாோ is -0.5, and the number of 
identical oligopolistic firms in the energy sector ሺ݊ሻ equals 4. Thus, the above identity dictates the 
industrial price elasticity of demand for the energy to be -0.76. Then, the elasticity of substitution 
for both the residents and the industrial sector can be calculated via the relevant price elasticity of 
demand. Next, the substitution elasticity between capital and fuel for the energy sector has been 
estimated in previous studies to range from 0.5 to 1.2 (Zha and Ding 2014). However, the 
proportional change in raw fuels is highly correlated with the proportional change in emissions, 
but this model does not distinguish between capital and fuel as differentiated inputs in the 
production of energy (recalling that standalone emissions appear on the input side of the energy 
sector’s production frontier). Thus, a small elasticity of substitution in energy production of 0.3 is 
assumed and sensitivity analysis shows the main result hold as long as the parameter value is 
greater than 0.1, all else equal. Tol (2005) summaries the marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide, 
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varying from $2 to $390 per ton of carbon from 28 published studies. This study uses a 
representative marginal damage of $34 per ton of carbon dioxide, which implies that the damages 
of the emissions are about 1 percent of GDP. 
 
1.5.2 Emission Tax and (Potential) Double Dividend 
As discussed above, this model with oligopolistic energy producers has three (potential) distortions 
in general equilibrium - insufficient production due to market power, negative externality when 
the prevailing tax is lower than the marginal damage, and price discrimination across user types. 
In this multiple distortion setting, using a single instrument may help correct one distortion while 
exacerbating another. For example, a higher emission tax reduces the negative pollution 
externality, but the resulting higher product price likely further distorts the production distortion. 
The double dividend hypothesis may help to deal with this problem whereby the revenue from an 
emission tax can be used to reduce other distorting taxes (Bovenberg and Goulder 1996; Fullerton 
and Metcalf 2001; Goulder 1995; Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw 1997). The presence of three 
distortions and many taxes in this model provides a multitude of options when implementing 
double-divided style policies.  
The benchmark case (Case 0) increases the emission tax by 10 percent and Table 1.4 reports 
the results of this policy change. Panel A records the policy change with the non-zero, exogenous 
policy highlighted in bold ሺ̂ݐ௓ ൌ 10 ൐ 0ሻ.  The other taxes are fixed with respect to the numeraire 
and thus recorded as zeros in the table. Then, Panel B records the resulting price and quantity 
changes due to the policy change; for example, the price of energy for industrial users increases 
more ሺ݌̂ா௑ ൌ 1.12%ሻ than the price for residential customers ሺ݌̂ா௑ ൌ 1.05%ሻ, and thus shrinks 
the relative gap in energy prices. Also, emissions fall by 3.49 percent as a result of the 10 percent 
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emission tax increase. Finally, Panel C reports the welfare changes using equation (1.20) translated 
into dollars after multiplying the percent welfare changes by total income (i.e., GDP). Overall, the 
benchmark case improves welfare by $1.58 billion (in 2015 dollars). The majority of welfare gain 
comes from a reduced pollution externality distortion but the price-discrimination distortion is also 
reduced as the gap between energy prices shrinks. However, the emission tax increase leads to 
greater energy sector production costs and thus further reduces equilibrium energy output with a 
greater production distortion effect that hurts welfare. 
To investigate the potential double-dividend feature of an environmental tax, Cases 1.1-1.4 
maintain the 10 percent emission tax increase but reduce ݐாோ, ݐா௑, ݐ௄ா, and ݐ௄௑, respectively, so 
that the proportional change of total net tax in the model ( ෠ܶ) remains at zero instead of lump-sum 
rebating the tax proceeds. Cases 1.1-1.3 yield larger total welfare increases than the benchmark 
case despite small reductions in pollution. However, Case 1.4 yields slightly lower welfare than 
the benchmark though more emission abatement occurs.  Also, these larger welfare gains come 
from different economic mechanisms. 
Case 1.1 has the largest welfare gain of any scenario presented in Table 1.4. Here, the pollution 
tax revenue is used to reduce ݐாோ by 19.68 percent and as a result, the residential energy price falls 
by 2.88 percent. This real fall in the residential price – not just relative to the industrial energy 
price as in the benchmark case – means the price discrimination distortion greatly diminishes and 
raises welfare by $1.38 billion. The falling energy price in one segment of the economy also lessens 
the decrease energy demand as total energy output only falls by -0.45 percent instead of -0.76 
percent in the benchmark case. Thus, the production distortion lowers welfare by merely $1.39 
billion instead of the benchmark’s $2.33 billion.  
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Case 1.2 finds an output distortion loss of less than $1 billion after reducing the tax on 
industrial sector energy purchases when recycling the emission tax revenue. However, the relative 
price difference across the energy goods widens as ݌ாோ increases by more than ݌ாோ, and leading 
to greater welfare losses from price discrimination. Yet, total welfare increases by more than the 
benchmark scenario. 
Case 1.3 (reduce ݐ௄ா ) has the second-largest welfare gain across scenario with an output 
distortion loss of less than $1 billion too and small welfare gains from a reduced price 
discrimination distortion. Also, this case has the smallest increase in energy sector marginal cost 
ሺߛො ൌ 0.30ሻ since all cases increase the pollution input cost by the same amount but the energy 
sector capital input tax falls here. This strategy can help reduced the insufficient production 
problem of oligopolistic producers when increasing correction tax on negative externality.  
Case 1.4 (reduce ݐ௄௑) is very similar to the benchmark case as the tax on industrial sector 
capital can only be slightly reduced by 0.02 percent as this composite sector employs the vast 
major of capital. The large capital tax base of the sector means only small changes in the tax can 
occur with the emission tax revenue. In contrast, Case 1.3 can lower the tax on energy sector capital 
by more than 6 percent as the tax base is smaller. The lowering of the tax on industrial capital 
slightly worsens the capital market distortion as the energy sector already pays a higher tax on its 
capital use. 
Overall, the majority of the policy scenarios presented in Table 1.4 lead to welfare 
improvements in this multiple distortions setting. In all scenarios, the direct tax increase on 
pollution leads to large welfare gains from the externality effect (see Panel C). However, the size 
and sign of the welfare changes for the other two distortions effects are sensitive to the exact policy 
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combination, and generally, the production effect welfare change is larger than the price-
discrimination effect welfare change. 
 
1.5.3 Policy combinations for fixed emissions reduction 
The results in Table 1.4 arise from policies that hold a constant emission tax at 10 percent. In 
contrast, Table 1.5 provides results when total emission reductions are fixed at the benchmark case 
with መܼ ൌ െ3.50 percent (as shown in the first column). Table 1.5 illustrates the point that the 
welfare impacts of matching the benchmark emission reduction vary greatly across policies.   
From Table 1.4, we know that Case 1.1 leads to the largest welfare gain from the revenue 
recycling policies but with less pollution reduction. Here, Case 2.0 mimics that policy but holding 
constant the pollution change, while optimizing over the pollution and residential energy tax 
changes. This case, along with Cases 2.3-2.5, maximizes welfare across the two tax instruments 
subject to the emission reduction and revenue-neutrality constraints. Case 2.0 provides a welfare 
increase of $3.7 billion, or $350 million more than Case 1.1 yields, by implementing a larger 
pollution tax increase of nearly 11 percent and thus generating more revenue recycling.  
However, it may not be feasible to increase the emissions tax and thus policymakers may 
attempt to reduce emissions via other, indirect tax instruments. The remainder of the scenarios 
presented in Table 1.5 analyze such circumstances as follows: Case 2.1, only allow ̂ݐாோ ൐ 0; Case 
2.2, only allow ̂ݐா௑ ൐ 0; Case 2.3, only allow ̂ݐாோ ൐ 0, the gained revenue can be used to reduce 
t௄ா , ݐ௄௑, or tா௑  with ෠ܶ ൌ 0; Case 2.4, only allow ̂ݐா௑ ൐ 0, the gained revenue can be used to 
reduce t௄ா, ݐ௄௑, or tாோ with ෠ܶ ൌ 0; and, Case 2.5, only allow ̂ݐா௑ ൐ 0, the gained revenue can be 
used to reduce t௄ா or ݐ௄௑ (but not tாோ) with ෠ܶ ൌ 0. 
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To start, Case 2.1 and 2.2 only allow ̂ݐாோ ൐ 0 and ̂ݐா௑ ൐ 0, respectively, and both cases lead 
to large, net welfare losses (recalling the welfare gain from the pollution externality alone is fixed 
and positive across all cases). In both cases, large production effect welfare losses of over $10 
billion accrue as the tax increases reduce energy production further below the competitive level. 
Here, መܼ ൌ ܧ෠ ൌ ܭ෡ா ൌ െ3.50 percent since the policy keeps the energy sector input prices constant 
in relative terms and thus the energy firms choose to scale their inputs and output in a constant 
proportion. For Case 2.1, a higher ݐாோ  further inflates the energy price gap between the two 
downstream markets and thus creates a large, negative impact on welfare via the price 
discrimination distortion effects. In contrast, Case 2.2 increases ݐா௑ reducing the price gap, but 
those welfare gains cannot overcome the large production distortion effect.  
For Case 2.3, the revenue raised from ݐாோ is used to reduce t௄ா , ݐ௄௑, or tா௑ subject to the 
revenue constraint and emission reduction target. As described above, Cases 2.3-2.5 maximize 
welfare across two or more tax instruments, but all the revenue has to be allocated to only one of 
the other taxes so the welfare maximum is checked across the available instruments for each case. 
Despite the revenue recycling available in Case 2.3, the results are similar to those in Case 2.1 
since the capital base for the composite industrial sector is large and thus the tax reduction per unit 
is small leaving the marginal incentives virtually unchanged.  
The numerical results from Case 2.4 and 2.5 provide positive welfare results. In Case 2.4, the 
best policy option is to increase the tax on ܧ௑ and use the revenue to subsidize ܧோ as the percent 
change on ݐாோ is greater than a 100 percent reduction.14 The large net welfare gain of nearly $17.2 
billion should be interpreted with caution as the tax changes in this case – as well as Case 2.1 and 
                                                 
14 To be clear, a -297.73 percent fall in ݐாோ means the tax goes negative by 197.73 percent relative to the initial tax;  that is, there is now a negative tax and hence an explicit subsidy. For example, an initial tax of $10/unit is now a 
subsidy of $19.73/unit. This interpretation follows because ̂ݐாோ and ̂ݐா௑ are defined relative to their initial tax such that ̂ݐாோ ൌ ݀ݐாோ ݐாோ⁄  and ̂ݐா௑ ൌ ݀ݐா௑ ݐா௑⁄ . 
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2.3 – are not “small” in concordance with a model that is linearized around an initial equilibrium. 
If the results are taken literally, then the subsidized energy price for residential users leads to over 
$24.1 billion in welfare gains for the price-discrimination distortion path, and therefore offsets the 
energy production loss effects. Regardless, the numerical results here help show the economic 
mechanisms within the model as well as the trade-offs faced by policymakers in this multiple 
distortions setting.  
Meanwhile, in Case 2.5 the increased revenue from raising the tax on ܧ௑ is used to cut tax on 
ܭா  and thus changes the relative price in the energy sector. 15  The marginal cost of energy 
production falls too as ߛො ൌ െ8.71 percent as the capital tax in the energy sector is cut in real terms 
although profits for the oligopolistic energy firms fall by 1.46 percent as a result of the tax on sales 
to the industrial sector. Regardless, the overall welfare gains in both Case 2.4 and Case 2.5 are 
higher than that for Case 2.0 and much larger than the benchmark case. Interestingly, the change 
in firm profits varies widely across the scenarios presented in Table 1.5 from -13.78 percent to 
32.90 percent. 
 
1.5.4 Parameter Sensitivity Analysis  
While many of the parameters and underlying data presented in Table 1.3 are well known, some 
other parameters are subject to greater uncertainty, such as the marginal cost of energy production 
ሺߛሻ and the elasticity of substitution in the production of energy ߪா. Table 1.6 provides results for 
sensitivity analysis on these parameters. The first column of the table repeats the benchmark case 
                                                 
15 Recall that while ̂ݐாோ and ̂ݐா௑ are defined relative to their initial tax the other tax changes such as ̂ݐ௄ா are defined relative to the price of the goods itself; for example, ̂ݐ௄ா ൌ ݀ݐ௄ா ݌௄ா⁄ . For Case 2.5, the initial ݐ௄ா is 20 percent of the capital price (normalized at $1), therefore ݐ௄ா ൌ $0.20 and ݌௄ா ൌ $1.2. For this scenario, ̂ݐ௄ா ൌ െ9.55 and thus ݀ݐ௄ா ൌ െ9.55 ∗ 1.2 ൌ െ0.1146. Thus, ݐ௄ா drops from $0.20 to $0.0854 per unit of capital and the new equilibrium price of capital in the energy sector is ݌௄ா ൌ $1.0854. 
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results and then Cases 3.1-3.4 keep the same policy changes as the benchmark but perform the 
sensitivity checks on the uncertain parameters. For Cases 3.1 and 3.2, the initial values for γ are 
set at $12.14 and $15.37, respectively, compared to the benchmark value of $13.76. Recall the 
benchmark marginal energy cost is set at 85 percent of the prevailing industrial energy price and 
these alternative values vary the percentage by 10 percent in either direction. For Cases 3.3 and 
3.4, the values for ߪா are set at 0.1 and 0.6, respectively, compared to the benchmark value of 0.3 
for the substitution elasticity. The results for Cases 3.1 and 3.2 are similar to the benchmark results 
in all respects exempt for firm profits and the production effect W1. For Case 3.2, the production 
distortion effect is significantly smaller since the initial marginal cost is now closer to the market 
price so the open-side of the Harberger triangle is smaller leading to less distortion, all else equal.  
Finally, Cases 3.3 and 3.4, have very different welfare effects. A small elasticity of 
substitution in the energy sector leads to welfare loses from the policy, while a higher ߪா leads to 
welfare gains. When ߪா is small then it limits the ability for firms to reduce per-unit emissions via 
a substitution effect and thus relies almost exclusively on the output effect to lower emissions. 
Thus, for a given tax increase a small elasticity of substitution yields less pollution reduction. In 
contrast, the higher ߪா in Case 3.4 means the firms can easily abate emissions, and thus the given 
tax increase is more effective at reducing emissions, leading to large welfare gains of $6.6 billion 
from the externality effect.  
 
1.6 Conclusion  
This paper studies the welfare and distributional effects of changing environmental taxes in a 
general equilibrium model under market power. In our model, the oligopolistic energy firms 
produce energy products as final goods to the residents and also as intermediate goods to other 
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industrial firms, and the government can change taxes on capital to both energy and industrial 
sectors, commodity taxes on energy products to both downstream markets, besides the traditional 
emission or pollution tax. The model allows us to explore the effects on the intermediate goods 
market and its pass-through effects on residents.  
We find closed-form solutions for the effects of a tax change in the presence of market power 
and price discrimination. All closed-form solutions can be written as a linear combination of three 
relative-price-change terms for each sector. The tradeoff of changing taxes for environmental 
purposes is among the gain from negative externality correction, the change from price 
discrimination distortion, the cost from enlarged distortion from an underproduction of 
oligopolistic goods, and even with the corresponding side effects with pre-existing tax distortions. 
The numerical analysis investigates the feature of double dividend, and provides cases to 
further explain the tradeoffs. We find that when the price discrimination effects are the more 
dominant one than the production distortion effects or externality correction effects, policy 
combination that reduces the difference between discriminatory prices in two downstream markets 
may perform even better than increasing emission tax directly to achieve the same emission 
reduction goal. 
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1.7 Tables 
 
Table 1.1 Effect of Tax Change on Relative Input Price Pairs 
 ܣመ ൌ ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ ܤ෠ ൌ ݌̂ா௑ െ ̂ݐ௄௑ ܥመ ൌ 	 ̂ݐ௓ െ ̂ݐ௄ா 
̂ݐ௓ ൐ 0 + + + 
̂ݐ௄ா ൐ 0 + + - 
̂ݐ௄௑ ൐ 0 - - 0 
̂ݐா௑ ൐ 0 - + 0 
̂ݐாோ ൐ 0 + 0 0 
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Table 1.2 Effects of relative price changes on inputs and outputs 
 Terms associated with 
 ܣመ ൌ 	 ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ ܤ෠ ൌ ݌̂ா௑ െ ̂ݐ௄௑ ܥመ ൌ 	 ̂ݐ௓ െ ̂ݐ௄ா 
ܭ෡௑ + + - 
ܭ෡ா - - + 
ܧ෠ - - - 
ܧ෠ோ - - (+) - 
ܧ෠௑ + - - 
෠ܺ + - (+) - 
መܼ - - - 
Note: Signs in parentheses occur when ሺ1 െ ߱ா߮ோሻߠா௑ ൏ ߱ா߮௑. 
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Table 1.3 Data and parameters for the numerical analysis of the general equilibrium model 
Symbol Explanation Value Unit 
ܧ Total energy consumption 65,104 Trillion Btu 
ܧோ Total energy consumption by residents 10,748 Trillion Btu 
ܧ௑ Total energy consumption by others 54,357 Trillion Btu 
݌ாோ Average price of energy to residents 23.03 $/Million Btu 
݌ா௑ Average price of energy to industrial 16.18 $/Million Btu 
ܼ Total CO2 emissions 5,259 Million Metric Tons 
ݐ௓ Per unit emissions tax 15.00 $/Metric Ton 
ߛ Marginal cost of energy production 13.76 $/Million Btu 
݊ Number of identical oligopolistic energy firms   4  
ߝாோ Residents’ price elasticity of demand for energy -0.50  
ߝா௑ Industry’s price elasticity of demand for energy -0.76  
ߠா௑ Share of total revenue of industrial firms that is spending on energy 4.94%  
ߠாோ Share of total income of the residents (GDP) that is spending directly on energy 1.37%  
ܫ Total income as gross domestic product 18,037 Billion Dollars 
ܭா Capital used in the energy sector 680 Billion Dollars 
ܭ௑ Capital used in the other sectors 15,372 Billion Dollars 
ݐ௄ா Capital tax on ܭா  20%  
ݐ௄௑ Capital tax on ܭ௑  10%  
߱ா Share of the total capital that goes to the energy sector 4.24%  
߮ோ Share of total energy products that sold to the residents directly 16.51%  
ߪா Elasticity of substitution in production of energy 0.3  
ߪ௎ Elasticity of substitution in utility function 0.49  
ߪ௑ Elasticity of substitution in industrial sector 0.74  
Note: The capital taxes are expressed in percentages here since capital is the numeraire. 
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Table 1.4 Effects of Emission Tax and Tax-Neutral Double Dividend Policies 
Case 0 Case 1.1 Case 1.2 Case 1.3 Case 1.4
Panel A: Exogenous Policy (in percent) 
̂ݐ௓ 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
̂ݐாோ 0.00 -19.68 0.00 0.00 0.00
̂ݐா௑ 0.00 0.00 -6.04 0.00 0.00
̂ݐ௄ா  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.63 0.00
̂ݐ௄௑ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02
Panel B: Closed-Form Solutions (in percent) 
ߛො 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.30 0.88
݌̂ா௑ 1.12 1.11 0.22 0.39 1.12
݌̂ாோ 1.05 -2.88 1.05 0.07 1.05
݌̂௑ 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03
ܭ෡௑ 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.02
ܭ෡ா -0.50 -0.19 0.04 0.03 -0.51
ܧ෠ -0.76 -0.45 -0.22 -0.25 -0.78
ܧ෠ோ -0.51 1.42 -0.52 -0.04 -0.52
ܧ෠௑ -0.81 -0.82 -0.16 -0.29 -0.83෠ܺ -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
መܼ -3.50 -3.19 -2.96 -3.16 -3.51
П෡ா  3.21 0.32 1.24 0.59 3.20෠ܶ  0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Welfare Effects (in 2015 $ million) 
Overall Total: 1,578.5 3,383.5 2,247.7 2,601.6 1,550.7
  
Output Effect: -2,328.1 -1,388.7 -681.1 -855.9 -2,375.9
- Term W1 -1,760.8 -1,050.3 -515.1 -647.4 -1,796.9
- Term W2 -567.3 -338.4 -166.0 -208.6 578.9
  
Price-Discrimination Effect:  183.6 1,375.9 -221.5 65.6 187.0
- Term W3 165.3 1,238.3 -199.3 59.0 168.3
- Term W4 18.4 137.6 -22.1 6.6 18.7
  
Externality Effect: 3,723.0 3,396.3 3,150.2 3,391.9 3,739.6
- Term W5 3,493.2 3,186.7 2,955.8 3,182.6 3,508.7
- Term W6 229.8 209.6 194.5 209.4 230.8
Notes: The bold cells indicate the exogenous policy parameters in panels A and B. In Panel C, 
cells are independently rounded such that sum totals may not equal the constituent parts. Terms 
W1-W6 are defined by equation (1.20). 
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Table 1.5 Effects of tax policy combinations to achieve the same emission reduction  
 Case 0 Case 2.0 Case 2.1 Case 2.2 Case 2.3 Case 2.4 Case 2.5
Panel A: Exogenous Policy Changes (in percentage) 
̂ݐ௓ 10.0 10.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
̂ݐாோ 0.00 -21.57 224.3 0.00 213.40 -297.73 0.00
̂ݐா௑ 0.00 0.00 0.00 39.25 0.00 91.35 92.94
̂ݐ௄ா  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -9.55
̂ݐ௄௑ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.25 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Closed-Form Solutions (in percentage) 
ߛො 0.88 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -8.71
݌̂ா௑ 1.12 1.24 0.00 5.86 0.00 13.65 2.82
݌̂ாோ 1.05 -3.16 44.85 0.00 42.68 -59.55 -10.41
݌̂௑ 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.29 -0.24 0.67 0.14
ܭ෡௑ 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.03
ܭ෡ா -0.50 -0.21 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -0.63
ܧ෠ -0.76 -0.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -0.88
ܧ෠ோ -0.51 1.55 -21.96 0.08 -21.02 29.34 5.13
ܧ෠௑ -0.81 -0.90 0.15 -4.20 -0.03 -9.99 -2.07
෠ܺ -0.02 -0.04 0.15 -0.06 0.15 -0.35 -0.08
መܼ -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50 -3.50
П෡ா  3.21 0.36 32.90 12.84 31.17 -13.78 -1.46෠ܶ  0.21 0.00 2.42 1.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Welfare Effects (in 2015$ million) 
Overall Total: 1,578.5 3,709.1 -20,571.6 -4,350.1 -19,877.1 17,185.7 5,440.8
    
Output Effect: -2,328.1 -1,522.3 -10,706.3 -10,706.6 -10,706.3 -10,706.3 -2,702.4
- Term W1 -1,760.8 -1,151.3 -8,097.4 -8,097.7 -8,097.4 -8,097.4 -2,043.9
- Term W2 -567.3 -370.9 -2,608.8 -2,633.4 -2,608.8 -2,608.8 -658.5
    
Price-Discrimination  
Effect: 183.6 1,508.3 -13,588.3 2,633.4 -12,893.8 24,169.1 4,420.2
- Term W3 165.3 1,357.4 -12,229.5 2,370.1 -11,604.4 21,752.1 3,978.2
- Term W4 18.4 150.8 -1,358.8 263.3 -1,289.4 2,416.9 442.0
    
Externality Effect: 3,723.0 
- Term W5 3,493.2 
- Term W6 229.8 
Notes: The bold cells indicate the exogenous policy parameters in panels A and B. In Panel C, cells are independently 
rounded such that sum totals may not equal the constituent parts. Terms W1-W6 are defined by equation (1.20). The 
tax combinations in Cases 2.3-2.5 maximize welfare across the two tax instruments subject to the emission reduction 
and revenue-neutrality constraints. 
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Table 1.6 Sensitivity Analysis  
 Case 0 Case 3.1 Case 3.2 Case 3.3 Case 3.4 Benchmark Low γ  High γ Low ߪா  High ߪா
Panel A: Exogenous Policy (in percent) 
̂ݐ௓ 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00̂ݐாோ ൌ ̂ݐா௑ ൌ ̂ݐ௄ா ൌ ̂ݐ௄௑  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Closed-Form Solutions (in percent) 
ߛො 0.88 1.00 0.79 0.88 0.88
݌̂ா௑ 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12
݌̂ாோ 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
݌̂௑ 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
ܭ෡௑ 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01
ܭ෡ா -0.50 -0.46 -0.52 -0.66 -0.24
ܧ෠ -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 -0.75 -0.77
ܧ෠ோ -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.50 -0.52
ܧ෠௑ -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 -0.80 -0.82෠ܺ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
መܼ -3.49 -3.46 -3.52 -1.66 -6.24
П෡ா  3.21 1.34 34.07 3.22 3.20෠ܶ  0.21 0.22 0.21 0.28 0.10
Panel C: Welfare Effects (in 2015$ million) 
Overall Total: 1,578.5 749.9 2,346.4 348.8 4,469.5
  
Output Effect: -2,328.1 -3,078.5 -1,585.5 -2,305.2 -2,362.4
- Term W1 -1,760.8 -2,575.3 -954.8 -1,743.5 -1,786.7
- Term W2 -567.3 -503.2 -630.7 -561.7 -575.7
  
Price-Discrimination Effect:  183.6 
- Term W3 165.3 
- Term W4 18.4 
  
Externality Effect: 3,723.0 3,689.7 3,748.3 1,772.7 6,648.3
- Term W5 3,493.2 3,462.0 3,516.9 1,663.3 6,237.9
- Term W6 229.8 227.8 231.4 109.4 410.4
Notes: The bold cells indicate the exogenous policy parameters in panels A and B. In Panel C, cells 
are independently rounded such that sum totals may not equal the constituent parts. Terms W1-W6 
are defined by equation (1.20). For Cases 3.1 and 3.2, the initial values for γ are set at 12.14 and 15.37, 
respectively, compared to the benchmark value of 13.76. Then, for Cases 3.3 and 3.4, the values for 
ߪா are set at 0.1 and 0.6, respectively, compared to the benchmark value of 0.3 for the substitution elasticity. 
 
44 
 
1.8 References 
Adachi, Takanori. 2005. “Third-Degree Price Discrimination, Consumption Externalities and 
Social Welfare.” Economica 72 (285): 171–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-
0427.2005.00407.x. 
Asch, Peter, and Joseph J Seneca. 1976. “Monopoly and External Costs: An Application of 
Second-Best Theory to the Automobile Industry.” Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 3 (1): 69–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(76)90013-9. 
Barnett, A. H. 1980. “The Pigouvian Tax Rule Under Monopoly.” The American Economic 
Review 70 (5): 1037–41. 
Baumol, William J. 1977. “On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct 
Industry.” The American Economic Review 67 (5): 809–22. 
Baumol, William J., and Wallace E. Oates. 1988. The Theory of Environmental Policy. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Baylis, Kathy, Don Fullerton, and Daniel H. Karney. 2014. “Negative Leakage.” Journal of the 
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 1 (1/2): 51–73. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/676449. 
Bernstein, Mark A., and James M. Griffin. 2006. Regional Differences in the Price-Elasticity of 
Demand for Energy. Citeseer. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.464.7523&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
Borenstein, Severin, and James Bushnell. 2015. “The U.S. Electricity Industry After 20 Years of 
Restructuring.” Working Paper 21113. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
https://doi.org/10.3386/w21113. 
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Lawrence H. Goulder. 1996. “Optimal Environmental Taxation in the 
Presence of Other Taxes: General- Equilibrium Analyses.” The American Economic 
Review 86 (4): 985–1000. 
Browning, Edgar K. 1994. “The Non-Tax Wedge.” Journal of Public Economics 53 (3): 419–33. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)90033-7. 
———. 1997. “A Neglected Welfare Cost of Monopoly—and Most Other Product Market 
Distortions.” Journal of Public Economics 66 (1): 127–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01613-1. 
Buchanan, James M. 1969. “External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure.” 
The American Economic Review 59 (1): 174–77. 
Chang, Juin-Jen, Jhy-Hwa Chen, Jhy-Yuan Shieh, and Ching-Chong Lai. 2009. “Optimal Tax 
Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities in a Dynamic Optimizing 
45 
 
Macro Model.” Journal of Public Economic Theory 11 (4): 623–51. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01423.x. 
Christensen, Laurits R., and William H. Greene. 1976. “Economies of Scale in U.S. Electric 
Power Generation.” Journal of Political Economy 84 (4, Part 1): 655–76. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/260470. 
Conrad, Klaus, and Jianmin Wang. 1993. “The Effect of Emission Taxes and Abatement 
Subsidies on Market Structure.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 11 (4): 
499–518. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(93)90022-5. 
Ebert, Udo. 1991. “Pigouvian Tax and Market Structure: The Case of Oligopoly and Different 
Abatement Technologies.” FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis 49 (2): 154–66. 
Ebert, Udo, and Oskar von dem Hagen. 1998. “Pigouvian Taxes Under Imperfect Competition If 
Consumption Depends on Emissions.” Environmental and Resource Economics 12 (4): 
507–13. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008215019489. 
EIA. 2016. Electric power monthly with Data for September 2016. USDOE Energy Information 
Administration, Washington, DC (United States).  
EIA. 2017. The State Energy Data System (SEDS). https://www.eia.gov/state/seds/, Washington, 
DC, United States. 
Fullerton, Don, and Garth Heutel. 2007. “The General Equilibrium Incidence of Environmental 
Taxes.” Journal of Public Economics 91 (3–4): 571–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.07.004. 
Fullerton, Don, and Daniel H. Karney. 2018. “Multiple Pollutants, Co-Benefits, and Suboptimal 
Environmental Policies.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 87 
(January): 52–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.003. 
Fullerton, Don, and Gilbert E. Metcalf. 2001. “Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents, and Pre-
Existing Distortions.” Journal of Public Economics 80 (2): 249–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00087-6. 
Fullerton, Don, and Gilbert E Metcalf. 2002. “Cap and Trade Policies in the Presence of 
Monopoly and Distortionary Taxation.” Resource and Energy Economics 24 (4): 327–47. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0928-7655(02)00012-X. 
Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski. 2014. “Optimal Taxes on 
Fossil Fuel in General Equilibrium.” Econometrica 82 (1): 41–88. 
https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10217. 
Goulder, Lawrence H. 1995. “Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Reader’s 
Guide.” International Tax and Public Finance 2 (2): 157–83. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00877495. 
46 
 
Goulder, Lawrence H., Ian W. H. Parry, and Dallas Burtraw. 1997. “Revenue-Raising versus 
Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Significance of Preexisting 
Tax Distortions.” The RAND Journal of Economics 28 (4): 708–31. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2555783. 
Harberger, Arnold C. 1962. “The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax.” Journal of Political 
Economy 70 (3): 215–40. https://doi.org/10.1086/258636. 
Kreps, David M., and Jose A. Scheinkman. 1983. “Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand 
Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes.” The Bell Journal of Economics 14 (2): 326–37. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3003636. 
Ma, Chunbo, and Lining He. 2008. “From State Monopoly to Renewable Portfolio: 
Restructuring China’s Electric Utility.” Energy Policy 36 (5): 1697–1711. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.01.012. 
Mas-Collell, Andreu, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford 
University Press. 
Misiolek, Walter S. 1980. “Effluent Taxation in Monopoly Markets.” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 7 (2): 103–7. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(80)90012-
1. 
———. 1988. “Pollution Control through Price Incentives: The Role of Rent Seeking Costs in 
Monopoly Markets.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 15 (1): 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(88)90023-X. 
Murry, Donald, and Zhen Zhu. 2008. “Asymmetric Price Responses, Market Integration and 
Market Power: A Study of the U.S. Natural Gas Market.” Energy Economics 30 (3): 748–
65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2006.10.002. 
Pepermans, G., J. Driesen, D. Haeseldonckx, R. Belmans, and W. D’haeseleer. 2005. 
“Distributed Generation: Definition, Benefits and Issues.” Energy Policy 33 (6): 787–98. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2003.10.004. 
Posner, Richard A. 1969. “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation.” Stanford Law Review 21 (3): 
548–643. https://doi.org/10.2307/1227624. 
Prabhakar Karthikeyan, S., I. Jacob Raglend, and D. P. Kothari. 2013. “A Review on Market 
Power in Deregulated Electricity Market.” International Journal of Electrical Power & 
Energy Systems 48 (June): 139–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2012.11.024. 
Smith, V. Kerry. 1976. “A Note on Effluent Charges and Market Structure.” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 2 (4): 309–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0095-0696(76)80007-1. 
Taylor, Lester D. 1975. “The Demand for Electricity: A Survey.” The Bell Journal of Economics 
6 (1): 74–110. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003216. 
47 
 
Tol, Richard S. J. 2005. “The Marginal Damage Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An 
Assessment of the Uncertainties.” Energy Policy 33 (16): 2064–74. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2004.04.002. 
Zha, Donglan, and Ning Ding. 2014. “Elasticities of Substitution between Energy and Non-
Energy Inputs in China Power Sector.” Economic Modelling 38: 564–571. 
 
  
48 
 
CHAPTER TWO: WIND ENERGY AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION: 
EVIDENCE FROM FARM-LEVEL DATA 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Wind energy is important for climate goals and has been developing rapidly over the last 15 years 
in the U.S., with annual generation growing from 11,187 GWh in 2003 to 254,303 GWh in 2017 
(U.S. EIA 2019). Wind generators currently provide roughly 6.3 percent of total U.S. utility-scale 
electricity generation, and the U.S. Department of Energy (U.S. DOE 2017) envisions that wind 
power could grow to 20 percent in 2030 and 35 percent in 2050. A unique feature of wind energy 
is that the footprints of wind farms often overlap with croplands. Wind turbine arrays can impact 
local agricultural production through two possible channels. First, landowners may purchase 
additional farm inputs or expand production with the royalties from leasing the airspace to wind 
developers (Kaffine 2019). Second, many studies suggest that wind turbines may affect 
agricultural production through microclimate effects or impacts on local ecosystems (Dai et al. 
2015; Rajewski et al. 2013; 2014). However, the existing scientific literature has not achieved a 
conclusion on the net effects of wind farms on agriculture mainly because field experiments are 
expensive and often suffer from the limitation of spatial representativeness. Therefore, well-
identified estimates of the net impacts of wind energy on agricultural production and outcomes on 
nearby farms would be helpful to quantify farmers’ welfare and to better design future renewable 
energy or agricultural policies.  
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In this paper, I provide estimates of the net effects of the development of wind energy on 
nearby crop yields, as well as operating expenses and farm incomes, based on the certified 
longitudinal farm-level data collected by the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management 
Association (FBFM) and the University of Illinois from 2003 to 2017. I exploit variation in the 
timing and spatial densities of sizable wind farm operations to study how they affect farm 
outcomes. My study provides several innovations relative to prior work (Kaffine 2019) that uses 
county-level data in the U.S. and finds positive effects of wind farms on neighboring crop yields 
with a straightforward reduced-form approach. First, I develop an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach based on local wind potential and aviation safety restrictions to deal with threats to causal 
identification. Using this IV approach, I find consistent but moderately larger positive effects 
compared to Kaffine's (2019) estimates. Second, I investigate two possible mechanisms that could 
lead to these positive effects of wind farms on crop yields: 1) my farm-level dataset provides me 
with a unique opportunity to directly examine whether operating expenses increase or not after 
wind turbines are installed nearby; and 2) my wind energy dataset includes the exact location of 
every wind turbine, and therefore, I can estimate microclimate effects using weather data at a fine 
grid level. Third, note that higher crop yields do not necessarily imply increases in net profits. 
Thus, this study further attempts to understand if the crop yield increases induced by nearby wind 
farms contribute to raising net farm income and operator returns, and, if so, to what extent. 
To identify the causal effects, I need to address measurement error and omitted-variable bias 
as two main sources of endogeneity. Measurement error may come from spatial spillover effects. 
I find some wind farms are concentrated on one side of county borders, with their footprints clearly 
truncated by administrative boundaries. However, the microclimate effects of these wind turbines 
can easily extend to adjacent counties. As a result, wind development indicators at the county level 
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that do not take this into account could result in an underestimate of the true impact due to the fact 
that they only increase in the county where the wind turbines are installed but remain unchanged 
in the adjacent counties. The omitted-variable bias problem may occur if the development of wind 
turbines is associated with local time-varying unobservables that can also affect agricultural 
production. For instance, the adoption rate of genetically engineered (GE) seeds, which is only 
available at the state level, has increased remarkably during the same study period in Illinois. 
Farmers’ attitudes toward new technology including wind energy may affect both the installed 
capacity of wind turbines and the adoption decisions of GE seeds.  
To deal with these challenges to identification, I develop a new instrumental variables 
approach. As a natural endowment, local wind energy potential measured by wind power class is 
a key driver for the development of wind energy. It is also exogenous and time-invariant (at least 
in the short term) in a given location, which implies that farm fixed-effects can largely capture its 
impacts on agricultural production. Therefore, given that the wind energy technology advancement 
and state-wide renewable energy policy changes across years are exogenous to crop yields, wind 
power class by year dummies could, in theory, work as instruments for the cumulative 
development of local wind energy. In practice, however, I find that they suffer from the weak IV 
problem. To enhance the correlation in the first stage, I notice that many proposed wind turbines 
could not be built because of their potential hazard to air navigation, and therefore I take aviation 
safety restrictions into consideration and construct feasible wind class (FWC) by year dummies as 
my new instruments. FWC is a simple function of multiplying wind power class by non-air-hazard 
ratio. I define the non-air-hazard ratio as the percentage of proposed wind turbine locations that 
receive determinations of “No Hazard to Air Navigation” based on the information provided by 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The development of wind energy will be largely 
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restricted in areas with a high likelihood to receive determinations of “Hazard to Air Navigation”, 
even though these areas may also have high wind potential. The basis for all air hazard 
determinations is aeronautical study findings. The airspace feasibility considers conditions far 
above the ground level and therefore provides plausibly exogenous variation with respect to 
agricultural activities.  
I find strong evidence that the development of wind energy has significant positive effects on 
nearby soybean and corn yields. In particular, given an additional 50 MW of wind capacity 
installed in the same county, my preferred estimates from the IV approach indicate that soybean 
and corn yields increase by roughly 1.2 and 1.9 bushels per acre, respectively, based on the level 
analyses, or by 1.9 and 1.6 percent, respectively, from the log-linear models. These estimated 
effects on crop yields, which are robust to different specifications, are moderately larger than 
extant estimates based on county-level data and reduced-form estimation strategies without 
addressing potential endogenous explanatory variables. My results further suggest that the 
marginal effects tend to diminish as the density of wind generators becomes higher. 
I then investigate two possible mechanisms that could lead to the increases in neighboring 
crop yields. One possible channel is through farm input or operation changes. People suspect that 
landowners receive lease payments from wind farms, and thereby may purchase additional farm 
inputs or expand production. FBFM data have detailed information on farm operating expenses, 
which provide me a unique opportunity to test directly whether farmers change their practices. 
With the help of farm-level observations, I find that crop acreage and per-acre farm operating 
expenses do not change measurably after wind turbines are installed nearby, suggesting that farm 
practices are unlikely to be changing significantly. A second possible channel is through changes 
in microclimates induced by the operation of sizable wind farms. Using fine-scale weather data 
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compiled by Schlenker and Roberts (2009), I implement a simple difference-in-differences 
analysis to test the microclimate effects of wind turbines at the 2.5-by-2.5-mile grid level. I find 
evidence that sizable wind farms have significant effects on the local climate, including growing 
degree days, extreme degree days, and precipitation. In particular, the growing season extreme 
degree days in grids close to a sizable wind farm decrease by about 2.2 to 2.6 percent after its 
installation. Overall, my results suggest that the microclimate effects induced by the operation of 
wind turbines are likely causing higher neighboring crop yields. 
In addition, to better understand how the induced positive effects on crop yields contribute to 
farm incomes, I explore the net impacts of nearby wind turbine arrays on crop revenue, net farm 
income, returns to operator labor and management, and returns to management (net farm income 
equals revenue less operating expenses and depreciation, and includes charges on invested capital 
or land, returns to unpaid family labor, and returns to operator labor and management).16 My 
results indicate that 50 MW of new wind capacity built in the same county raises crop revenue by 
$10.4 per acre (or 1.4 percent), which is roughly consistent with my estimated yield effects on 
soybeans and corn. Second, I find that net farm income increases by $5.26 per acre (or 2.9 percent), 
given the same condition as above. Since Illinois farmers are not particularly credit constrained, 
they should already be maximizing their net farm incomes as a function of inputs. Therefore, the 
                                                 
16 Crop revenue is defined by FBFM (Krapf et al., 2017) as: the sum of grain, seed, and feed sales; the value of 
homegrown seed used; the value of all feed fed (except milk); government farm program payments received and 
accrued; crop insurance payments received and accrued; and the change in value for feed and grain inventories, less 
the value of feed and grain purchased. 
Net farm income is defined by FBFM (Krapf et al., 2017) as: the value of farm production, less total operating 
expenses and depreciation, plus gain or loss on machinery or buildings sold. Net farm income includes the return to 
the farm and family for unpaid labor, the interest on all invested capital, and the management return. 
Returns to operator labor and management is defined by FBFM (Krapf et al., 2017) as: total net farm income, less 
the value of family labor and the interest, including net rent, charged on all capital invested. This figure is the residual 
returns to all unpaid operators’ labor and management efforts. 
Returns to management is defined by FBFM (Krapf et al., 2017) as: the residual surplus after a charge for unpaid 
family and operator labor and the interest or land charge on capital are deducted from net farm income. 
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fact that per-acre net farm income goes up is consistent with the insignificant changes in farm 
practices and further points to the induced microclimate effects. Third, I find relatively large 
increases in operator returns. In particular, for an additional 50 MW of wind capacity installed in 
the same county, my estimates show that returns to operator labor and management increase by 
$3.63 per acre (or 2.9 percent), and returns to management increase by $3.54 per acre (or 7.2 
percent). The fact that almost all the returns to operator labor and management are realized through 
higher returns to management is further evidence that microclimate changes are driving higher 
yields because the increase in operator returns does not appear to be driven by commensurate 
increases in unpaid operator labor. These estimates suggest that the development of wind energy 
may have large unanticipated positive effects on local farmers’ welfare. Given the corn and 
soybean prices and harvested acreage in 2017, my estimates imply an annual increase of $43.8 
million in total crop revenue or $22.1 million in total net farm income in Illinois alone from an 
additional well-dispersed 1,000 MW of wind capacity (or a 23 percent increase) installed within 
the state.  
This paper contributes to a large and growing literature on the externalities of wind energy, 
and even renewable energy more broadly.17 The economic literature has studied emission and 
pollution abatement from renewable energy (e.g., Chiang et al. 2016; Cullen 2013; Kaffine, 
McBee, and Lieskovsky 2013; Novan 2015), and other papers estimate the external effects of wind 
turbines on the value of nearby properties since wind turbines generate visual disamenities and 
noise (e.g., Dröes and Koster 2016; Gibbons 2015; Jensen, Panduro, and Lundhede 2014; Lang, 
Opaluch, and Sfinarolakis 2014; Vyn and McCullough 2014). Moreover, recent studies investigate 
the externalities of wind energy on various outcomes, for instance, costs of wake effects from 
                                                 
17 For further reference, Dai et al (2015) and Zerrahn (2017) provide comprehensive literature reviews with more 
details on wind power and its externalities from multiple perspectives, not limited to economic papers.  
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uncoordinated wind energy development (Lundquist et al. 2019), impacts of low-frequency noise 
on human health (Zou 2018), and net effects on crop yields (Kaffine 2019). In addition, this paper 
brings a new perspective, from wind energy, on the interactions among farm operations, 
agricultural policy, and renewable energy policy, which traditionally largely concentrate on the 
impacts of bioenergy and ethanol production on crop production, farmland value, land-use 
changes, and Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) enrollment decisions (e.g., Blomendahl, 
Perrin, and Johnson 2011; Henderson and Gloy 2009; Miao 2013; Motamed, McPhail, and 
Williams 2016; Peckham and Kropp 2015).  
 
2.2 Background 
This section briefly introduces the basic scientific mechanism underlying the microclimate effects 
of wind turbines. I then discuss the reasons why scientific literature has not achieved a consensus 
regarding the net effects of wind farms on agricultural production. 
Existing scientific literature has revealed the impacts of large wind farms on meteorology and 
possibly on climate, especially at local and regional scales. An array of wind turbines reduces wind 
speed and creates turbulence, which can enhance vertical mixing and exchanges of heat, moisture, 
and carbon dioxide in the wake of rotors when harvesting energy from the atmosphere (Adkins 
and Sescu 2018; Baidya Roy, Pacala, and Walko 2004; Rajewski et al. 2014). A typical scale of 
the length of wind turbine wakes can reach around 20 km and is not sensitive to the size of the 
wind farms or the local climate conditions (Abbasi and Abbasi 2016). Analyses based on model 
simulations also show that the impacts of wind turbines can extend to the scale of 10 km or even 
up to more than 50 km downwind (Abbasi and Abbasi 2016; Fitch et al. 2012; Fitch, Lundquist, 
and Olson 2013; Lundquist et al. 2019; Rajewski et al. 2013).  
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Only a few field experiments have measured air temperature, surface fluxes, and other 
variables from on-shore wind plants. Baidya Roy and Traiteur (2010) use observations from a 
wind farm in California and indicate that the wind farm warms near-surface air temperatures 
downwind during the night and early morning hours, but also leads to a cooling effect during the 
day. Smith et al. (2013) collect in situ data from a wind farm in the Midwest and find a strong 
warming effect at night and significant impacts on downwind wind speed and turbulence intensity. 
Similar phenomena have also been discovered by a comprehensive field campaign in Iowa called 
Crop Wind Energy Experiment (CWEX), which attempts to understand the impacts of wind 
turbines on the microclimate over cropland (Rajewski et al. 2013; 2014; 2016; Rhodes and 
Lundquist 2013).   
Since wind farms are often located on agricultural lands in the Midwest, large wind plants can 
potentially affect crop growth through their microclimate effects (Adkins and Sescu 2018; 
Armstrong et al. 2014; Baidya Roy and Traiteur 2010; Harris, Zhou, and Xia 2014; Rajewski et 
al. 2013; Xia et al. 2016; Zhou et al. 2012). Unfortunately, current scientific literature has not 
achieved a consensus regarding the net effects of wind farms on crop or vegetation growth, while 
some studies even find a limited or inhibiting effect (Tang et al. 2017; Xia and Zhou 2017). There 
are three major challenges. First, changes in heat, moisture flux, and carbon dioxide caused by 
large wind farms may have both positive and negative effects on crop growth, and the direction of 
the overall effect can vary across specific locations or weather conditions. Reports from the CWEX 
indicate that the warming effect at night may increase plants’ respiration, while the enhanced 
fluxes of carbon dioxide and water contribute to transpiration and photosynthesis in the daytime 
(Rajewski et al. 2014). Second, the signs and magnitudes of local climate changes due to wind 
turbines depend on many specific and complicated factors and conditions, not to mention the 
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interactions between the characteristics of turbines and the crop surface (Rajewski et al. 2014; 
2016).18 Short-term observations from a limited number of observation points in these expensive 
field experiments often suffer from uncertainties from cultivar, soil texture, and management 
techniques and may not obtain enough statistical power to distinguish true effects from the noisy 
background. Third, large wind farms may affect local ecosystems and productivity through other 
direct or indict channels besides microclimate effects, such as low-frequency noise, bird and bat 
mortality or disturbance, soil erosion, visual pollution, and path planning for tractors (Boyles et al. 
2011; Dai et al. 2015; Moravec et al. 2018; Zerrahn 2017).  
To deal with these challenges, Kaffine’s (2019) paper uses a reduced-form, econometric 
approach to identify the net impact of wind farms on neighboring crop yields, and takes advantage 
of the large number of observations to overcome the lack of representativeness issue. That study 
employs county-level crop and wind capacity data in the U.S. and finds that corn yields increase 
by about 1 percent with an additional 100 MW of wind capacity installed in the same county.  
 
2.3 Data  
This study assembles a unique and comprehensive dataset by combining FBFM farm-level 
production and expenses data, geographic locations and characteristics of wind turbines mainly 
from the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA), airspace obstruction determinations from 
the FAA, wind potential information from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. 
DOE, and meteorological variables compiled by Schlenker and Roberts (2009) based on the 
PRISM climate data. 
                                                 
18 Rajewski et al. (2014, 2016) indicate that the magnitude and locations of local climate changes are affected by the 
turbine characteristics (hub height, rotor diameter, blade style, blade pitch angle, and model-specific thrust and power 
coefficients) and the ambient conditions (atmospheric stability, wind direction, wind speed, and moisture conditions).  
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2.3.1 Farm Data 
My primary farm-level variables are from certified longitudinal data collected by the FBFM 
Association and the University of Illinois from 2003 to 2017. FBFM data include more than 90 
years of farm business records and have long been used in many studies in the field of agricultural 
economics (e.g., Barry, Bierlen, and Sotomayor 2000; Franken, Pennings, and Garcia 2014; 
Garcia, Sonka, and Yoo 1982; Garcia et al. 1986; Woodard and Verteramo-Chiu 2017). The 
dataset used in this study includes annual corn and soybean yields, farm incomes and returns, farm 
operating expenses, total operating acres, share of land-use for each crop, land ownership (owned, 
crop shared, and cash rented), farm types, percentage of land irrigated, percentage of feed fed, and 
soil productivity rate for each farm. Unfortunately, FBFM data only have the geographic location 
information of farms available at the county level, but do not reveal further details of farms’ 
specific locations.  
The FBFM data contain annual accounting and production records for more than 5,000 
participating farms in recent years, which is about one out of every five Illinois commercial farms 
with over 500 acres or total farm sales over $100,000 (Franken, Pennings, and Garcia 2014). About 
half of the total FBFM samples are qualified as certified data and released for this study. The 
FBFM educational service is available to all agricultural producers in Illinois for a fee, and farmers 
participate in this business analysis program voluntarily (Krapf, Raab, and Zwilling 2017).  
Since producers voluntarily choose to participate in the FBFM service each year, one might 
be concerned about the selection effects on enrollment related to the installation of wind turbines. 
Appendix Table B.1 lists the retention rates, defined as the percentage of this year’s farms that 
also took the survey the previous year. The overall average retention rate is about 80 percent for 
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all farms and 81 percent for farms in counties with installed wind capacity as of the end of 2017.19 
The retention rate differences between farms in panels A and B are relatively small compared to 
yearly changes. I do not find evidence that implies systematic selection in FBFM enrollments due 
to the development of wind energy.  
 
2.3.2 Wind Turbine Data 
The wind turbine data mainly come from the database managed by the AWEA, which provides 
specific geographic location, turbine model, capacity, and online year and month for each 
commercial wind turbine. I then merge the AWEA dataset with two other datasets, the United 
States Wind Turbine Database (USWTDB) from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the U.S. 
DOE and the Wind Turbine Location Data from the FAA, based on the spatial location of each 
turbine to provide complementary information.  
Since the FBFM data do not reveal the location information of farms below the county level, 
the wind development variables need to be constructed as a county-by-year panel so that both 
datasets can be merged. One of the primary explanatory variables generated in this study is wind 
capacity density (MW/square mile), which equals the total capacity of all installed wind turbines 
in each county divided by the county’s area, the same as in Kaffine’s (2019) paper. However, since 
many wind farms are located near county borders, the local impacts of wind farms can easily 
extend to neighboring counties, and therefore cannot be fully captured by the county-level wind 
capacity density. To deal with this spatial spillover effect, I develop another explanatory variable 
to reflect the local development of wind energy, wind area ratio, which is defined as the percentage 
                                                 
19 Note that an 80 percent retention rate does not mean that only 64 percent of farms would remain after two years or 
51 percent after three years. Although only 454 farms have complete records for all years from 2003 to 2017, most 
farms occasionally skip one or two years but reenter the FBFM system later. 
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of the county area that is within a certain distance (e.g., 10 km or 25 km) of a sizable wind farm in 
a given year. To avoid including isolated wind turbines, here “sizable” means at least 10 wind 
turbines.20 In Figure 2.1, the dark dots are existing wind turbines in and around the state of Illinois 
at the end of 2017; the inner buffer areas are within 10 km of a sizable wind farm, while the outer 
buffer areas are within 25 km of a sizable wind farm. Ideally, the buffer areas should be on the 
downwind side of wind farms if the impacts come from microclimate effects exclusively. 
However, the differences are likely attenuated, since 1) modern large wind turbines can rotate 
actively to face the wind direction; 2) both wind development variables wind capacity density and 
wind area ratio are aggregated at the county level and therefore not that sensitive to shifts of buffer 
areas; and 3) wind turbines may affect agricultural activities through other channels, which may 
not necessarily be on the downwind side.    
The Wind Turbine Location Data from the FAA also provide determination and status 
information of proposed wind turbine locations from Obstruction Analysis/Airport Airspace 
Analysis (OE/AAA). As shown in Appendix Figure B.1, FAA decides whether a potential location 
of wind turbine is hazardous to air navigation. If so, then further construction is not allowed. I use 
these air navigation restrictions as essential components to construct my instruments. Details of 
my IV approach are described in the empirical strategy section.  
 
2.3.3 Weather and Wind Potential 
I use the Fine-Scale Daily Weather Data for the Contiguous United States compiled by Schlenker 
and Roberts (2009) based on the PRISM climate data from 1998 to 2017. The raw data files use a 
weighted average of the ten surrounding weather stations and provide daily minimum and 
                                                 
20 Although I have to arbitrarily choose a threshold number of wind turbines to define what a sizable wind farm is, it 
turns out that the corresponding buffer areas are not at all sensitive to any threshold number from 5 to 16.  
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maximum temperature and precipitation at the 2.5-by-2.5-mile grid level (Schlenker and Roberts 
2009). Following previous literature, I construct growing season precipitation as the cumulative 
depth in mm of water from April 1 to September 30. Similarly, growing degree days (GDD) are 
the number of degree days between 10°C and 30°C, and extreme degree days (XDD) are the 
number of degree days above 30°C, during the same agricultural growing period every year.  
Wind power class data are from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the U.S. DOE. 
All areas are designated into seven classes, as illustrated in Appendix Figure B.2. Generally 
speaking, Class 1 areas have the least potential for the development of wind energy, while areas 
designated Class 3 or higher have adequate wind resources for utility-scale wind turbine 
applications. Class 2 areas are marginal for commercial wind turbines. Note that wind power class 
is a time-invariant variable, and county-level averages of wind power class have been calculated 
for further application. 
 
2.3.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for selected important variables in odd years at the farm 
level with simple identical weights. Panel A includes all farms, while panel B only includes farms 
from counties with wind capacity installed by the end of 2017. Both crop yields and wind energy 
have achieved remarkable growth during the same period from 2003 to 2017. Meanwhile, the 
number of farms participating in the FBFM declines in general, which is consistent with the 
decrease of the total number of farms in Illinois, but with a very similar trend in counties with or 
without wind energy development. As a natural consequence, the average acreage of farms 
increases in both panels.  
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Another interesting fact reflected by the summary table is that farms located close to wind 
turbines have relatively higher soil productivity rates than the state average, and therefore, higher 
yields on both corn and soybeans as well. Figures 2.2(a) and 2.2(b) provide box plots for the 
soybean and corn yields of farms located in counties with different exposure levels to wind turbines 
by the end of 2017, marked as “no exposure” if the wind area ratio (25 km) in 2017 is 0 percent, 
“less exposure” if between 0 and 60 percent, and “more exposure” if above 60 percent. Despite 
the fact that crop yield data are almost always full of noise, Figures 2.2(a) and 2.2(b) illustrate 
roughly a parallel movement pattern of the yield trends among farms in all three wind energy 
exposure categories. Although the gap in soil productivity rate between farms in panels A and B 
remains roughly the same throughout the study period, and it is hard to believe that energy 
companies intend to build wind turbines on better agricultural fields, any analysis that attempts to 
estimate the effects of wind farms on crop yields will need to address potential challenges from 
spatial spillovers, unobservable time-varying factors or unknown channels along with the existing 
trends of yield increase and farm expansion, especially when the wind-energy-affected buffer 
areas, as shown in Figure 2.1, are obviously geographically clustered in Illinois.  
 
2.4 Empirical Strategy 
This section introduces a typical ordinary least squares (OLS) strategy first. Next, I discuss two 
threats to identification from measurement error and omitted-variable bias and then suggest a new 
IV approach to identify the net effects of wind energy on local farm outcomes. 
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2.4.1 OLS Approach 
The econometric strategy in this study is based on a fixed-effects model that follows Kaffine 
(2019) and Deschênes and Greenstone (2007). The empirical regression model used to estimate 
the effects of wind farms on crop yields is:  
ݕ௜௖௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ ௖ܹ௧ ൅ ߠ ௜ܺ௖௧ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߳௜௖௧,  (2.1)
where ݕ௜௖௧ is the per-acre soybean or corn yield on farm ݅ in county ܿ in year ݐ and ߳௜௖௧ is the error 
term. Since the farm location is only available at the county level, my primary explanatory variable 
indicating the development of wind energy, ௖ܹ௧, needs to be aggregated at the county level. ௖ܹ௧ 
can be either wind capacity density as megawatts of wind capacity installed per square mile in the 
county or wind area ratio defined as the percentage of area that is within a certain distance (10 or 
25 km) of a sizable wind farm in county ܿ in year ݐ. Farm fixed-effects ߙ௜ control time-invariant 
farm characteristics such as topographic and geographic conditions. Year fixed-effects ߛ௧ absorb 
common annual shocks to yields over time, such as technology improvement. Besides fixed-effects 
controls, the vector of time-variant control variables at the farm level ௜ܺ௖௧ includes percentage of 
land irrigated, percentage of feed fed, share of land ownership (owned, crop shared, and cash 
rented), as well as farm size and soil productivity rates and their quadratic terms. All regression 
analyses are weighted based on the number of operating acres of the corresponding crop. Also, I 
only use farms that were in the system at least once before the installation of wind turbines nearby.  
The identifying assumptions of the OLS approach are: 1) crop yields on farms from wind-
energy-affected counties would have parallel trends as those that are far away from sizable wind 
farms in a counterfactual world with no wind turbines installed, and 2) no unobservable or 
uncontrolled for variables that affect agricultural production are correlated with wind energy 
development. 
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One might be concerned about the aggregation error when county averages of wind capacity 
density and wind area ratio are used in the regression model described by equation (2.1) since the 
true farm-level values of these wind energy indicators are not available, while all other variables 
are at the farm level. Unlike the classical measurement error that is uncorrelated with the truth, 
here the error is uncorrelated with the aggregated averages but necessarily correlated with the true 
farm-level values (Kirwan and Roberts 2016). Therefore, supposing no other source of 
endogeneity, within estimators using county averages will be consistent with estimates using farm-
level values in panel data.21  
 
2.4.2 Threats to Identification   
To identify the effects of the development of wind energy on local crop yields and farm operation 
activities consistently, I need to address two threats to identification: omitted-variable bias and 
measurement error.   
Some obvious control variables, such as farm operating expenses and local meteorological 
variables, are potentially endogenous, even though they have important explanatory power for 
agricultural outcomes. Farm operation costs may be endogenous through two possible channels. 
First, farmers may use the lease payments from wind energy companies to purchase additional 
production inputs like land, labor, capital, or fertilizer (Kaffine 2019). Second, farmers may change 
their behaviors based on their own observations, like crop growth level or pest damages, even 
                                                 
21 To see this, we have ௖ܹ௧ ൌ ௜ܹ௖௧ ൅ ݑ௜௖௧, where ௜ܹ௖௧ is the true wind development variable on farm ݅ in county ܿ in 
year ݐ, ௖ܹ௧ is the aggregated county average of ௜ܹ௖௧ in year ݐ, and ݑ௜௖௧ is the measurement error. Unlike the classical measurement error assumption that ܿ݋ݒሺ ௜ܹ௖௧, ݑ௜௖௧ሻ ൌ 0, here the error ݑ௜௖௧ is correlated with ௜ܹ௖௧ but uncorrelated with the average ௖ܹ௧, that is, ܿ݋ݒሺ ௖ܹ௧, ݑ௜௖௧ሻ ൌ 0. Assuming no other endogeneity, we can rewrite the model as ݕ௜௖௧ ൌߙ௜ ൅ ߚ ௜ܹ௖௧ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ ௖ܹ௧ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧ െ ߚݑ௜௖௧ . Therefore, in panel data, within estimators using county average ௖ܹ௧ will be consistent since ܿ݋ݒሺ ௖ܹ௧, ߝ௜௖௧ െ ߚݑ௜௖௧ሻ is zero and controlling individual and time fixed-effects can eliminate biases from the nonzero correlations ܿ݋ݒሺ ௖ܹ௧, ߙ௜ሻ and ܿ݋ݒሺ ௖ܹ௧, ߛ௧ሻ. 
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though farmers may not establish causal links between wind turbine installation and certain 
changes they have observed. 22 Moreover, since wind turbines can affect local climate, as discussed 
in the background section, they may also change common weather control variables used in 
agricultural models like GDD, XDD, or precipitation during the growing season. However, 
dropping these controls in farm operations and local climates may bring omitted-variable bias. 
In addition, the location selection of wind farms may be correlated with unobservable time-
varying local characteristics that can affect agricultural activities. For instance, during the same 
study period from 2003 to 2017, the adoption of genetically engineered (GE) seeds has expanded 
from 77 to 93 percent for soybeans and from 28 to 92 percent for corn in Illinois, and shifts have 
occurred among different types of GE technologies. However, the adoption rate information is not 
available below the state level. OLS estimates could be biased if the GE adoption decision of 
farmers was correlated with unobservable factors that might affect wind installation such as local 
farmers’ attitudes to new technology.  
Another source of threats to identification is measurement error. An ideal indicator for the 
development of wind energy would reflect both the density of installed capacity and the distance 
from a sizable wind farm at the local level. Unfortunately, neither wind capacity density nor wind 
area ratio is perfect. As shown in Figure 2.1, many wind farms are located near county borders 
and only on one side in particular, but the effects of wind turbines are not blocked by the 
administrative boundaries. By definition, wind capacity density at the county level only increases 
in the county where the wind farm has been installed but remains unchanged in the adjacent 
counties. As a result, failing to deal with the measurement error from spatial spillovers could result 
in a significant underestimate of the true impact of wind farms. On the other hand, wind area ratio 
                                                 
22 Mill (2015) indicates that landowners generally do not think that wind energy changes local weather patterns based 
on a survey.  
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takes the spatial spillovers into consideration roughly by allowing adjacent counties to be affected. 
However, it cannot effectively reflect the increase of wind capacity in nearby locations as long as 
the total number of wind turbines is above the “sizable” threshold (10 turbines here).23 Moreover, 
the effects of wind turbines on local climate are probably not evenly distributed within a perfectly 
round buffer area, which creates another type of measurement error.  
 
2.4.3 IV Approach  
In order to address these potential threats to identification discussed above, I need an IV approach 
designed to leverage exogenous variation that is essential to the development of wind farms but 
does not affect agricultural production. As a natural endowment, wind potential measured by wind 
power class is a key driver for the development of wind energy. It is also exogenous and time-
invariant, at least in the short term, in a given location, which implies that the farm fixed-effects 
can largely capture its impacts on agricultural production in general. In theory, I could use 
interactions of wind power class and year dummies as instruments for cumulative local wind power 
development, given that the wind energy technology advancement and state-wide renewable 
energy policy changes across years are exogenous to agricultural production. However, I find these 
instruments suffer from the weak IV problem.  
To enhance the correlation in the first stage, I take the navigation safety restrictions into 
consideration.24 According to the FAA, all air-hazard decisions are based on the aeronautical study 
findings “as to the extent of adverse physical or electromagnetic interference effect upon navigable 
                                                 
23 Since the associated buffer areas with 25 km or 10 km are much larger than the footprints of the wind farms, the 
buffer area of a dense array of 40 wind turbines is only slightly larger than that of a wind farm with 20 turbines. Note 
that this problem has nothing to do with the choice of the threshold used to define “sizable wind farms”. 
24 Involving air safety restrictions into the instrument construction can also eliminate other potential confounding 
effects. For example, one concern is that the effects of windy conditions on crop growth could possibly vary year by 
year, since wind can reduce the chances of disease by drying out plants faster in a wet season, or can remove water 
too quickly for plants to replace in a particularly hot season.  
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airspace or air navigation facilities” before any real construction or adjustment, and thus provide 
plausibly exogenous variation with respect to agricultural activities.25 FAA determinations can 
prevent wind turbines from being built in certain areas, even if these areas have high local wind 
potential. Therefore, integrating non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋ with wind power class can strengthen the 
instruments in the first stage.  
I construct a time-invariant instrument, feasible wind class, to reflect how easy or difficult to 
develop wind energy. Here feasible wind class is defined as ܨܹܥ௖ ≡ wind power class௖ ൈ
non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋௖ , where wind power class௖  is the area-weighted average of wind power 
class, which measures available wind resources for the development of commercial wind energy, 
in county ܿ. One complication with incorporating the air safety restrictions is that the FAA makes 
its determinations on a case-by-case basis and does not provide an overall local measure of air 
navigation restrictions. Therefore, I define the time-invariant non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋௖  as the 
percentage of proposed wind turbine locations that receive determinations of “No Hazard to Air 
Navigation” in county ܿ by the end of the study period (i.e., 2017) to reflect the overall restriction 
level on wind turbine construction due to airspace feasibility at the county level. Here I assume 
that non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋ with more wind turbine applications and FAA decisions in a certain area 
is approaching its true local measure. For counties with less than five applications by the end of 
2017, I assign the state average. Due to the concern that the decision of when to apply could 
potentially be endogenous, I only use the time-invariant non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋௖  in my main 
                                                 
25  FAA Order JO 7400.2M - Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters: Chapter 7, 7-1-1: “The basis for all 
determinations must be on the aeronautical study findings as to the extent of adverse physical or electromagnetic 
interference effect upon navigable airspace or air navigation facilities.”  
Also, Chapter 7, 7-1-3: “Issue a ‘Determination of Hazard’ (DOH) if the structure would have or has a substantial 
adverse effect; negotiations with the sponsor have been unsuccessful in eliminating the substantial adverse effect; and 
the affected aeronautical operations and/or procedures cannot be adjusted to accommodate the structure without 
resulting in a substantial adverse effect.”  
Available (on 06/26/2019) at: https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/7400.2M_Bsc_dtd_2-28-19.pdf. 
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specifications. 26  However, it is possible to use the time-variant non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋௖௧  to 
construct instruments, and, in fact, non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋௖௧  remains roughly consistent with its 
time-invariant version after receiving numbers of applications.27 I present the results based on 
time-variant FWC in the appendix. 
To account for cumulative development of wind energy, the first-stage regression uses FWC 
by year dummies as the instruments to estimate the wind development variables as follows: 
௜ܹ௖௧ ൌ ߙ௜ଵ ൅ ∑ ߩ௧ܨܹܥ௖ ൈ 1(t =year)௬௘௔௥ ൅ ߠଵ ௜ܺ௖௧ ൅ ߛ௧ଵ ൅ ߳௜௖௧ଵ . (2.2a)
I then use the predicted values of ௜ܹ௖௧ in the second-stage regression as follows: 
ݕ௜௖௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ ෡ܹ௜௖௧ ൅ ߠ ௜ܺ௖௧ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߳௜௖௧. (2.2b)
Using this strategy, the local average treatment effect will come from the variation in the difficulty 
of developing wind energy among counties due to local wind potential and airspace feasibility, 
given the same technology advancement level and overall renewable energy policy environment 
in any particular year. The identifying assumption is that my instruments can largely determine 
the installed capacity of wind turbines and exclusively affect agricultural activities through the 
channel of wind energy, and also requires parallel trends of the reduced form and no other 
confounding factors.  
In my main specification, the potential income channel through receiving royalties from wind 
energy companies might affect some control variables, like farm size, percentage of land irrigated, 
and share of land ownership. As a robustness check, I use only year and farm fixed-effects in 
                                                 
26 If the true measure of local air navigation restrictions is available, it would be an ideal component to construct my 
instrument, and the decision of when to apply will not be a concern anymore.  
27 People may argue that wind developers would not know air-hazard determinations from the latter years when they 
made decisions in earlier years, though non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋  remains roughly stable after receiving numbers of 
applications. As an alternative approach, I construct a time-variant ܨܹܥ௖௧  as wind power class௖ ൈ
non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋௖௧, where non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋௖௧ is defined as the percentage of proposed wind turbine locations that receive determinations of “No Hazard to Air Navigation” in county ܿ by the year ݐ. Again, state average by the 
year ݐ is assigned to counties with less than five applications.  
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addition to the wind development variables in one specification, which eliminates the chance of 
having any endogenous control variables. Next, I allow for more flexible controls with the 
interactions between farm characteristics and year dummies, which provides a robustness test of 
parallel trends, because if there is anything time-varying between farms in observable ways, that 
might also imply changes in unobservable ways.  
 
2.4.4 Mechanism Investigation  
Following the discussion in the background section with existing scientific literature, large wind 
farms could affect local meteorological variables. Using the weather dataset compiled by 
Schlenker and Roberts (2009) based on the PRISM data, I implement a simple panel regression 
model to test the microclimate effects of wind turbines at the 2.5-by-2.5-mile grid level: 
ݕ௚௧ ൌ ߙ௚ ൅ ߚ ௚ܹ௧ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߳௚௧, (2.3)
where ݕ௚௧ can be GDD, XDD, or precipitation during the growing season of grid ݃ in year ݐ. ௚ܹ௧ 
indicates whether the centroid of grid ݃ in year ݐ is within a certain distance (10km or 25km) of a 
sizable wind farm. Since the weather data provide exact geographic location information for each 
grid, here the primary explanatory variable ௚ܹ௧ does not need to be adjusted at the county level. 
Location and year fixed-effects are controlled by ߙ௚  and ߛ௧ , respectively. To prevent 
misinterpretation, note that the grid-level daily weather data compiled by Schlenker and Roberts 
(2009) are weighted averages from the closest ten weather stations rather than direct local weather 
observations. Therefore, the coefficients estimated from the above regression analysis are very 
likely to be underestimated.28 However, if results do reveal a significant effect, it is strong evidence 
                                                 
28 Note that the measurement error from using the weighted average of observations from closest ten weather stations 
does not satisfy the classical measurement error assumption, since it is probably correlated with the wind development 
variable ௚ܹ௧. Therefore, it is endogenous, even though it comes from the left-hand side of the regression.   
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that wind farms affect local climate. The purpose of this analysis is to test if sizable wind farms 
can affect weather variables, like GDD, XDD, and precipitation during the growing season. If so, 
these meteorological variables would confound the estimated effects of wind farm operations on 
nearby crop yields if these control variables were included.  
Since farmers might use their land lease payments to purchase additional inputs, my farm-
level dataset provides a unique opportunity to test directly whether farm operation outcomes are 
affected by the development of wind farms nearby. For this, I use the same 2SLS approach as 
described in equations (2.2a) and (2.2b). The wind energy development variable remains 
unchanged, so do farm and year fixed-effects. However, now the dependent variable ݕ௜௖௧ can be 
fertilizer costs, crop costs (sum of fertilizer, pesticide, and seed costs), power and equipment costs, 
building costs, labor costs, crop revenue, net farm income, and operator returns from farm ݅ in 
county ܿ in year ݐ.  
 
2.5 Results 
This section begins with results from the baseline specification, and then test the validity of my IV 
approach. Next, I provide more robustness checks. I further investigate two possible mechanisms 
that could lead to my findings. Finally, I estimate the effects of wind energy development on farm 
incomes and returns. 
 
2.5.1 Effects on Crop Yields  
Table 2.2 reports the primary results of the effects of wind farms on crop yields nearby. As 
soybeans and corn are two major crops in Illinois, panel A summarizes the results for soybeans 
and panel B for corn. OLS estimates based on equation (2.1) are in the first four columns, and 
70 
 
2SLS estimates outlined by equations (2.2a) and (2.2b) are in the last four columns. Moreover, 
odd-numbered columns (1a), (1b), (3a), and (3b) report estimates from regressions on per-acre 
yields of corn and soybeans, while the rest of the columns are based on log-linear models.  
All the specifications in Table 2.2 control for year fixed-effects, farm fixed-effects, and farm 
characteristics. Farm observations from different years are probably serially correlated, even after 
controlling for the fixed-effects. Moreover, agricultural activities on farms close to each other 
could have spatial autocorrelation due to unobservable spatial or social factors and policy 
similarities. The typical approach is to use the biggest or most aggregated clusters if possible 
(Abadie et al. 2017; Cameron and Miller 2015). Therefore, the standard errors are clustered at the 
county level in Table 2.2.  
My results show that all OLS and 2SLS coefficients of both wind capacity density and wind 
area ratio (25 km) are positive. Central estimates from 2SLS are larger than those from OLS. In 
panel A, all estimated effects of wind energy on soybean yields, except one, are positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level regardless of the level or log-linear models. In panel B, only 2SLS 
coefficients on wind development variables for corn yields are significant at the 10 percent level, 
while OLS estimates are still positive though not significant.  
Note that the unit of wind capacity density is megawatts per square mile, as defined in Kaffine 
(2019). However, this unit is actually very large. The overall wind capacity density in Illinois as 
of the end of 2017 is only 0.078 MW per square mile with 4,332 MW of wind capacity installed. 
The county with the highest wind capacity density reaches 0.526 MW per square mile, with 548 
MW of installed wind capacity. To interpret the coefficients of all column (a)s, I transfer the unit 
to a more reasonable marginal magnitude. Since the average county area in IL is 544.3 square 
miles, an additional 50 MW of wind capacity installed within a county means a 0.092 MW per 
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square mile increase in wind density.29 Given this relationship, a new wind farm with 50 MW of 
wind power capacity increases soybean yields by 1.2 bushels per acre and corn yields by 1.9 
bushels per acre based on column (3a), or raises soybean and corn yields by 1.9 and 1.6 percent, 
respectively, according to column (4a), within the same county. The estimates on wind area ratio 
(25 km) provide another perspective to look at the effects. From column (4b), we can observe that, 
with an additional 1 percent of county area located within 25 km of a sizable wind farm, average 
soybean yield increases by roughly 0.11 percent, and corn yield increases by about 0.08 percent. 
The fact that the point estimates on corn yield are significant at the 10 percent level but not lower 
is probably due to noisier yield observations and larger standard errors, since the actual magnitudes 
of the estimated effects on corn are very similar to those on soybeans as shown above. I should 
also emphasize that the main estimates in Table 2.2 are only valid at the margin, and I will test the 
concavity of the effects in the next section to help with interpretation and extrapolation. 
An essential identifying assumption underlying both the OLS and the IV approaches is that 
crop yields on farms located either close to or away from sizable wind farms have common yield 
trends before the installations of wind turbines. As mentioned above, areas that experience wind 
energy development happen to have relatively better soil quality and therefore relatively higher 
average yields, though it is hard to believe that energy companies intend to select better agricultural 
lands to build wind turbines. However, the obvious geographic cluster pattern of areas affected by 
wind energy raises the concern that they might be on a different long-run trend of crop yields than 
other areas, apart from the effects induced by wind energy. Although Figures 2.2(a) and 2.2(b) 
                                                 
29 Kaffine (2019) uses the county-level data in the U.S. and does the calculation with an additional 100 MW of wind 
capacity. However, the average county land area in the lower 48 states of the U.S. is 997.6 square miles, and about 
800 square miles for those with corn production according to Kaffine (2019), but only 544.3 square miles in Illinois. 
To be roughly consistent regarding the magnitudes, I use an additional 50 MW of wind capacity instead. 
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illustrate parallel movements of crop yields in general, I test the common pre-trends assumption 
formally with a flexible difference-in-differences specification: 
ݕ௜௖௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ∑ ߚఛ߱௖௧ఛିଵఛୀି଻ ൅ ∑ ߚఛ߱௖௧ఛ଻ఛୀଵ ൅ ߠ ௜ܺ௖௧ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߳௜௖௧, (2.4)
where ߱௖௧ఛ ൌ 1ሺݐ െ ௖ܶ ൌ ߬ሻ is a dummy variable taking the value of one when the county ܿ is ߬ 
years away from the initial wind development in year ݐ . 30  I estimate relative effects for a 
reasonably wide range of six years prior to the initial installation and six years post the first 
installation of wind turbines. To top and bottom code years beyond six years, here ߬ ൌ െ7 means 
seven years and above prior to the initial installation, and similarly, ߬ ൌ 7 means seven years and 
above away from the initial exposure. 
Figure 2.3 plots the estimated coefficients ߚመఛ and corresponding confidence intervals based 
on robust errors clustered at the county level. If the parallel trends assumption holds, one can 
expect all coefficients for both soybean and corn yields prior to the first wind development remain 
small and insignificant. The positive effects become more obvious after a few years from the initial 
development mainly because of a time gap between the installation of the first wind turbine and 
the proper operation of the whole wind farm. The estimates of soybean yield are consistently large 
from the second year after the first wind turbine was installed, though I do not have sufficient 
statistical power for these individual year effects. Although most of the coefficients on corn yields 
also become highly positive after a couple of years, they vary somewhat across years after the 
initial installation, which could possibly be due to the unbalanced and noisy panel data. These 
results also partially explain why the difference between the OLS and 2SLS estimates for corn 
yields are larger than those for soybean yields.  
                                                 
30 Here the initial wind development is defined as the year when the first non-isolated wind turbine was installed, or 
the wind area ratio (25 km) became larger than 25 percent even if no single wind turbine was built in the county, since 
I want to get rid of isolated one or two wind turbines and also want to take the spatial spillover effects into 
consideration more or less.  
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2.5.2 Validity of Instrumental Variables 
The above analyses rely heavily on the validity of the instrumental variables. The first condition 
is that FWC needs to be correlated with the development of wind farms, which is seemingly 
plausible. Of the two components used to construct the instrumental variables, wind power class 
measures wind resources available for commercial wind turbines, and non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋ 
determines the share of potential wind turbine projects that can move forward to construction. By 
using FWC rather than raw wind power class, the first-stage predictions have been enhanced, since 
some windy areas receive low scores for the possibility of wind energy development due to 
aviation safety restrictions. The results from the first-stage regression are illustrated in Figures 
2.4(a) and 2.4(b) for wind capacity density and wind area ratio (25 km), respectively. The 
coefficients of these earlier years are small or not significant probably because only a few wind 
farms were built before 2008. After that, the coefficients of FWC become positive, large, and 
significant. The general increasing trends of the first-stage coefficients over the years fit the 
development of wind energy well. Appendix Figures B.3(a) and B.3(b) illustrate the corresponding 
first-stage coefficients when using wind power class only. Although they are positive in later years 
as well, the standard errors are much larger than those with FWC, so that most of the coefficients 
are at the edge of being significant or insignificant at the 5 percent level. 
Another key condition of any IV approach is the exclusion restriction assumption, which 
requires that FWC can affect crop yields solely through the development of wind farms. A simple 
and straightforward test of the exclusion restriction assumption is to see if the set of FWC has any 
explanatory power in the regression on crop yields directly before the installation of wind turbines 
nearby. Figures 2.5(a) and 2.5(b) use a subsample of farms located in counties that had not been 
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affected by wind farms by 2012 for soybeans and corn, respectively. Since wind energy has been 
developed dramatically in recent years, I would lose too many observations, especially those in 
areas with high FWC, if I push the threshold year to later than 2012. None of the 18 estimates 
except one are significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, these coefficients do not have clear 
increase or decrease trends across the years from 2003 to 2011 comparing to the benchmark 
vertical line of 2012. These results support the claim that FWC does not significantly affect crop 
yields before the installation of wind turbines, which implies that the exclusion restriction 
assumption holds for the IV approach. 
To further rule out concerns on the construction of my instrumental variables, I provide two 
robustness checks. Appendix Table B.2 shows the results on the subsample without 30 counties in 
southern Illinois, since most of them did not have any proposed wind turbine by the end of 2017. 
One may be concerned that these counties are too different from counties in the north to be a good 
control group. Others may be concerned about assigning the state average of non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋ 
in constructing their local instrumental variables. However, the coefficients from Appendix Table 
B.2 have similar magnitudes as those from Table 2.2, though I lose statistical power due to the 
reduction in sample size. Moreover, as discussed in section 4.3 for my IV approach, one may also 
worry about the calculation of non-air-hazard	ݎܽݐ݅݋ based on information from the latter years. 
Appendix Table B.3 shows the results using time-variant feasible wind class (ܨܹܥ௖௧) to construct 
instrumental variables, and the estimates are similar to my main results.  
 
2.5.3 Other Robustness Checks  
The 2SLS estimates from Table 2.2 provide suggestive evidence of a positive net effect of sizable 
wind farms on crop yields. Table 2.3 further checks the robustness of the 2SLS estimates with 
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different specifications and controls. The estimates in columns (1a) and (1b) of Table 2.3 only 
control for farm and year fixed-effects. The estimates for soybeans from both columns are 
significant at the 1 percent level and corn estimates are also significant at the 10 percent level, 
which imply that these results are not being driven by potentially endogenous controls. Next, 
columns (2a) and (2b) in Table 2.3 allow more flexible controls for farm characteristics by 
multiplying them with year dummy variables. Again, the estimates from this specification remain 
almost unchanged, which imply the parallel trends hold since unobservable variations between 
farms are often reflected in observable ways as well. 
Columns (3a) and (3b) then control for farm operations. Farm inputs are essential to crop 
yields, and controlling for them would help identify the true impacts of wind farms on crop yields 
through the microclimate or ecosystem effects. However, landowners might expand farm 
production after receiving royalties from wind energy companies. Farmers might also change their 
agricultural practices based on observed changes resulting from the induced effects through 
microclimate or ecosystems without even knowing the causal relationship. The point estimates 
from columns (3a) and (3b) are almost identical to those in the previous columns correspondingly, 
which suggests that the farm input channel may explain the yield increases only to a limited extent.  
People may also argue that growing-season GDD and precipitation are important factors that 
can largely determine crop yields. In particular, prior literature often controls for both of them, 
along with their quadratic terms, in preferred specifications, and even involves interaction terms 
of weather variables with multiple fixed-effects in some specifications. The remaining two 
columns in Table 2.3 include these meteorological variables as controls. The coefficients on wind 
development variables estimated in these specifications remain in the same direction, and the 
estimates on soybean yields are still significant at the 1 percent level. The point estimates reduce 
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modestly compared to the rest of the columns in Table 2.3. However, these weather variables have 
probably reflected the microclimate effects induced by wind turbines, and therefore, should not be 
included as right-hand side control variables if the microclimate effects caused by wind turbines 
were the primary mechanism that leads to yield increases. To further investigate possible channels, 
I directly examine the effects of wind energy on farm operations and meteorological variables in 
the mechanism investigation section later. 
As an alternative robustness check, Appendix Table B.4 summarizes the results using the 
dummy indicator 1(Wc0) for the wind development, which takes value one after the first installation 
of wind turbines in county c. Similarly, panel A is for soybeans, and panel B is for corn. Column 
(1) only includes year and farm fixed-effects, column (2) further controls for farm characteristics, 
and column (3) adds farm operations on the right-hand side. To absorb any potential alternative 
local trends, I allow each county to have its own linear time trend in column (4). The 2SLS 
coefficients of the dummy wind indicators are positive and significant in most of these 
specifications for both crops. The magnitudes of the coefficients for both soybeans and corn remain 
almost the same in the first three columns. In the last specification, the estimate on soybean yields 
even has an increase with county-specific linear time trends controlled, but the corn one has a 
modest decrease and becomes insignificant mainly due to much higher standard error. 
If sizable wind farms cause the crop yield increases in neighboring areas, the effects should 
be larger in closer areas. To see this, I use a different threshold distance, 10 km, to calculate wind 
area ratio besides the 25 km threshold used in previous tables. Note that wind capacity density, 
wind area ratio (25 km), and wind area ratio (10 km) are very different in terms of determining 
which counties have been affected by wind energy. By the end of 2017, 31 counties have installed 
wind capacity but only 19 of them have sizable wind farms. There are 35 counties with a positive 
77 
 
wind area ratio (25 km) varying from 0.1 to 100 percent, but only 24 counties are defined as 
affected by wind energy based on wind area ratio (10 km), with values varying from 2 to 50 
percent. Although none of these variables measure the impacts of wind energy perfectly, estimates 
from using different wind development variables provide another robustness check. If the 
development of wind farms has causal effects on the crop yields of nearby farms, the estimated 
effects of wind area ratio (10 km) should be larger than those of wind area ratio (25 km). As shown 
in Table 2.4, the coefficients of wind area ratio (10 km) in column (3) are about double the 
magnitude of those of wind area ratio (25 km) in column (2) for both soybeans and corn, and 
significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Finally, to allow for non-linear effects of wind farms on crop yields, columns (4), (5), and (6) 
in Table 2.4 include a corresponding quadratic term of wind capacity density, wind area ratio (25 
km), and wind area ratio (10 km), respectively. All coefficients of the squared terms of wind energy 
variables are negative in both panels for soybean and corn yields, which suggests diminishing 
marginal effects, though I do not have enough statistical power. Again, central estimates are only 
valid at the margin. In particular, we must be cautious about projecting the potential effects on 
agricultural production too far away in areas with intensive growth of wind power capacity. 
 
2.5.4 Mechanism Investigation 
To investigate potential mechanisms that could lead to these findings, I directly examine the effects 
of wind energy on meteorological variables and farm operations. I find significant effects on local 
climate but do not detect measurable changes on farm operations after wind turbines are installed 
nearby. Therefore, my results suggest that the microclimate effects induced by the operation of 
wind turbines are likely resulting in the higher crop yields. 
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Table 2.5 presents results from a simple panel regression based on equation (2.3). The wind 
energy development indicator is time-variant, and shifts from 0 to 1 if a sizable wind farm has 
been installed within 25 km of the centroid of a grid. The “donut” regressions reported in columns 
(2), (4), and (6) do not include grids with their centroids located between 25 km and 40 km from 
any sizable wind farm built before the end of 2017. The estimates of the wind energy indicator 
within 25 km clearly show that the development of wind farms has significant effects on local 
meteorological variables. In particular, growing-season XDDs in grids within 25 km of a wind 
farm after its installation decrease by about 2.2 to 2.6 percent. Due to the fact that the grid-level 
daily weather data are weighted average observations from the closest 10 weather stations as 
described by Schlenker and Roberts (2009), the results presented in Table 2.5 tend to be 
underestimated, and therefore, cannot be interpreted as rigorous scientific evidence of 
microclimate effects resulting from the development of wind farms. However, these estimates are 
strong enough to show that all three weather variables, GDD, XDD, and precipitation, are 
endogenous as right-hand-side explanatory variables in regression analyses for crop yields or farm 
operations.  
The FBFM farm-level data provides a unique opportunity for further investigation of possible 
effects of the development of wind energy on farm practices. The results in Table 2.6 suggest that 
wind farms do not change farm operations in general, or at least, most effects are too minimal to 
be statistically detected with the currently available dataset. The coefficients of wind capacity 
density in panel A or wind area ratio (25 km) in panel B are all insignificant, except one, on both 
corn and soybean acreage and different operating expenses.31 
                                                 
31 Certain operating expenses are defined by FBFM (Krapf et al., 2017) as: 
Power and equipment includes depreciation, repairs, machine hire and lease, fuel and oil, and the farm share of 
expenses for electricity, telephone, and light vehicles. 
Labor includes hired labor plus family and operator’s labor, charged in 2016 at $3,800 per month. 
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2.5.5 Effects on Farm Incomes 
The next question is what these findings mean to farmers and policymakers. To answer this 
question, a proper accounting of the effects of wind turbines on farm incomes is important.  
Table 2.7 reports estimates on various farm incomes and returns based on different 
definitions.32 Not surprisingly, the estimates of both wind capacity density in panel A and wind 
area ratio (25 km) in panel B suggest positive effects on per-acre crop revenue, net farm income, 
returns to operator labor and management, and returns to management, as shown in columns (1) 
to (4). Similar to the interpretation of the results from Table 2.2, I multiply the coefficients by 
0.092 MW of wind capacity per square mile, which is derived from an additional 50 MW of wind 
energy capacity built within a county. The estimate from column (1) in panel A of Table 2.7 
implies a $10.4 per acre (or 1.4 percent) increase in crop revenue, which is consistent with the 
preferred estimates of the yield effects on soybeans and corn.  
Since Illinois farmers are not particularly credit constrained, they should already be 
maximizing their net farm incomes as a function of inputs. Therefore, it is likely that farmers are 
expanding production and using more inputs, if the per-acre net farm income, which is defined as 
the value of farm production less total operating expenses and depreciation, does not change when 
yields and crop revenue go up after the installation of wind turbines nearby. Instead, under the 
same conditions as above, the coefficient from column (2) in panel A, Table 2.7 indicates that per-
acre net farm income increases by $5.26 (or 2.9 percent). This finding further implies the 
insignificant changes in farm practices and points to the induced microclimate effects.  
                                                 
32 Please refer to footnote 16. 
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Moreover, I find relatively large increases in operator returns. In particular, for an additional 
50 MW of new wind capacity in the same county, my estimates from columns (3) and (4) show 
that returns to operator labor and management increase by $3.63 per acre (or 2.9 percent), and 
returns to management increase by $3.54 per acre (or 7.2 percent). Therefore, almost all the returns 
to operator labor and management are realized through higher returns to management. As the 
returns to operator labor and management include the returns to the operator(s) for unpaid labor 
and the returns to management, this is further evidence that microclimate changes are driving 
increased yields because the increase in operator returns does not appear to be driven by 
commensurate increases in unpaid operator labor. 
For a simple back-of-envelope calculation here, consider an additional 1,000 MW of wind 
power capacity installed in Illinois, which is about a 23 percent increase based on 4,332 MW 
installed by the end of 2017. Also assuming the incremental capacity spreads evenly across the 
whole state, this addition can increase wind capacity density by about 0.018 MW per square mile. 
Therefore, the estimated crop return increase is about $2.04 per acre based on the coefficient of 
column (1) in panel A, Table 2.7. Considering only the areas cultivated with soybeans and corn in 
Illinois, which is 21.5 million acres in 2017, the total potential increase in crop revenue is about 
$43.8 million per year. Similarly, the estimated annual increase in net farm income is about $22.1 
million under the same assumptions. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
This paper investigates the net impacts of sizable wind farms on local crop yields and agricultural 
activities at the farm level by using a new IV approach. I find that soybean and corn yields increase 
by roughly 1.9 and 1.6 percent, respectively, given an additional 50 MW of wind capacity installed 
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in the same county. The induced microclimate changes are likely the main contributors to these 
increases, as my results also show that the development of wind energy has significant impacts on 
local meteorological variables but does not measurably change farm operations. Moreover, I also 
find that farmers can obtain most of the benefits gained from the higher crop yields as returns to 
operator labor and management. The aggregate effect from this unanticipated positive externality 
of wind energy on agricultural production is fairly large in Illinois. 
Even with these non-negligible aggregate effects, the policy implications can be subtle. On 
one hand, landowners and wind energy companies can fully internalize the local impacts on the 
croplands where turbines are standing through the bargaining and leasing process, as long as both 
parties are fully aware of all possible positive and negative externalities. On the other hand, the 
microclimate effects of wind turbines and their positive impacts on crop yields can extend far 
beyond farm boundaries or even county borders. Therefore, policymakers may want to consider 
these positive spillovers to neighboring areas, along with other possible externalities of wind 
energy, when updating both agricultural and renewable energy policies.  
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2.7 Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 2.1 Installed wind turbines and 10 or 25 km buffer areas to sizable wind farms, by 
the end of 2017  
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(a) Soybeans 
 
 
(b) Corn 
Figure 2.2 Box plots of FBFM soybean and corn yield observations, 2003-2017 
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 (a) Soybeans 
 (b) Corn 
Figure 2.3 Yield differences in years before and after the first wind development 
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(a) Wind capacity density  
 
 (b) Wind area ratio (25 km) 
Figure 2.4 First-stage results with feasible wind class by year dummies as the instruments 
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 (a) Soybeans 
 (b) Corn 
Figure 2.5 Exclusion restriction test of the instruments on soybean and corn yields 
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics (odd years)  2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 
Panel A: All farms          
Corn yield (bushel per acre) 168.01 146.47 185.49 181.94 165.75 188.17 186.70 213.66 
(27.43) (27.03) (26.90) (22.94) (26.34) (25.96) (31.75) (31.12) 
Soybean yield (bushel per acre) 37.35 51.32 50.40 50.31 54.78 54.87 61.01 61.89 
(7.22) (7.73) (8.60) (8.14) (9.91) (8.78) (8.94) (8.69) 
Soil productivity rate 79.77 80.54 80.70 80.63 80.82 80.79 81.15 81.34  (12.57) (12.45) (12.24) (12.39) (12.37) (12.29) (12.06) (11.94) 
Operating acres 720.13 774.89 816.51 834.97 891.93 889.35 947.86 997.58  (587.64) (608.53) (652.21) (669.48) (930.76) (823.32) (889.63) (1119.42) 
Percent land owned 27.56 26.61 25.96 25.42 25.76 26.59 26.28 26.55  (29.69) (29.09) (28.51) (28.15) (27.90) (27.94) (27.68) (27.63) 
Wind area ratio (25 km, percent) 0.00 2.28 4.50 17.74 30.46 44.00 44.19 44.54   (8.21) (12.18) (26.32) (33.79) (39.15) (38.97) (39.36) 
Wind capacity density (MW/sqml) 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.038 0.089 0.133 0.133 0.140  (0.008) (0.010) (0.092) (0.134) (0.160) (0.160) (0.167) 
N 3042 2987 2826 2767 2788 2719 2737 2449 
Panel B: Farms in counties with wind farms installed by the end of 2017      
Corn yield (bushel per acre) 174.39 148.46 191.71 186.21 172.26 192.49 189.60 220.69 
(20.82) (26.50) (20.07) (20.45) (23.53) (24.46) (30.77) (22.10) 
Soybean yield (bushel per acre) 35.89 51.84 52.89 51.72 56.91 56.50 62.42 63.13 
(6.56) (7.39) (6.24) (7.35) (8.76) (8.07) (7.99) (7.80) 
Soil productivity rate 83.87 84.41 84.43 84.57 84.83 84.84 84.99 85.17 
(9.09) (8.89) (8.82) (8.75) (8.69) (8.48) (8.46) (8.23) 
Operating acres 659.37 716.20 751.56 770.01 845.14 838.76 884.71 959.60 
(506.32) (555.80) (592.95) (621.17) (1028.25) (859.53) (825.66) (1259.80) 
Percent land owned 26.38 25.71 24.88 24.51 24.54 25.51 25.19 26.06 
(29.78) (28.83) (28.18) (28.00) (27.47) (27.34) (27.08) (27.59) 
Wind area ratio (25 km, percent) 0.00 3.65 7.29 27.15 46.98 67.50 68.13 69.71 
(10.15) (14.84) (29.07) (32.98) (30.62) (29.90) (29.58) 
Wind capacity density (MW/sqml) 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.062 0.145 0.215 0.217 0.232 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.110) (0.145) (0.154) (0.153) (0.157) 
N 1835 1862 1743 1721 1715 1684 1681 1476 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.2 Effects of wind farms on soybean and corn yields, 2003-2017 
 yield - OLS ln(yield) - OLS yield - 2SLS ln(yield) - 2SLS  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Panel A: Soybeans         
Wind capacity density  
(MW/sqmi) 
5.460***  0.0983*** 12.89*** 0.203** 
(1.735) (0.0319) (4.773) (0.0878) 
Wind area ratio  
(25 km, %) 
0.0230*** 0.000405*** 0.0650*** 0.00110*** 
(0.00701) (0.000130) (0.0185) (0.000363) 
Observations 37924 36333 37924 36333 37924 36333 37924 36333 
Adjusted R2 0.669 0.667 0.646 0.644 0.666 0.661 0.645 0.641 
Panel B: Corn      
Wind capacity density 
(MW/sqmi) 
4.367  0.0331 20.26* 0.169* 
(5.960)  (0.0475) (11.31) (0.100) 
Wind area ratio  
(25 km, %) 
 0.0270 0.000193 0.0934*  0.000790*  (0.0278) (0.000207) (0.0505)  (0.000445) 
Observations 38853 37211 38853 37211 38853 37211 38853 37211 
Adjusted R2 0.726 0.727 0.629 0.630 0.725 0.726 0.627 0.628 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Farm characteristics include farm size (w/ quadratic term), soil productivity rate (w/ quadratic term), 
farm type, percentage of land irrigated, percentage of feed fed, share of land ownership (owned, crop shared, 
and cash rented). Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. Asterisks ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.3 Robustness checks of effects of wind farms on soybean and corn yields, 2003-2017 
 yield – 2SLS  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Panel A: Soybeans         
Wind capacity density 
(MW/sqmi) 
13.00***  13.43*** 12.41*** 10.11*** 
(4.747) (4.644) (4.441) (3.660) 
Wind area ratio  
(25 km, %) 
0.0654*** 0.0665*** 0.0631*** 0.0500*** 
(0.0184) (0.0174) (0.0172) (0.0145) 
GDD       0.114*** 0.113*** 
       (0.0135) (0.0139) 
GDD2       -0.0000350*** -0.0000344*** 
       (0.00000395) (0.00000407) 
Precipitation       0.0563*** 0.0562*** 
       (0.00732) (0.00725) 
Precipitation2       -0.0000428*** -0.0000424*** 
       (0.00000528) (0.00000515) 
Observations 37926 36335 37918 36327 37924 36333 37924 36333 
Adjusted R2 0.665 0.660 0.673 0.668 0.668 0.664 0.685 0.681 
Panel B: Corn      
Wind capacity density 
(MW/sqmi) 
19.78* 19.30* 18.64* 12.30 
(11.17) (10.38) (10.73) (9.577) 
Wind area ratio  
(25 km, %) 
0.0915* 0.0944** 0.0866* 0.0568 
(0.0499) (0.0458) (0.0478) (0.0442) 
GDD       0.406*** 0.382*** 
       (0.0505) (0.0462) 
GDD2       -0.000110*** -0.000105*** 
       (0.0000130) (0.0000127) 
Precipitation       0.126*** 0.133*** 
       (0.0413) (0.0413) 
Precipitation2       -0.000103*** -0.000107*** 
       (0.0000316) (0.0000314) 
Observations 38855 37213 38845 37203 38853 37211 38853 37211 
Adjusted R2 0.724 0.726 0.734 0.735 0.726 0.728 0.735 0.736 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year by characteristics No No Yes Yes No No No No 
Operating costs No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Note: Operating costs include fertilizer costs, crop costs (sum of fertilizer, pesticide, and seed), power and equipment 
costs, building costs, and labor costs. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. 
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.4 Diminishing marginal effects of wind farms on crop yields, 2003-2017 
 yield w/o quadratic terms yield w/ quadratic terms  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Soybeans       
Wind capacity density (MW/sqmi) 12.89*** 51.16 
(4.773) (38.36) 
Wind area ratio (25 km, %) 0.0650*** 0.317* 
(0.0185) (0.169)  
Wind area ratio (10 km, %)   0.141***   0.663 
   (0.0459)   (0.454) 
[Wind capacity density]2    -99.12   
    (103.9)   
[Wind area ratio (25 km, %)]2     -0.00270  
     (0.00184)  
[Wind area ratio (10 km, %)]2      -0.0149 
      (0.0134) 
Observations 37924 36333 37143 37924 36333 37143 
Adjusted R2 0.666 0.661 0.664 0.657 0.637 0.646 
Panel B: Corn    
Wind capacity density (MW/sqmi) 20.26* 57.71 
(11.31) (89.33) 
Wind area ratio (25 km, %) 0.0934* 0.219 
(0.0505) (0.415) 
Wind area ratio (10 km, %)   0.227*   0.229 
   (0.123)   (0.973) 
[Wind capacity density]2    -102.1   
    (236.3)   
[Wind area ratio (25 km, %)]2     -0.00136  
     (0.00408)  
[Wind area ratio (10 km, %)]2      -0.000300 
      (0.0269) 
Observations 38853 37211 38076 38853 37211 38076 
Adjusted R2 0.725 0.726 0.726 0.725 0.726 0.727 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. Asterisks ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Effects of wind farms on meteorological variables, 1998-2017 
 ln(GDD) ln(GDD)-donut ln(XDD) ln(XDD)-donut ln(precip.) ln(precip.)-donut  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
If within 25 km of wind farms 0.00152*** 0.00168*** -0.0223*** -0.0258*** -0.0133*** -0.0173*** 
(0.000219) (0.000229) (0.00273) (0.00286) (0.00136) (0.00144) 
Observations 177660 157660 177651 157651 177660 157660 
Adjusted R2 0.997 0.997 0.992 0.992 0.975 0.975 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Grid FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the grid level. The “donut” specifications 
reported in columns (2), (4), and (6) do not include grids with their centroids located between 25 km and 40 
km from any sizable wind farm built before the end of 2017. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.6 Effects of wind farms on farm operations 
 Corn Acreage 
Soybean 
Acreage Fertilizer Crop Total 
Power and 
Equipment Building Labor  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Wind capacity density       
Wind capacity density 
(MW/sqmi) 
-42.92 -41.14 0.937 -6.681 24.32 13.80 3.014 
(136.5) (139.1) (7.577) (12.17) (23.10) (9.169) (5.894) 
Observations 36281 36281 36278 36273 36281 36273 36268 
Adjusted R2 0.955 0.886 0.637 0.763 0.772 0.568 0.749 
Panel B: Wind area ratio     
Wind area ratio (25 km, %) -0.211 -0.318 0.00759 -0.0184 0.115 0.0651* 0.0128 
(0.684) (0.646) (0.0340) (0.0569) (0.100) (0.0368) (0.0272) 
Observations 34737 34736 34734 34729 34737 34729 34724 
Adjusted R2 0.975 0.901 0.638 0.765 0.773 0.574 0.745 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.7 Effects of wind farms on farm income and returns 
 Crop revenue (per acre) 
Net farm 
income  
(per acre) 
Returns to operator 
labor and management  
(per acre) 
Returns to 
management  
(per acre)  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  
Panel A: Wind capacity density     
Wind capacity density (MW/sqmi) 113.2** 57.17** 39.47* 38.50 
(56.56) (28.06) (23.21) (24.50) 
Observations 36281 36281 36281 36281 
Adjusted R2 0.839 0.358 0.330 0.330 
Panel B: Wind area ratio     
Wind area ratio (25 km, %) 0.592** 0.322** 0.238** 0.240** 
(0.250) (0.139) (0.108) (0.108) 
Observations 34737 34737 34737 34737 
Adjusted R2 0.839 0.352 0.322 0.320 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. Asterisks ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DO WIND FARMS CAUSE HIGHER INSECTICIDE USE? 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The wind energy industry has grown dramatically in the last two decades. The total installed wind 
power capacity in the U.S. has increased more than 40 times since 1999, from 2,472 MW then to 
105,583 MW in 2019 (AWEA 2019). However, wind turbines have long been accused of killing 
a large number of bats and birds, and thus may have lowered the natural predatory pressure on 
insects locally. The most recent estimates of annual wind turbine‐caused bird and bat fatalities in 
the U.S. are more than 3 million bats and about 415,010 to 1,111,219 birds (Smallwood, Bell, and 
Standish 2020). Since the footprints of wind farms often overlap with agricultural lands, the 
decline in natural pest-control can result in an increase in pesticide use nearby. Pesticides are 
widely used in U.S. agriculture, with farmers using about 1.2 billion pounds of pesticides every 
year (Donley 2019). The high level of pesticide use often raises concern, as a large scientific 
literature has investigated the toxicity of various agrichemicals and suggests that they have 
negative impacts on ecosystems and human health (e.g., Andersson, Tago, and Treich 2014). 
Furthermore, pesticides do not necessarily remain on the target field and can be carried by either 
wind or water, generating direct and indirect exposures. However, there is evidence that wind 
energy development can also be beneficial to local farm productivity (e.g., Kaffine 2019). 
Therefore, improving our understanding regarding the impact that wind farms have on local 
pesticide use will have implications for future wind energy expansion policies. As wind energy is 
projected to be the fastest-growing renewable energy source in 2020 (EIA 2020), the net effect on 
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farmers from the local impact of wind turbines on productivity, natural pest-control, and potential 
health consequences in neighboring areas is an important open empirical question. 
This paper exploits the temporal and spatial variation in the development of wind energy to 
investigate how sizable wind farms affect insecticide use nearby. We find evidence that the 
development of wind energy has significant positive effects on insecticide use. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to establish the causal relationship between wind 
energy and higher insecticide use. In order to study these effects, we construct a comprehensive 
panel dataset at the county-by-year level for the lower 48 contiguous states spanning 20 years from 
1999 to 2018. To identify the causal effects, we follow the fixed-effects panel regression model 
used by papers that study climate change, renewable energy, and/or agricultural productivity, such 
as Kaffine (2019) and Deschênes and Greenstone (2007). Since both bats and birds are flying 
animals that can travel across county borders, and as pesticides are non-point source pollutants, 
the impact of wind turbines on local ecosystems can easily extend to adjacent counties. To capture 
the potential spatial spillover effect of wind farms, we define our variable of interest as wind area 
ratio, which is the percentage of total county area that is within a certain distance: 10, 25, or 50 
kilometers, from a sizable wind farm in any given year. The wind area ratio can capture affected 
areas based on real geographic distance and is not restricted by the administrative county borders. 
This is different than previously used measures, for instance, the county-level wind capacity 
density, defined by Kaffine (2019), as megawatts of wind capacity installed per square mile. As 
this measure only captures data on wind development within the county, it will not take the spatial 
spillover effect into account. This might lead us to regard counties that are experiencing the effects 
of wind farms on local bats and birds populations as control counties, resulting in an attenuated 
estimate of the true impact.  
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In our results, we find that insecticide use increases by roughly 0.43 percent with an additional 
1 percent of county area located within 10 km of a sizable wind farm. When allowing the wind 
area ratios to include buffer areas of wind farms across longer distances, we should expect to see 
the wind energy effects on insecticide use become smaller if remote wind farms have less of a 
local effect on natural predator densities and insecticide use. Our analysis confirms this pattern, as 
the coefficient of wind area ratio (10 km) is more than double the size of that with a buffer distance 
of 25 kilometers, and about five times as the estimate based on wind area ratio (50 km).  
To allow the results to be directly comparable to previous work on wind energy development, 
we also test for the effects using the wind capacity density definition. We find that insecticide use 
increases by about 3.2 percent when an additional 100 MW of wind capacity installed in the same 
county. Using a log-log specification, our results show that the insecticide use increases by about 
0.38 percent when wind capacity density increases by 1 percent. We provide graphical evidence 
for the patterns recovered in these regressions using partial regressions plots, where we residualize 
insecticide use and wind development intensity on the county and state-by-year fixed effects. 
These plots help to validate a linear functional form between wind energy development and 
insecticide use, especially when counties have higher cropland ratios, as insecticide use is highly 
correlated with agricultural activities. 
We investigate if insecticides are already increasing in use prior to wind energy development, 
which could lead us to find a spurious correlation if wind energy is also increasing over time. To 
examine the common trends assumption, we implement a flexible difference-in-differences 
framework with dummy leads and lags from the initial exposure to sizable wind farm development. 
We find support in the data for a lack of pre-trends prior to the initial exposure to sizable wind 
farms, which we define as the year when the cumulative installed capacity reached 10 MW within 
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the county. However, the lag coefficients do not jump up immediately after the initial exposure. 
Instead, we find a gradual dynamics pattern, where insecticide use increases but only several years 
after the first wind energy development. These patterns are consistent with the fact that there is 
likely a time gap between the installation of wind turbines and their sequential impact on natural 
predators, and that many counties experienced a continuous development of wind energy in the 
following years, leading to intensifying pressure on birds and bats. To rule out further concerns on 
selection bias of counties that accept the installation of wind turbines, we provide robustness 
checks with various restrictions and controls, and our estimates are robust across different 
specifications. Furthermore, the test of Oster (2019) suggests that the bias from unobservables has 
to be way larger than the impact of the observables, including county and state-by-year fixed 
effects, to erase our estimated treatment effects, and therefore, it is less likely that omitted 
unobservable factors spuriously drive our estimates. 
This paper contributes to the literature on potential externalities of wind energy (e.g., Kaffine 
2019; Zou 2018; Kaffine, McBee, and Lieskovsky 2013; Novan 2015; Jensen, Panduro, and 
Lundhede 2014; Dröes and Koster 2016; Gibbons 2015), as well as environmental pollutions 
generated from agricultural production (e.g., Frank 2018; Taylor 2019; Rangel and Vogl 2018; 
Tschofen, Azevedo, and Muller 2019; Brainerd and Menon 2014; Larsen, Gaines, and Deschênes 
2017). The existing literature focuses on the impacts of climate change and environmental 
pollutions on ecosystems, agriculture, and economics, and various studies also investigate 
technical and policy approaches implemented to deal with environmental issues. This study 
provides a perspective that these approaches, such as renewable energy, may result in unexpected 
further impacts on local ecosystems, economics, and even human health. As a natural next step, 
our follow-up study will explore the effects of the development of wind energy on human health, 
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such as infant mortality and birth defects, and verify whether the local health effects of wind energy 
are through the induced higher use of insecticide or other possible channels. 
 
3.2 Background 
This section briefly introduces the scientific background on the effects of wind turbines on bat and 
bird fatalities, and then provide a literature review on pesticide use and its health impacts. 
 
3.2.1 Impact of Wind Turbines on Bats and Birds 
Many scientific studies investigate and estimate bird and bat fatalities caused by wind turbines, as 
wind energy expanded in recent decades. Given the installed wind generation capacity in 2012, 
Loss, Will, and Marra (2013) estimate that on average, in the contiguous U.S., 234,000 birds are 
killed annually by collisions with monopole turbines. Similarly, Erickson et al. (2014) estimate the 
range of wind turbine-caused bird fatalities to be between 214,000 and 368,000, and Smallwood 
(2013) quantifies the mortality impact as 573,000 birds, using data from a similar time period. 
Projecting these estimates to 2019 with current installed wind power capacity in the lower 48 states 
yields annual bird fatalities ranging from 415,010 to 1,111,219 birds (Smallwood, Bell, and 
Standish 2020). 
Unfortunately, the wind turbine-caused bat mortality rate is even higher than that of birds. 
Bats suffer both from direct collisions with the blades of the wind turbine, as well from abrupt 
changes in air pressure, known as barotrauma. Air pressure around the turbine blades can be about 
10 to 15 kPa lower (10-15% relative to the air pressure at sea level), which has been previously 
documented to cause deaths in rats, who have a similar body size, if not larger, to many bat species 
(Arnett et al. 2011; Hayes 2013; Kunz et al. 2007; Cryan and Barclay 2009).  However, the unique 
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respiratory system of birds makes them less susceptible to barotrauma than that of mammals 
(Baerwald et al. 2008). One additional important factor in explaining differential impacts between 
bats and birds is that bats exhibit a different behavioral response. Birds learn to avoid wind farms, 
while bats appear to be drawn to them, potentially because the wind currents around the blades are 
similar to those around trees, leading bats to dive and forage for insects (Cryan et al. 2014; Horn, 
Arnett, and Kunz 2008).  
Based on wind capacity in 2012, the estimate of annual wind turbine‐caused bat fatalities in 
the U.S. varies from 600,000 (Hayes 2013) to 888,000 bats (Smallwood 2013). Smallwood, Bell, 
and Standish (2020) then estimate annual fatalities in 2019 to be more than 3 million bats, which 
are more than the estimated nationwide mortality at 600,000 bats per year caused by a fungal 
disease known as White Nose Syndrome (Hopkins and Soileau 2018). A very recent study further 
implies that all these estimates could be underestimated, as they find that the estimated bat and 
bird fatalities could be 4.2 to 6.4 times and 1.6 to 2.7 times higher, respectively, based on dog 
searchers rather than human searchers (Smallwood, Bell, and Standish 2020). However, these 
estimates are often crude back-of-envelope calculations, that raise criticism about how accurate 
they are (Willis et al. 2010).  
Insectivorous birds consume about 400 to 500 million metric tons of prey every year (Nyffeler, 
Şekercioğlu, and Whelan 2018). Bats are also voracious predators of insects that eat more than 40 
percent, and up to 150 percent, of their body weight a night in insects. With population estimates 
ranging between half a billion to a billion bats in the U.S., this represents a sizable source of 
naturally provisioned pest control (Maine and Boyles 2015; Rodríguez-San Pedro et al. 2018; 
Whitaker 1995; Williams-Guillén, Perfecto, and Vandermeer 2008). Boyles et al. (2011) suggest 
that the value of bats in North America could be more than $3.7 billion to the agricultural sector 
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per year. Therefore, since wind turbines have killed large amounts of bats and birds, which could 
have lowered the natural predatory pressure on insects, this decline in natural pest-control can 
result in an increase in pesticide use nearby.  
 
3.2.2 Pesticide Use and Health 
As a substitute for naturally provided pest-control, pesticides, including insecticides, in particular, 
are by design toxic substances, and each of them is regulated by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Frank 
2018). The annual U.S. pesticide usage is about 1.2 billion pounds, based on 2016 estimates 
(Donley 2019). Although several scientific studies have revealed the negative effects of pesticides 
on ecosystems and human health, most estimates of the health impacts of pesticides cannot be 
considered as established and causal due to limitations such as non-random samples or small 
numbers of exposed subjects (Jurewicz et al. 2006; Andersson, Tago, and Treich 2014; Frank 
2018; Taylor 2019). Possible negative health effects include cancer (e.g., Alavanja, Ross, and 
Bonner 2013), depression and neurological deficits (e.g., Beseler and Stallones 2008), diabetes 
(e.g., Montgomery et al. 2008; Swaminathan 2013), birth defects and deaths (e.g., Garry et al. 
2002; Roberts and Karr 2012), and many others (see Andersson, Tago, and Treich 2014). However, 
most of the existing papers focus on the effects of certain pesticides on occupationally exposed 
groups such as farmers, and the effects of pesticide mixtures on human health are largely unknown 
(Hernández et al. 2013). Furthermore, spatial spillover effects may occur as pesticides are a non-
point source pollutant, which can spread with wind and water, and thus lead to indirect exposures 
(Frank 2018).  
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Two recent working papers in economics utilize natural incidents as sources of exogenous 
variation in changes of pesticide use. Frank (2018) exploits a natural experiment, where the sharp 
declines in bat populations caused by White Nose Syndrome lead to higher use of pesticides, to 
investigate the health effects of pesticide exposure, and finds a large and significant increase in the 
female infant mortality rate. Taylor (2019) levers on the mass emergence cycles of cicadas and 
their primary damages on woody plants as plausible exogenous variation in pesticide use changes, 
and provides evidence that higher pesticide use has negative impacts on infant health in the short-
run and may also result in lower test scores and higher dropout rates in the long-term.  
 
3.3 Data  
In this study, we construct a panel dataset at the county-by-year level for the lower 48 contiguous 
states spanning 20 years from 1999 to 2018. We first describe various data sources, including 
pesticide use, wind energy, cropland, and weather, in this section, and then provide summary 
statistics for selected variables.  
 
3.3.1 Pesticide Use 
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) water-quality studies provide estimates of agricultural use of 
pesticide compounds at the county-by-year level for the conterminous U.S. (Stone 2013; Baker 
and Stone 2015; Wieben 2019). The raw datasets provide the measure in kilogram per county for 
each chemical constituent. Frank (2018) classifies and aggregates these chemical compounds into 
three categories: insecticides, fungicides, and herbicides. This study uses the data compiled by 
Frank (2018) from 1999 to 2018, and normalizes the use amount into intensity by dividing the 
county area.   
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3.3.2 Wind Energy 
The wind turbine data are mainly based on the WindIQ database conducted by the American Wind 
Energy Association (AWEA). Two other datasets, the United States Wind Turbine Database 
(USWTDB) from the U.S. Geological Survey and the Wind Turbine Location Data from the 
Federal Aviation Administration, provide supplemental information. We merge these three 
datasets based on the spatial location of every wind turbine, and thus we construct a comprehensive 
wind turbine dataset, including geographic location, turbine model, capacity, and online year and 
month, for each wind turbine. 
We develop several variables to reflect local development of wind energy at the county-by-
year level so that the wind energy data can be merged with the pesticide use panel. One of the 
primary explanatory variables used in this study is wind capacity density (MW/square mile), which 
equals the total capacity of all installed wind turbines in each county divided by the county area, 
as defined by Kaffine (2019).  
However, the local impact of these wind turbines on bat and bird populations can easily extend 
to adjacent counties, and thus result in a spatial spillover effect on insecticide use as well. To deal 
with this issue, previous literature generates rough buffer areas based on wind farm location 
information from EIA-860 forms. Unfortunately, EIA-860 forms only provide a single geographic 
location for each wind farm, which is often far away from the centroid of the footprints of turbines 
owned by the same wind farm; and ignore whether all the belonging wind turbines are within the 
same county. This problem becomes especially severe for large wind farms that span sizeable 
areas. We take full advantage of our wind energy dataset at the turbine level, and implement 
another set of explanatory variables for local wind energy development, wind area ratio, which is 
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defined as the percentage of county area that is within a certain distance of 10 km, 25 km, or 50 
km from a sizable wind farm (e.g., at least 10 wind turbines in this study) in a given year. The set 
of wind area ratios can capture affected areas based on different real geographic distances and is 
not restricted by the administrative county borders. Figure 3.1 presents the locations of installed 
wind turbines by the end of 2018, as well as 10, 25, and 50 km buffer areas of sizable wind farms. 
 
3.3.3 Cropland and Weather 
The harvested cropland information is derived from the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (USDA NASS) online, which is reported in the U.S. Census of Agriculture every 5 years. 
Harvested cropland area from the 1997 Census of Agriculture is used as the sample weight in our 
main analyses, since the development of wind energy may have affected agricultural activities and 
thus we choose the closest year before our study period. 
We use the Fine-Scale Daily Weather Data for the Contiguous United States, compiled by 
Schlenker and Roberts (2009), from 1999 to 2017. The dataset uses a weighted average of the ten 
surrounding weather stations with raw observations from the PRISM climate data, and provides 
daily minimum and maximum temperature and precipitation at the 2.5-by-2.5-mile grid level 
(Schlenker and Roberts 2009). We construct and aggregate growing degree days (GDD), extreme 
degree days (XDD), and growing season precipitation at the county-by-year level.33 
 
                                                 
33 Growing season precipitation is the cumulative depth in mm of water from April 1 to September 30. Similarly, 
growing degree days are the number of degree days between 10 °C and 30 °C, and extreme degree days are the number 
of degree days above 30 °C, during the same agricultural growing period every year. 
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3.3.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for selected variables every three years from 2000 to 2018. 
Panel A includes only counties with installed wind energy capacity by 2018, and panel B covers 
the rest of counties in the lower 48 states. We can observe that the normalized insecticide use has 
an overall downward trend but the development of wind energy, either measured by wind capacity 
density or wind area ratios, has a clear upward trend. Wind area ratios take spatial spillovers into 
consideration through different buffer distances, and therefore, counties in panel B may also have 
positive values.  
More interestingly, panel A counties have much larger mean values of both county area and 
harvested cropland area (in 1997) than those in panel B counties. The back of envelope calculation 
then shows that the cropland ratio of panel A equals about 22.6 percent, which is also larger than 
15.0 percent as of panel B. Therefore, counties with and without installed wind turbines are quite 
different, and the statistics in Table 3.1 suggest that sizable wind farms are more likely to be built 
on counties with more croplands.  
Figure 3.2 further investigates the development trend regarding wind capacity density after 
the first wind turbine was built in each county. Note that here year 0 is the year before the year 
when the first wind capacity was installed.34 Based on this setting, all counties must have newly 
installed capacity in year 1, but may or may not have active construction of wind turbines in the 
following years. The total sample size shrinks as the time axis goes because we do not have 
observations for counties with their first installation in the latter years. The blue curve reflects the 
cumulative increase in wind capacity density in the remaining counties, and the red curve 
                                                 
34 Therefore, counties with positive wind capacity in the first year of our study period (i.e., 1999) have been dropped 
from Figure 2, since we cannot identify exact years after their first installed wind turbine.  
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illustrates the average yearly increase, which remains stable at the rate about 0.1 MW per square 
mile, in counties with active wind capacity installations in the corresponding years.  
 
3.4 Empirical Strategy 
This section introduces a typical fixed-effects panel regression model that used to estimate the 
average treatment effect of the development of wind energy on insecticide use first. We then 
present a flexible difference-in-differences model to formally test the common trends assumption 
that our analyses rely on. 
 
3.4.1 Average Treatment Effect 
Recent studies that utilize the natural temporal and geographic variation of certain incidents, such 
as White Nose Syndrome exposure (Frank 2018) and cicada emergence (Taylor 2019), often 
implement a straightforward difference-in-differences design with a clear treatment indicator after 
the exposure to these incidents. Although the underlying empirical strategy is similar, this study 
needs to address gradually increasing trends of wind energy developments across counties. 
Therefore, we use the fixed-effects panel regression model that follows Deschênes and Greenstone 
(2007) and Kaffine (2019):  
ݕ௖௧ ൌ ߚ ௖ܹ௧ ൅ ߠܺ௖௧ ൅ ߛ௖ ൅ ߛ௦௧ ൅ ߳௖௧,  (3.1)
where ݕ௖௧ is the logarithmic transformation of the insecticide use in county ܿ in year ݐ, and ߳௖௧ is 
the error term. Our explanatory variable of interest, ௖ܹ௧, reflects the extent of exposure to the 
development of wind energy at the county-by-year level, which can be wind capacity density as 
megawatts of wind capacity installed per square mile or its logarithmic form, and wind area ratio 
defined as the percentage of area that is within a certain distance (10, 25, or 50 km) of a sizable 
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wind farm in county ܿ in year ݐ. We include county and state-by-year fixed effects, which control 
for time-invariant county characteristics and common yearly shocks at the state level, respectively. 
Moreover, in some specifications, we also add a vector of time-variant control variables, ܺ௖௧, at 
the county level,.  
The identifying assumptions of our main estimation are: first, insecticide use in counties that 
are located close to wind farms would have parallel trends to those that are far away from them if 
these wind turbines have never been installed; and second, no unobservable or uncontrolled for 
variables that affect insecticide use is correlated with the development of wind energy. We will 
provide a formal test in the next section to examine the first assumption. In terms of the second 
assumption, one may argue that landlords may receive royalties from wind developers and 
therefore change practices. However, pesticide applications are costly, such that it is less plausible 
that farmers will purchase and apply additional pesticides without observing worse pest problems, 
and the mechanism behind our analysis is the causal relationship between the wind energy 
development and its damages on natural pest control. 
Similar to Frank (2018), we use the acreage of harvested cropland prior to the development 
of wind energy as the sample weight, since wind turbines may affect microclimates and thus nearby 
agricultural activities. However, the U.S. Census of Agriculture only reports the harvested 
cropland area at the county every 5 years, we choose to use the values from the Census of 
Agriculture 1997, which is the closest available year prior to our dataset. Even though commercial 
wind turbines had been installed before 1997 in the U.S., these earlier turbine models are 
significantly smaller, in height, diameter, or capacity, than later modern ones, and the overall 
installed capacity was also negligible by 1997. 
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3.4.2 Testing for Common Trends   
Once a sizable wind farm is developed in a county, we consider that county as exposed to wind 
energy intensity, and can only test that insecticide use has parallel pre-trends prior to the initial 
exposure to the development of wind energy. To examine pre-trends in the data, in order to inform 
us on the validity of the identifying assumption, we implement the following regression model 
with a flexible difference-in-differences format: 
ݕ௖௧ ൌ ∑ ߚఛ߱௖௧ఛିଵఛୀି଻ ൅ ∑ ߚఛ߱௖௧ఛ଻ఛୀଵ ൅ ߠܺ௖௧ ൅ ߛ௖ ൅ ߛ௦௧ ൅ ߳௖௧, (3.2)
where ߱௖௧ఛ ൌ 1ሺݐ െ ௖ܶ ൌ ߬ሻ is a dummy variable indicating whether the county ܿ is ߬ years away 
from its initial wind exposure time ௖ܶ in year ݐ. We estimate relative lead and lag effects for a 
reasonably wide range of six years prior to and six years post the initial exposure. To top and 
bottom code years beyond six years, here ߬ ൌ െ7 indicates seven years and above prior to ௖ܶ, and 
߬ ൌ 7 covers years that are at least seven years away from the initial exposure. 
Recall from equation (3.1) that the primary explanatory variable, ௖ܹ௧ , is continuous and 
becomes larger as the development of wind energy proceeds. As a consequence, defining an 
indicator for the initial wind exposure becomes a challenge. Here the initial wind exposure is 
defined as the year when the cumulative installed capacity surpassed 10 MW. Although the 
thresholds we chose may be arbitrary and controversial, the reasons to do so is that we want to 
eliminate the noisy disturbances from isolated wind turbines and only focus on sizable wind farms 
as the impact of only a few of wind turbines on local ecosystems is probably very limited.  
 
3.5 Results 
We provide our main estimates on the effects of the wind energy development on insecticide use 
first in this section. We then analyze the partial regression plots to reveal the relationship between 
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the estimated effects and cropland ratio. Finally, we test the common trends assumption formally 
and provide multiple specifications to check the robustness of our results. 
 
3.5.1 Effects on Insecticide Use  
Table 3.2 presents our main results from the specification described by equation (3.1). To estimate 
the average treatment effects of the development of wind energy on insecticide use, we take the 
natural logarithm of the insecticide use as the dependent variable and provide estimates based on 
five different wind development variables as interested response variables. Columns (1) and (2) 
report coefficients of wind capacity density and its natural logarithm, respectively. The set of wind 
area ratios, including buffer distances of 10, 25, and 50 kilometers, are in the other three columns, 
respectively. All five specifications in Table 3.2 control for county fixed effects and state-by-year 
fixed effects. We use the harvested cropland area in 1997 as the sample weight when the response 
variable is insecticide use. Robust errors are clustered at the state level due to potential temporal 
and spatial autocorrelation.  
Our results suggest that the development of wind energy has positive effects on insecticide 
use. All estimated coefficients from five columns in Table 3.2, except the last one, are significant 
at the 1 percent level. Following Kaffine (2019), an additional 100 MW of wind capacity installed 
within a county implies a 0.1 MW per square mile increase in wind energy density, because the 
wind capacity density is defined as megawatts of wind capacity installed per square mile and the 
average county area in the lower 48 states is 997.6 square miles.35 To interpret the coefficient from 
column (1), Table 3.2, a new wind farm with 100 MW of wind power capacity, thereby, increases 
                                                 
35 Kaffine (2019) uses the county-level data in the U.S. and also calculates the effects with an additional 100 MW of 
wind capacity. To be consistent with his definition of wind capacity density, here we still use the unit kilowatt per 
square mile. However, we implement kilometer and square kilometer anywhere else throughout the paper. 
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insecticide use by about 3.2 percent within the same county. After taking the natural logarithm of 
the wind capacity density, we can interpret the coefficient from column (2) more straightforwardly. 
If the wind capacity density increases by 1 percent, the insecticide use would increase by about 
0.38 percent. 
When using the wind area ratio variables, we are able to better account for the potential spatial 
spillovers. These spillovers are potentially generated as the disruption to the ecosystem function 
of pest control fulfilled by bats and birds is affected by wind turbine density in the region, both 
within, and outside the county borders. According to column (3), an additional 1 percent of county 
area located within 10 km of a sizable wind farm, insecticide use increases by roughly 0.43 percent. 
Furthermore, if sizable wind farms indeed result in a higher application of insecticide, we expect 
to see the effects become smaller as buffer distance increases. As a comparison, we also include 
wind area ratio (25 km) and wind area ratio (50 km). As expected, the coefficient of wind area 
ratio (10 km) in column (3) is more than double the magnitude of the coefficient of wind area ratio 
(25 km) in column (4) and about five times as the size of the estimate based on wind area ratio (50 
km). These estimates suggest that the impact of wind turbines on local insecticide use decays with 
distance, but as our insecticide use data are at the county-level, we cannot estimate a more 
structured function form for this spatial pattern.  
In the absence of farm-level data, measuring wind energy development using density and area 
ratio measures provide proxies for the treatment of interest. Neither of these approaches fully 
captures the local and spatial spillover effects on naturally provided pest control. However, we 
recover similar precise point estimates with meaningful magnitudes, which provide a robustness 
check for one another. Note that wind capacity density, wind area ratio (10 km), wind area ratio 
(25 km), and wind area ratio (50 km) are very different in determining “treatment” counties. By 
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the end of 2018, 544 counties in the lower 48 states have installed wind turbines but only 397 of 
them have installed at least 10 MW of wind capacity. Alternatively, when determining treatment 
based on wind area ratios, 582, 811, and 1,151 counties have at least part of their lands within 10, 
25, or 50 km from a sizable wind farm, respectively.  
 
3.5.2 Partial Regression Plots 
Figure 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) present partial regression plots with the y-axis as the residuals of 
regressing the response variable against the independent variables except for the wind 
development variable, and the x-axis as the residuals from regressing the wind development 
variable against the remaining independent variables. Figure 3.3(a) includes residuals from the 
whole sample, linear fitted line, and bin averages. The residuals on ln(Insecticide use) are very 
noisy, in particular, counties with none or limited installed wind capacity are clustered around the 
vertical line at zero. Although we can hardly see the positive correlation pattern directly from the 
scatters, the bin averages are consistent with the slope of the fitted curve.  
If sizable wind farms indeed cause the increase in insecticide use in nearby areas, the effects 
should be more obvious in counties with relatively more croplands. To see this, we first define the 
cropland ratio as the harvested cropland area divided by the total county area. Figure 3.3(b) then 
provides four panels to show the partial regression plots for counties with cropland ratio varying 
from 0 to 40 percent, 40 to 60 percent, 60 to 80 percentile, and above 80 percent, respectively, 
using only “treatment” counties based on wind capacity density. We can clearly observe the 
distribution pattern of the residual scatters changes as cropland ratio increases, from clustering at 
the center in the lowest cropland ratio category to reasonably spreading along the fitted line in the 
highest category. 
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3.5.3 Common Trends 
An essential identifying assumption underlying the above analysis is that insecticide use in 
counties affected by the expansion of wind energy would have their outcomes develop along with 
a parallel trend as that in counties located far away from sizable wind farms in a counterfactual 
world without wind energy intensification. We, therefore, test for the existence of pre-trends prior 
to treatment onset. There are two key challenges involved in testing for pre-trends in this setting. 
First, as mentioned above, areas that experienced wind energy development are different, in many 
characteristics, from non-wind-energy counties. Second, most counties with installed wind 
capacity have accumulated their installed capacity over multiple construction periods. As such, it 
is not immediately clear as to when can we define a county as treated. Clearly, a few small and 
dispersed wind turbines do not represent a large disruption to bats and birds as several large-scale 
wind farms do. Since we lack formal guidance from the ecological literature regarding sharp 
thresholds for when birds and bats are considered to be negatively affected by wind farms, we are 
left with making an arbitrary choice.  
For the sake of simplicity, we choose 10 MW of installed capacity as an arbitrary threshold. 
We test the common pre-trends assumption formally with a flexible difference-in-differences 
specification described in equation (3.2). Figure 3.4(a) plots the estimated coefficients ߚመఛ  and 
corresponding confidence intervals based on robust errors clustered at the state level with the 
whole sample, while Figure 3.4(b) only uses counties with at least 10 MW capacity installed by 
the end of 2018 so that the results are not contaminated with a potentially invalid control group. 
The latter test, in Figure 3.4(b), provides an event-study where we identify the effect only relative 
to the staggered timing in which counties pass the 10 MW threshold we define.  Counties could 
117 
 
become treated before reaching 10 MW of installed capacity, meaning their natural pest predators 
decline even at lower levels of installed capacity. This would mean that treated counties are 
classified as control counties, which would attenuate the estimates. Similar attenuation would 
occur if the true threshold is above 10 MW, as we would have true treatment with true control 
counties in the treatment group.  
In these figures, year 0 on the x-axis indicates the year before the year when counties had at 
least 10 MW of wind energy capacity installed. We should expect to observe small and 
insignificant coefficients before year 1, if the parallel pre-trends assumption holds. Although all 
pre-trend coefficients in both figures are not significantly different than zero, the results imply that 
insecticide use in 5 to 7 years prior to the installation of the first sizable wind capacity is lower in 
treatment counties due to reasons that our specification fails to account for. On the other end, in 
the years after crossing the 10 MW threshold of installed capacity, the effects on insecticide use 
are positive, and they become gradually larger with time.  This observed dynamic response has 
two likely explanations. First, there could be a time gap between the installation of a sizable wind 
farm and its sequential impact on insecticide use, through its impact on the natural predators of 
pests in the region. As previously discussed, wind turbines are a large contributor to birds and bat 
mortality, and there might be a lag until this effect accumulates to a sizable impact on pest 
conditions. Second, most counties installed additional wind power capacity in the following years, 
as depicted in Figure 3.2. These factors suggest a complex dynamic pattern driven by an 
accumulation of the effect on birds and bats, as well as intensifying treatment over time.  
Figure 3.4(c) further divides all counties with non-zero croplands into two groups based on 
whether its cropland ratio is above and below the median value at the 13.82 percent. The 
coefficients of these below-median counties are very noisy and not significantly different from 
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zero. Nonetheless, the estimates of these above-median counties show a very similar pattern as in 
Figures 3.4(a) and 3.4(b) but with the last two coefficients significant at the 5 percent level. These 
results are consistent with the finding from the partial regression plots as shown in Figure 3.3(b). 
 
3.5.4 Robustness Checks  
The estimates in Table 3.2 suggest a positive effect of sizable wind farms on nearby insecticide 
use. Due to the large noise in the pesticide-use data, one may be concerned that the positive effect 
is a coincident that the development of wind energy happens to be correlated with the insecticide 
use trend in a small group of counties. Table 3.3 then checks the robustness of the estimates with 
many different restrictions on the sample. Column (1) keeps only samples till 2014, as pesticide-
use estimates prior to 2015 include estimates with seed treatment application but not after (Wieben 
2019). Column (2) removes all samples from the state California due to the concern that the 
pesticide-use data were obtained from the Department of Pesticide Regulation Pesticide Use 
Reporting (DPR–PUR) database, which applied a different estimation process (Wieben 2019). As 
counties with and without installed wind energy capacity by 2018 are different in many 
characteristics, Column (3) restricts the sample to the 12 Midwest states only and Column (4) 
keeps the sub-sample of 18 selected states that have state-level wind capacity density larger than 
0.005 MW per square mile and cropland ratio larger than 12 percent to improve similarity between 
control and treatment counties. Column (5) removes counties that reached 10 MW of installed 
wind capacity later than 2013 so that all treatment counties have at least six post-exposure years, 
and thus the estimates will not be driven by short-term effects that could result from the recent 
growth in the wind energy industry. Finally, column (6) controls for weather variables including 
GDD, XDD, precipitation, and their quadratic terms. However, recent studies (e.g., Kaffine 2019) 
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indicate that sizable wind farms can affect microclimates, and thus these meteorological variables 
may not be good controls. Robust errors are clustered at the state level for all columns except 
columns (3) and (4), since both specifications have a fewer number of states and thus robust errors 
reported in these two columns are clustered at the county level. 
Table 3.3 also uses the same five different wind development variables as in Table 3.2, and 
reports them in panel A to E, respectively. Comparing to the corresponding coefficients in Table 
3.2, all estimates in Table 3.3 remain consistent and similar in magnitude across all specifications. 
In particular, the coefficients from all five panels, except two, are significant at the 5 percent level 
or lower. The results of these robustness checks support our main finding and imply that the effect 
of the development of wind energy on insecticide use is not an accident occurrence under certain 
temporal and spatial conditions. 
In addition to robustness checks reported in Table 3.3, we conduct Oster’s (2019) test to check 
the unobservable selection and estimate stability, which is based on a test statistic from Altonji, 
Elder, and Taber (2005) that measures how important the unobservables would have to be relative 
to the observables under the null of a zero treatment effect. The result of Oster’s test suggests that 
the unobservables would need to be 6.68 times as important as the observables to fully eliminate 
our estimated treatment effects, and therefore, it is less likely that our estimates are driven by 
unobservable omitted variables.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
Previous literature in ecology has documented adverse impacts of wind turbines on bird and bat 
populations. As these are both important sources of biological pest control, there are concerns that 
their decline will result in increased insecticide use. This paper investigates the impacts of sizable 
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wind farms on local insecticide use. Using the gradual construction of wind farms across counties, 
we find that agricultural insecticide use increases by 0.43 percent when the ratio of land in and 
around the county with installed wind energy capacity increases by 1 percent. While previous work 
on the wind energy development has highlighted potential benefits to farmers, there is a growing 
body of evidence suggesting there might also be unintended consequences. This work contributes 
to our broader understanding on the local benefits and costs of wind farm installations.  
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3.7 Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 3.1 Installed wind turbines and 10, 25, and 50 km buffer areas to sizable wind 
farms, by 2018  
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 Figure 3.2 Increasing trend of wind capacity density 
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Figure 3.3(a). Partial regression plot, with all observations 
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     Cropland ratio: 0-40 percent     Cropland ratio: 40-60 percent 
     Cropland ratio: 60-80 percent     Cropland ratio: > 80 percent 
Figure 3.3(b). Partial regression plots by category of cropland ratio, 
using only counties with installed wind capacity by 2018 
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 (a) Whole sample 
 (b) Only the treatment counties 
 
Figure 3.4 Insecticide use differences in years before and after the first wind development 
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 (c) Above- and below-median groups based on cropland ratio 
 
Figure 3.4 (cont.) Insecticide use differences in years before and after the first wind 
development  
 
  
127 
 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics (every three years)  2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 
Panel A: Counties with installed wind turbines by 2018        
Insecticide Use (kg per square kilometer) 12.606 11.508 8.954 8.600 9.011 8.293 4.593 
(54.034) (50.172) (41.666) (35.828) (38.434) (47.751) (13.875) 
Wind capacity density (MW/sqml) 0.0025 0.0058 0.0138 0.0463 0.0911 0.1300 0.1793 
(0.0218) (0.0310) (0.0491) (0.1381) (0.2071) (0.2358) (0.2750) 
Wind area ratio (10 km) 0.0051 0.0166 0.0282 0.0769 0.1223 0.1473 0.1755  (0.0360) (0.0609) (0.0761) (0.1365) (0.1599) (0.1700) (0.1869) 
Wind area ratio (25 km) 0.0204 0.0664 0.1099 0.2452 0.3654 0.4255 0.4795  (0.1072) (0.1810) (0.2316) (0.3169) (0.3461) (0.3467) (0.3467) 
Wind area ratio (50 km) 0.0704 0.1791 0.2582 0.4341 0.6328 0.7146 0.7577  (0.2240) (0.3362) (0.3872) (0.4299) (0.4056) (0.3777) (0.3579) 
Harvested cropland (square kilometer) 762.51    (619.98)   
County area (square kilometer) 3367.42   
(4558.84)   
N 544 
Panel B: Counties with no installed wind turbine        
Insecticide Use (kg per square kilometer) 18.099 15.076 12.466 10.391 10.709 9.327 6.536 
(87.722) (81.615) (62.808) (53.343) (54.173) (50.945) (32.256) 
Wind capacity density (MW/sqml) 0.000 
Wind area ratio (10 km) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 0.0015 0.0018 0.0023 
(0.0013) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0071) (0.0103) (0.0116) (0.0131) 
Wind area ratio (25 km) 0.0002 0.0015 0.0032 0.0096 0.0179 0.0216 0.0271 
(0.0072) (0.0189) (0.0307) (0.0552) (0.0753) (0.0825) (0.0970) 
Wind area ratio (50 km) 0.0044 0.0138 0.0235 0.0478 0.0905 0.1072 0.1237 
(0.0475) (0.0852) (0.1160) (0.1699) (0.2337) (0.2541) (0.2741) 
Harvested cropland (square kilometer) 341.26 
(412.60) 
County area (square kilometer) 2272.98 
(3032.43) 
N 2561 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parenthesis. 
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Table 3.2 Effects of the development of wind energy on insecticide use 
ln(insecticide use) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Wind Capacity Density (MW/sqmi) 0.323***  
(0.0941)  
ln(Wind Capacity Density)  0.377***  
(0.107) 
Wind Area Ratio (10 km) 0.427*** 
(0.125) 
Wind Area Ratio (25 km) 0.188***  
(0.0621)  
Wind Area Ratio (50 km) 0.0872** 
(0.0381) 
Observations 60184 60184 60184 60184 60184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.908 
      
State by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. 
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  
129 
 
Table 3.3 Robustness checks 
ln(insecticide use) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  
Panel A       
Wind Capacity Density (MW/sqmi) 0.385*** 0.331*** 0.305*** 0.286*** 0.325*** 0.282** 
(0.132) (0.0974) (0.0623) (0.0617) (0.110) (0.117) 
Panel B       
ln(Wind Capacity Density)  0.463*** 0.387*** 0.352*** 0.340*** 0.381*** 0.329** 
(0.145) (0.111) (0.0704) (0.0681) (0.127) (0.135) 
Panel C       
Wind Area Ratio (10 km) 0.567*** 0.428*** 0.403*** 0.407*** 0.435*** 0.369** 
(0.143) (0.125) (0.0874) (0.0809) (0.151) (0.158) 
Panel D       
Wind Area Ratio (25 km) 0.249*** 0.189*** 0.180*** 0.186*** 0.196** 0.159** 
(0.0699) (0.0624) (0.0405) (0.0371) (0.0768) (0.0760) 
Panel E       
Wind Area Ratio (50 km) 0.129*** 0.0876** 0.0624** 0.0861*** 0.0959* 0.0704* 
(0.0459) (0.0382) (0.0264) (0.0244) (0.0522) (0.0414) 
Observations 48208 59159 21032 31101 59951 57250 
       
State by Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Without samples after 2015 Yes      
No CA counties  Yes     
Only Midwest counties   Yes    
Only counties in selected states    Yes   
Exposure to sizable wind farm before 2014     Yes  
With weather controls      Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level for columns (1), (2), (5), and (6), and at 
the county level for columns (3) and (4). Weather controls include GDD, XDD, precipitation, and their quadratic 
terms. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
A.1 List of Parameters 
߱ா ≡ ܭா/ܭ, the share of the total capital owned by the residents that goes to the energy sector. 
ߠாோ ≡ ݌ாܧ/ܫ or ݌ாோܧோ/ܫ, the share of the total consumption of the residents that is spending on 
commodity ܧ (or ܧோ). 
ߠா் ≡ ݐாܧ/ܶ, the share of total tax revenue that is from the commodity tax on energy product E 
(in the extension model, ߠா்  is replaced by ߠா௑்  and ߠாோ் ).  
ߠா௑் ≡ ݐா௑ܧ௑/ܶ, the share of total tax revenue that is from the commodity tax on energy products 
that sold to the industrial sector. 
ߠாோ் ≡ ݐாோܧோ/ܶ, the share of total tax revenue that is from the unit tax on energy products that sold 
to the residents. 
ߠா௑ ≡ ௣ಶ೉ா೉௣೉௑ , the share of the total revenue of the industrial firms that is spending on input ܧ. 
ߠ௓ா ≡ ௧ೋ௓௣ಶா, the share of the total revenue of the energy firms that is spending on pollution tax. 
ߠ௓ா௑ ≡ ௧ೋ௓௣ಶ೉ா೉, the ratio of total pollution tax and revenue from energy sold to other firms, where 
௧ೋ௓
௣ಶ೉ா ൌ
௧ೋ௓
௣ಶ೉ா೉ ∗ ߮௑ ൌ ߠ௓
ா௑߮௑ 
ߠ௓ாோ ≡ ௧ೋ௓௣ಶೃாೃ, the ratio of total pollution tax and revenue from energy sold to residents, where 
௧ೋ௓
௣ಶೃா ൌ
௧ೋ௓
௣ಶೃாೃ ∗ ߮ோ ൌ ߠ௓
ாோ߮ோ 
ߩ௓ா ≡ ௧ೋ௓ఊா , the ratio of total pollution tax and total energy production cost. 
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ߪ௎ ≡ ௗ௟௡ሺ௑/ாೃሻௗ௟௡ሺ௣೉/௣ಶೃሻ , the elasticity of substitution between commodities ܺ  and ܧ  in the utility 
function. 
ߪ௑ ≡ ௗ௟௡ሺ௄೉/ா೉ሻௗ௟௡ሺ௣಼೉/௣ಶ೉ሻ, the elasticity of substitution in the production of ܺ. 
ߪா ≡ ௗ௟௡ሺ௄ಶ/௓ሻௗ௟௡ሺ௣಼ಶ/௧ೋሻ, the elasticity of substitution in the production of ܧ. 
ߝாோ ≡ డாೃ/ாೃడ௣ಶೃ/௣ಶೃ, the residents’ price elasticity of demand for energy product ܧோ. 
ߝா௑ ≡ డா೉/ா೉డ௣ಶ೉/௣ಶ೉, the industry ܺ’s price elasticity of demand for the energy input ܧ௑. 
߮௑ ≡ ܧ௑/ܧ, the share of total energy products that sold to other industrial firms as intermediate 
goods.  
߮ோ ≡ ܧோ/ܧ, the share of total energy products that sold to the residents. 
ߚா ≡ ݍ௄ ݌௄ா⁄ , the non-tax share of the total capital price in the energy sector. 
ߚ௑ ≡ ݍ௄ ݌௄௑⁄ , the non-tax share of the total capital price in the industrial sector. 
 
A.2 Long-Run Marginal Cost of Energy Production 
Although the energy sector, including its distribution utilities, was a classic example of a natural 
monopoly (Baumol 1977; Posner 1969), the average size of generators, and the fixed cost of 
building a single power generator, becomes much smaller due to the development of various 
technologies, like renewable energy and distributed generation (Borenstein and Bushnell 2015; 
Pepermans et al. 2005). Christensen and Greene (1976) also find that firms in the U.S. electricity 
generation are operating in the flat area of the average cost curve by 1970 and conclude that a few 
huge firms are not necessary for efficient production, though there were significant scale 
economies available to the industry in 1955. As the consumers’ demand from energy sector has 
increased, to supply an economy like a state or nation needs many power plants. The aggregation 
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of numbers of generator units has regularizing effects and thus can make the average production 
set almost convex (Mas-Collell, Whinston, and Green 1995). Moreover, the log-linearized general 
equilibrium model captures the relatively long-term effects from one equilibria to the next with 
small enough tax or other exogenous changes. In our case, the whole energy sector in a large 
economy like the U.S. will need to retire or add many generators or facilities when facing policy 
shocks. As shown in Figure A.1, the marginal cost of energy products in this model is not just the 
marginal cost of producing one more unit of electricity or gasoline at given production capacity 
represented by the blue line with slope β. Instead, the slope of the solid line α gives the marginal 
cost defined in this model, which covers costs for both marginal capacity and quantity shifts after 
the implementation of new environmental policies. Another benefit of this setting is that pricing 
at the marginal cost, represented by slope α, will be able to cover the whole fixed investments. 
Therefore, it is safe to assume that the energy sector has many units of generators and the aggregate 
production function is constant returns to scale. 
 
Figure A.1 Production and Marginal Costs in the Energy Sector  
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A.3 Welfare Expression Derivations 
All intermediate equations in this section are marked with “W” for welfare expression derivations. 
To start, totally differentiate the representative consumer’s utility function ܷሺܺ, ܧோ; ܼሻ  and 
substitute in the FOCs from the utility maximization problem to find: 
ܷ݀ ൌ ߲ܷ߲ܺ ݀ܺ ൅
߲ܷ
߲ܧோ ݀ܧோ ൅
߲ܷ
߲ܼ ܼ݀ ൌ ߣ݌௑݀ܺ ൅ ߣ݌ாோ݀ܧோ ൅
߲ܷ
߲ܼ ܼ݀. (W.1)
Next, totally differentiate the production function ܺ ൌ ܺሺܭ௑, ܧ௑ሻ and substitute in the FOCs from 
the profit maximization problem to get: 
݀ܺ ൌ ߲߲ܺܭ௑ ݀ܭ௑ ൅
߲ܺ
߲ܧ௑ ݀ܧ௑ ൌ
݌௄௑
݌௑ ݀ܭ௑ ൅
݌ா௑
݌௑ ݀ܧ௑. (W.2)
Continuing, plug equation (W.2) into equation (W.1) to yield: 
ܷ݀ ൌ ߣሺ݌௄௑݀ܭ௑ ൅ ݌ா௑݀ܧ௑ሻ ൅ ߣ݌ாோ݀ܧோ ൅ ߲ܷ߲ܼ ܼ݀. 
Dividing both sides by ߣܫ gives: 
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ
1
ܫ ሺ݌௄௑݀ܭ௑ ൅ ݌ா௑݀ܧ௑ሻ ൅
݌ாோ
ܫ ݀ܧோ െ ߤ
ܼ
ܫ መܼ. (W.3)
Since ܧோ  and ܧ௑  are identical energy products that follow the same production function ܧ ൌ
ܧሺܭா, ܼሻ, it must be that ܧ ൌ ܧ௑ ൅ ܧோ. Also, recall the capital resource constraint ܭா ൅ ܭ௑ ൌ ܭ. 
Thus, rewrite the above production function of energy as: 
ܧ௑ ൅ ܧோ ൌ ܧሺܭഥ െ ܭ௑, ܼሻ. 
Then, totally differentiating the above equation and substitute in the FOCs to find: 
݀ܧ௑ ൅ ݀ܧோ ൌ െ ߲ܧ߲ܭா ݀ܭ௑ ൅
߲ܧ
߲ܼ ܼ݀ ൌ െ
݌௄ா
ߛ ݀ܭ௑ ൅
ݐ௓
ߛ ܼ݀. 
Rewrite the above equation as: 
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݌௄ா݀ܭ௑ ൌ ݐ௓ܼ݀ െ ߛ݀ܧ௑ െ ߛ݀ܧோ. (W.4)
Substituting equation (W.4) to equation (W.3) to find: 
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ
1
ܫ
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ሺݐ௓ܼ݀ െ ߛ݀ܧ௑ െ ߛ݀ܧோሻ ൅
݌ா௑
ܫ ݀ܧ௑ ൅
݌ாோ
ܫ ݀ܧோ െ ߤ
ܼ
ܫ መܼ  
Rearranging the above equation shows: 
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
൬݌ா௑ െ ݌௄௑݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧ௑
ܫ ܧ෠௑ ൅ ൬݌ாோ െ
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧோ
ܫ ܧ෠ோᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ை௨௧௣௨௧ ா௙௙௘௖௧ ے
ۑ
ۑ
ې
൅ ൬݌௄௑݌௄ா ݐ௓ െ ߤ൰
ܼ
ܫ መܼᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௧௘௥௡௔௟௜௧௬
 (W.5)
Rewrite equation (W.5) to reveal: 
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ ൬݌ா௑ െ ݌ாோ ൅ ݌ாோ െ
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧ௑
ܫ ܧ෠௑ ൅ ൬݌ாோ െ
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧோ
ܫ ܧ෠ோ ൅ ൬
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ݐ௓ െ ߤ൰
ܼ
ܫ መܼ 
ൌ ൬݌ாோ െ ݌௄௑݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧ
	ܫ ܧ෠ ൅ ሺ݌ா௑ െ ݌ாோሻ
ܧ௑
ܫ ܧ෠௑ ൅ ൬
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ݐ௓ െ ߤ൰
ܼ
ܫ መܼ. 
(W.6)
Similarly, one can rewrite equation (W.5) as:  
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ ൬݌ா௑ െ
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧ௑
ܫ ܧ෠௑ ൅ ൬݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ ൅ ݌ா௑ െ
݌௄
݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧோ
ܫ ܧ෠ோ ൅ ൬
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ݐ௓ െ ߤ൰
ܼ
ܫ መܼ 
ൌ ൬݌ா௑ െ ݌௄௑݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧ
	ܫ ܧ෠ ൅ ሺ݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ሻ
ܧோ
ܫ ܧ෠ோ ൅ ൬
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ݐ௓ െ ߤ൰
ܼ
ܫ መܼ. 
(W.7)
Multiplying equations (W.6) and (W.7) by ߮ோ and ߮௑, respectively, yields 
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ ൬߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧ
ܫ ܧ෠ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ை௟௜௚௢௣௢௟௬	ை௨௧௣௨௧
൅ ሺ݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ሻ ܧோܧ௑ܧܫ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௉௥௜௖௘	஽௜௦௖௥௜௠௜௡௔௧௜௢௡	
൅ ൬݌௄௑݌௄ா ݐ௓ െ ߤ൰
ܼ
ܫ መܼᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௫௧௘௥௡௔௟௜௧௬
. 
(W.8)
Define ݉ா௑ ≡ ݌ா௑ െ ߛ െ ݐா௑ and ݉ாோ ≡ ݌ாோ െ ߛ െ ݐாோ, then rewrite equation (W.8) as: 
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ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ ൬߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ ߛ ൅ ߛ െ
݌௄௑
݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧ
	ܫ ܧ෠ ൅ ሺݐாோ െ ݐா௑ሻ
ܧோܧ௑
ܧܫ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯
൅ ሺ݉ாோ െ ݉ா௑ሻܧோܧ௑ܧܫ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ െ ൬
ݐ௄ா െ ݐ௄௑
݌௄ா ݐ௓൰
Z
ܫ መܼ ൅ ሺݐ௓ െ ߤሻ
Z
ܫ መܼ. 
Finally, rearranging the above equation generates equation (1.20) in section 1.3 as: 
ܷ݀
ߣܫ ൌ ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ
ܧ
	ܫ ܧ෠ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐଵ
൅ ൬ݐ௄ா െ ݐ௄௑݌௄ா ߛ൰
ܧ
	ܫ ܧ෠ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐଶ
൅ ሺ݉ாோ െ ݉ா௑ሻܧோܧ௑ܧܫ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐଷ
൅ ሺݐாோ െ ݐா௑ሻ ܧோܧ௑ܧܫ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐସ
൅ ሺݐ௓ െ ߤሻ Zܫ መܼᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐହ
൅ ൬ݐ௄௑ െ ݐ௄ா݌௄ா ݐ௓൰
Z
ܫ መܼᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ௐ଺
. 
Assume pre-existing labor taxes are uniform in both industrial and energy sectors as ݐ௄ா ൌ
ݐ௄௑ ൒ 0, we will have ݌௄௑ ൌ ݌௄ா and therefore equation (W.5) becomes equation (1.18) and 
equation (W.8) becomes equation (1.19) in section 1.3.  
 
A.4 Theorem Proofs 
Theorem 1.1 (reprinted from Chapter One) Assume a policy lowers total energy sector output 
൫ܧ෠ ൑ 0൯ . If so, then the output distortion lowers welfare. Furthermore, without losing the 
generality, assume the residential consumers are less elastic and thus face a higher energy price 
(i.e., ݌ாோ ൐ ݌ா௑). If ܧ෠௑ ൏ ܧ෠ோ  (note that we must have ܧ෠௑ ൏ 0, but ܧ෠ோ  can be either positive or 
negative), then the price discrimination distortion lessens and has the opposite sign to the output 
distortion, and thus increasing welfare.   
Proof. From equation (1.19), denote the Oligopoly Output Effect as ܨ ൌ ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ
ߛሻ ா	ூ ܧ෠ and the Price Discrimination Effect as ܩ ൌ ሺ݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ሻ
ாೃா೉
ாூ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯. By assumption 
ܧ෠ ൏ 0. Also, since energy production and income are positive values in the initial equilibrium, 
then ܧ ܫ⁄ ൐ 0. Market power means ݌ாோ ൐ ߛ and ݌ா௑ ൐ ߛ, and recall ߮ோ ൅ ߮௑ ൌ 1 and ߮ோ, ߮௑ ∈
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ሺ0,1ሻ . Thus, the weighted average of the two prices is above the marginal cost so that 
ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ ൐ 0, and therefore ܨ ൏ 0. Next, assume ݌ாோ ൐ ݌ா௑ and find cases where 
ܩ ൐ 0 when ܨ ൏ 0. To start,	ሺ݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ሻ ൐ 0 by assumption, and ாೃா೉ாூ ൐ 0 since all the terms 
are positive in the initial equilibrium. Then, recall ߮௑ܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோ ൌ ܧ෠ ൏ 0. Thus, if ܧ෠ோ ൐ 0 then 
it must be that ܧ෠௑ ൏ 0, and therefore ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ ൐ 0 and finally ܩ ൐ 0. However, it may also be 
that ܧ෠௑ ൏ ܧ෠ோ ൏ 0, implying 0 ൏ ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑ ൏ െܧ෠௑ and ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ ൐ 0, and finally ܩ ൐ 0. QED 
 
Theorem 1.2 (reprinted from Chapter One) Assume a policy lowers total energy sector output 
൫ܧ෠ ൑ 0൯. Without losing the generality, assume the residential consumers are less elastic and thus 
face a higher energy price (i.e., ݌ாோ ൐ ݌ா௑). Then, a necessary condition to yield a net welfare gain 
with respect to the price discrimination and output effects is ܧ෠ோ ൐ 0 (implying ܧ෠௑ ൏ 0). 
Proof. From equation (1.19), denote the Oligopoly Output Effect as ܨ ൌ ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ
ߛሻ ா	ூ ܧ෠  and the Price Discrimination Effect as ܩ ൌ ሺ݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ሻ
ாೃா೉
ாூ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯. Need to show 
ܨ ൅ ܩ ൐ 0  implies ܧ෠ோ ൐ 0 ; that is, an increase in energy consumption by the residential 
consumers must necessarily hold if the Price Discrimination Effect gain outweighs the Oligopoly 
Output Effect loss when ܧ෠ ൏ 0. So,  
ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ ܧ	ܫ ܧ෠ ൅ ሺ݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ሻ
ܧோܧ௑
ܧܫ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ ൐ 0 
⟺ ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ ܧ	ܫ ܧ෠ ൅ ሺ݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ሻ
ܧோ
	ܧ
ܧ௑
ܧ
ܧ
	ܫ ൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ ൐ 0 
⟺ ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோ െ ߛሻܧ෠ ൅ ሺ݌ாோ െ ݌ா௑ሻ߮ோ߮௑൫ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑൯ ൐ 0 
⟺߮௑݌ா௑ܧ෠ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோܧ෠ െ ߛܧ෠ ൅ ߮ோ߮௑݌ாோܧ෠ோ െ ߮ோ߮௑݌ா௑ܧ෠ோ െ ߮ோ߮௑݌ாோܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோ߮௑݌ா௑ܧ෠௑ ൐ 0 
⟺߮௑݌ா௑ܧ෠ ൅ ߮ோ݌ாோܧ෠ െ ߛܧ෠ ൅ ߮ோ߮௑݌ாோܧ෠ோ െ ߮ோ߮௑݌ா௑ܧ෠ோ െ ߮ோ߮௑݌ாோܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோ߮௑݌ா௑ܧ෠௑ ൐ 0 
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⟺߮௑߮௑݌ா௑ܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோ߮௑݌ா௑ܧ෠ோ ൅ ߮௑߮ோ݌ாோܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோ߮ோ݌ாோܧ෠ோ െ ߮௑ߛܧ෠௑ െ ߮ோߛܧ෠ோ
൅ ߮ோ߮௑݌ாோܧ෠ோ െ ߮ோ߮௑݌ா௑ܧ෠ோ െ ߮ோ߮௑݌ாோܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோ߮௑݌ா௑ܧ෠௑ ൐ 0 
⟺ ߮௑ܧ෠௑ሺ߮௑݌ா௑ ൅ ߮ோ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோሺ߮ோ݌ாோ ൅ ߮௑݌ாோ െ ߛሻ ൐ 0 
⟺߮௑ܧ෠௑ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோሺ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ ൐ 0 
which is the condition for ܨ ൅ ܩ ൐ 0. 
Then, recall ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ ൐ 0 and ሺ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ ൐ 0. Since ߮௑ܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோ ൌ ܧ෠ ൑ 0, then ܨ ൅ ܩ ൐ 0 
cannot hold if both ܧ෠௑ ൑ 0 and ܧ෠ோ ൑ 0. Therefore, ܧ෠ோ ൐ 0 or ܧ෠௑ ൐ 0. Also, if ݌ாோ ൐ ݌ா௑ and 
thus ܨ ൏ 0 and ܩ ൐ 0 when ܧ෠௑ ൏ ܧ෠ோ by Theorem 1, and thus only ܧ෠ோ ൐ 0 may hold as one of 
the quantity terms is positive while the other negative. QED 
 
Theorem 1.3 (reprinted from Chapter One) Assume a policy lowers total energy sector output 
൫ܧ෠ ൑ 0൯. Without losing the generality, assume the residential consumers are less elastic and thus 
face a higher energy price (i.e., ݌ாோ ൐ ݌ா௑). Then, a sufficient condition to yield a net welfare gain 
with respect to the price discrimination and output effects in addition to ܧ෠௑ ൏ 0  is ܧ෠ோ ൐
ఝ೉ሺ௣ಶ೉ିఊሻ
ఝೃሺ௣ಶೃିఊሻ ൫െܧ෠௑൯, or equivalently, ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ݀ܧ௑ ൅ ሺ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ݀ܧோ ൐ 0. 
Proof. From the Proof of Theorem 2, ߮௑ܧ෠௑ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோሺ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ ൐ 0 and if ݌ாோ ൐ ݌ா௑ 
then ܧ෠௑ ൏ 0 and ܧ෠ோ ൐ 0. Rearranging, 
⟺߮ோܧ෠ோሺ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ ൐ െ߮௑ܧ෠௑ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ 
⟺߮ோܧ෠ோሺ݌ாோ െ ߛሻ ൐ ߮௑ሺ݌ா௑ െ ߛሻ൫െܧ෠௑൯ ൐ 0 
⟺ ܧ෠ோ ൐ ఝ೉ሺ௣ಶ೉ିఊሻఝೃሺ௣ಶೃିఊሻ ൫െܧ෠௑൯ ൐ 0. QED 
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A.5 General Equilibrium Solutions 
This section shows how to derive solutions (equations below are marked with “S” for “solution”), 
and all intermediate equations are marked with “E” for equilibrium derivatives. As described in 
section 1.2, the fourteen-equation system below (reprinted from Chapter One) defines the model: 
߱ாܭ෡ா ൅ ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻܭ෡௑ ൌ 0, (1.1)
෠ܺ െ ܧ෠ோ ൌ ߪ௎ሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ, (1.2)
ܧ෠௑ െ ܭ෡௑ ൌ ߪ௑ሺ݌̂௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ, (1.3)
෠ܺ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻܭ෡௑ ൅ ߠா௑ܧ෠௑, (1.4)
෠ܺ ൅ ݌̂௑ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻ൫ܭ෡௑ ൅ ݌̂௄௑൯ ൅ ߠா௑൫ܧ෠௑ ൅ ݌̂ா௑൯, (1.5)
ܧ෠ ൌ ߮௑ܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோ, (1.6)
መܼ െ ܭ෡ா ൌ ߪாሺ݌̂௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ, (1.7)
݌̂ா௑ ൌ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑ ൬
ݐா௑
݌ா௑ ̂ݐா௑ ൅
ߛ
݌ா௑ ߛො൰, (1.8)
݌̂ாோ ൌ ݊ߝாோ1 ൅ ݊ߝாோ ൬
ݐாோ
݌ாோ ̂ݐாோ ൅
ߛ
݌ாோ ߛො൰, (1.9)
ܧ෠ ൌ 	݌௄ாܭாߛܧ ܭ෡ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
ߛܧ መܼ, (1.10)
ߛො ൅ ܧ෠ ൌ 	݌௄ாܭாߛܧ ൫݌̂௄ா ൅ ܭ෡ா൯ ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
ߛܧ ൫̂ݐ௓ ൅ መܼ൯, (1.11)
݌̂௄ா ൌ ߚாݍො௄ ൅ ̂ݐ௄ா, (1.12)
݌̂௄௑ ൌ ߚ௑ݍො௄ ൅ ̂ݐ௄௑, (1.13)
ݍො௄ ൌ 0. (1.14)
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From equations (1.12) to (1.14), substitute ݌̂௄ா ൌ ̂ݐ௄ா and ݌̂௄௑ ൌ ̂ݐ௄௑ to replace ݌̂௄ா and ݌̂௄௑ in 
equations (1.3), (1.5), (1.7), and (1.11). Next, subtracting equation (1.4) from equation (1.5) to 
reveal: 
݌̂௑ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻ̂ݐ௄௑ ൅ ߠா௑݌̂ா௑. (E.1)
Subtracting (1.10) from equation (1.11), respectively, yields: 
ߛො ൌ ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ̂ݐ௓ ൅
	݌௄ாܭா
ߛܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൌ ߩ௓
ா̂ݐ௓ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩ௓ாሻ̂ݐ௄ா. (S.1)
Plugging the above equation into equations (1.8) and (1.9) to find: 
݌̂ா௑ ൌ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑ ൬
ݐா௑
݌ா௑ ̂ݐா௑ ൅
݌௄ாܭா
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௓൰, (S.2)
݌̂ாோ ൌ ݊ߝாோ1 ൅ ݊ߝாோ ൬
ݐாோ
݌ாோ ̂ݐாோ ൅
݌௄ாܭா
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௓൰. (S.3)
Plugging equation (S.2) into equation (E.1) to yield:  
݌̂௑ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻ̂ݐ௄௑ ൅ ߠா௑ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑ ൬
ݐா௑
݌ா௑ ̂ݐா௑ ൅
݌௄ாܭா
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௓൰. (S.4)
Substituting equation (1.4) to equation (1.2) and rearranging shows: 
ܧ෠ோ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻܭ෡௑ ൅ ߠா௑ܧ෠௑ െ ߪ௎ሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ. (E.2)
Substituting equation (1.3) to equation (E.2) to eliminate ܭ෡௑ and rearranging shows: 
ܧ෠ோ െ ܧ෠௑ ൌ െߪ௑ሺ1 െ ߠா௑ሻሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ െ ߪ௎ሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ. (E.3)
To eliminate E෡, plugging equation (1.6) into (1.10) provides: 
߮௑ܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோ ൌ ݌௄ாܭாߛܧ ܭ෡ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
ߛܧ መܼ. (E.4)
Then get rid of መܼ, substituting equation (1.7) into (E.4) shows: 
ܧ෠ ൌ ߮௑ܧ෠௑ ൅ ߮ோܧ෠ோ ൌ ܭ෡ா ൅ ߪா ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ. (E.5)
Substituting equation (E.3) into (E.5) to remove ܧ෠௑, and rearranging yields: 
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ܧ෠ோ ൌ ܭ෡ா ൅ ߪா ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ െ ߪ௑߮௑ሺ1 െ ߠா
௑ሻሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ െ ߪ௎߮௑ሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ
ൌ ܭ෡௑ ൅ ߪ௑ߠா௑ሺ̂ݐ௄ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ െ ߪ௎ሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ. 
(E.6)
Similarly, to eliminate ܧ෠ோ by substituting equation (E.3) into (E.5) finds: 
ܧ෠௑ ൌ ܭ෡ா ൅ ߪா ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ ൅ ߪ௑߮ோሺ1 െ ߠா
௑ሻሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ ൅ ߪ௎߮ோሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ
ൌ ܭ෡௑ ൅ ߪ௑ሺ̂ݐ௄ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ. 
(E.7)
Substituting equations (1.4) and (E.5) into equation (1.2) to remove ෠ܺ and ܧ෠ோ, respectively, then 
using equation (1.3) to further eliminate ܧ෠௑ provides: 
ܭ෡௑ െ ܭ෡ா ൌ ߪா ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ െ ߪ௑ሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா
௑ሻሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ ൅ ߪ௎߮ோሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ. (E.8)
With only two unknowns (ܭ෡௑ and ܭ෡ா) left in equation (E.8), remove ܭ෡ா by substituting equation 
(1.1) to yield: 
ܭ෡௑ ൌ ߪ௎߱ா߮ோሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ െ ߪ௑߱ாሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ ൅ ߪா߱ா ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ. (S.5)
Rearranging equation (1.1) recovers ܭ෡ா ൌ ିሺଵିఠಶሻఠಶ ܭ෡௑ and therefore: 
ܭ෡ா ൌ െߪ௎ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ߮ோሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ ൅ ߪ௑ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ
െ ߪாሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ. 
(S.6)
All the remaining input solutions are found by substituting equations (S.5) and (S.6) back to 
equations (E.5), (E.6) and (E.7) revealing: 
ܧ෠ ൌ െߪ௎ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ߮ோሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ ൅ ߪ௑ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ
൅ ߪா߱ா ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ, 
(S.7)
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ܧ෠ோ ൌ െߪ௎ሺ1 െ ߱ா߮ோሻሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ ൅ ߪ௑ሾߠா௑ െ ߱ாሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሿሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ
൅ ߪா߱ா ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ, 
(S.8)
ܧ෠௑ ൌ ߪ௎߱ா߮ோሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ ൅ ߪ௑ሾ1 െ ߱ாሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሿሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ
൅ ߪா߱ா ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ. 
(S.9)
Next, substituting equation (S.9) to equation (1.2) shows: 
෠ܺ ൌ ߪ௎߱ா߮ோሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ ൅ ߪ௑ሾߠா௑ െ ߱ாሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሿሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ
൅ ߪா߱ா ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ. 
(S.10)
Finally, substituting equations (S.6) to equation (1.7) yields: 
መܼ ൌ െߪ௎ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ߮ோሺ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ሻ ൅ ߪ௑ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሺ̂ݐ௄௑ െ ݌̂ா௑ሻ
൅ ߪா ൤1 െ ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ ݐ௓ܼߛܧ ൨ ሺ̂ݐ௄ா െ ̂ݐ௓ሻ. 
(S.11)
Finally, define the relative price changes as follows: ܣመ ≡ ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑, ܤ෠ ≡ ݌̂ா௑ െ ̂ݐ௄௑, and ܥመ ≡
̂ݐ௓ െ ̂ݐ௄ா, thus: 
ܣመ ≡ ݌̂ாோ െ ݌̂௑ ൌ ൬ ݊ߝாோ1 ൅ ݊ߝாோ൰ ൬
ݐாோ
݌ாோ ̂ݐாோ ൅
	݌௄ாܭா
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௓൰
െ ߠா௑ ൬ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑൰ ൬
ݐாோ
݌ாோ ̂ݐாோ ൅
	݌௄ாܭா
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௓൰ െ ሺ1 െ ߠா
௑ሻ̂ݐ௄௑, 
ܤ෠ ≡ ݌̂ா௑ െ ̂ݐ௄௑ ൌ ൬ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑൰ ൬
ݐா௑
݌ா௑ ̂ݐா௑ ൅
	݌௄ாܭா
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௓൰ െ ̂ݐ௄௑, 
ܥመ ≡ ̂ݐ௓ െ ̂ݐ௄ா. 
All the above solutions can be summarized as follows (with “S” for “solution”): 
ߛො ൌ ߩ௓ா̂ݐ௓ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩ௓ாሻ̂ݐ௄ா, (S.1)
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݌̂ா௑ ൌ ൬ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑൰ ൬
ݐா௑
݌ா௑ ̂ݐா௑ ൅
݌௄ாܭா
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௓൰, (S.2)
݌̂ாோ ൌ ൬ ݊ߝாோ1 ൅ ݊ߝாோ൰ ൬
ݐாோ
݌ாோ ̂ݐாோ ൅
݌௄ாܭா
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ாோܧ ̂ݐ௓൰, (S.3)
݌̂௑ ൌ ߠா௑ ൬ ݊ߝா௑1 ൅ ݊ߝா௑൰ ൬
ݐா௑
݌ா௑ ̂ݐா௑ ൅
݌௄ாܭா
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௄ா ൅
ݐ௓ܼ
݌ா௑ܧ ̂ݐ௓൰ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠா
௑ሻ̂ݐ௄௑, (S.4)
ܭ෡௑ ൌ ߪ௎߱ா߮ோܣመ ൅ ߪ௑߱ாሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻ ܤ෠ െ ߪா߱ாߩ௓ாܥመ, (S.5)
ܭ෡ா ൌ െߪ௎ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ߮ோܣመ െ ߪ௑ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻ ܤ෠ ൅ ߪாሺ1 െ ߱ாሻߩ௓ாܥመ,	 (S.6)
ܧ෠ ൌ െߪ௎ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ߮ோܣመ െ ߪ௑ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻ ܤ෠ െ ߪா߱ாߩ௓ாܥመ, (S.7)
ܧ෠ோ ൌ െߪ௎ሺ1 െ ߱ா߮ோሻܣመ െ ߪ௑ሾߠா௑ െ ߱ாሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሿ ܤ෠ െ ߪா߱ாߩ௓ாܥመ, (S.8)
ܧ෠௑ ൌ ߪ௎߱ா߮ோܣመ െ ߪ௑ሾ1 െ ߱ாሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሿ ܤ෠ െ ߪா߱ாߩ௓ாܥመ, (S.9)
෠ܺ ൌ ߪ௎߱ா߮ோܣመ െ ߪ௑ሾߠா௑ െ ߱ாሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻሿ ܤ෠ െ ߪா߱ாߩ௓ாܥመ, (S.10)
መܼ ൌ െߪ௎ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻ߮ோܣመ െ ߪ௑ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻሺ߮௑ ൅ ߮ோߠா௑ሻ ܤ෠ െ ߪாሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߱ாሻߩ௓ாሿܥመ. (S.11)
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APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES AND TABLES FOR CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wind Turbine Location Data (updated 10/2018), Federal Aviation Administration 
 
Figure B.1 Proposed wind turbine locations with determinations of “Hazard to Air 
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Navigation” 
 
Source: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy 
 
Figure B.2 Wind power class map 
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(a) Wind capacity density 
 
 
(b) Wind area ratio (25 km) 
 
Figure B.3 First-stage results with wind power class by year dummies as the instruments 
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Table B.1 The retention rates of FBFM enrollment, 2003 - 2017 
Year Percent of farms enrolled in last year All farms Farms in counties with wind farms by the end of 2017 Difference 
2003 N/A N/A N/A 
2004 79.59 81.25 1.66 
2005 78.47 81.74 3.27 
2006 74.69 75.78 1.09 
2007 77.7 80.39 2.69 
2008 79.02 80.09 1.07 
2009 81.15 82.67 1.52 
2010 80.23 80.59 0.36 
2011 83.35 83.03 -0.32 
2012 83.32 83.91 0.59 
2013 80.68 82.17 1.49 
2014 82.24 83.73 1.49 
2015 81.75 82.56 0.81 
2016 80.12 79.18 -0.94 
2017 76.67 77.38 0.71 
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Table B.2 Effects of wind farms on soybean and corn yields without southern Illinois, 2003-
2017 
 yield - OLS ln(yield) - OLS yield - 2SLS ln(yield) - 2SLS  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Panel A: Soybeans         
Wind capacity density  
(MW/sqmi) 
3.565**  0.0745** 8.256* 0.157  
(1.658)  (0.0310) (4.600) (0.0966)  
Wind area ratio  
(25 km, %) 
 0.0116* 0.000252* 0.0508**  0.00101**  (0.00685) (0.000130) (0.0225)  (0.000478) 
Observations 34473 32882 34473 32882 34473 32882 34473 32882 
Adjusted R2 0.674 0.673 0.659 0.658 0.673 0.668 0.658 0.653 
Panel B: Corn      
Wind capacity density 
(MW/sqmi) 
1.268  0.00639 16.92 0.126  
(6.342)  (0.0494) (12.65) (0.105)  
Wind area ratio  
(25 km, %) 
0.0130 0.0000531 0.0907 0.000632 
(0.0299) (0.000219) (0.0662) (0.000534) 
Observations 33794 35436 33794 35436 33794 35436 33794 33794 
Adjusted R2 0.714 0.634 0.634 0.711 0.712 0.632 0.632 0.714 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Farm characteristics include farm size (w/ quadratic term), soil productivity rate (w/ quadratic 
term), farm type, percentage of land irrigated, percentage of feed fed, share of land ownership (owned, 
crop shared, and cash rented). Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. 
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table B.3 Effects of wind farms on soybean and corn yields with time-variant instrumental 
variables, 2003-2017 
 yield - OLS ln(yield) - OLS yield - 2SLS ln(yield) - 2SLS  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Panel A: Soybeans         
Wind capacity density  
(MW/sqmi) 
5.343***  0.0962*** 9.611** 0.135* 
(1.699)  (0.0309) (4.438) (0.0725) 
Wind area ratio  
(25 km, %) 
 0.0224*** 0.000393*** 0.0485***  0.000765**  (0.00702) (0.000129) (0.0165)  (0.000295) 
Observations 37924 36333 37924 36333 37924 36333 37924 36333 
Adjusted R2 0.672 0.670 0.651 0.649 0.671 0.668 0.651 0.648 
Panel B: Corn      
Wind capacity density 
(MW/sqmi) 
3.486  0.0279 26.76* 0.243* 
(5.862) (0.0467) (15.75) (0.145) 
Wind area ratio  
(25 km, %) 
0.0255 0.000178 0.125* 0.00115* 
(0.0280) (0.000207) (0.0681) (0.000617) 
Observations 38853 37211 38853 37211 38853 37211 38853 37211 
Adjusted R2 0.729 0.730 0.632 0.633 0.726 0.728 0.628 0.629 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Farm characteristics include farm size (w/ quadratic term), soil productivity rate (w/ quadratic term), 
farm type, percentage of land irrigated, percentage of feed fed, share of land ownership (owned, crop shared, 
and cash rented). Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. Asterisks ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table B.4 Robustness checks with dummy wind development indicator, 2003-2017 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Soybeans     
1(Wc0) 7.675*** 7.663*** 7.473*** 11.94** 
(1.583) (1.584) (1.501) (4.815) 
Observations 35749 35749 35749 35749 
Adjusted R2 0.642 0.642 0.646 0.630 
Panel B: Corn  
1(Wc0) 11.09* 10.91* 10.34* 9.391 
(5.682) (5.953) (5.624) (10.15) 
Observations 36593 36593 36593 36593 
Adjusted R2 0.726 0.727 0.729 0.737 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Farm characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Operating costs No No Yes No 
County specific linear time trend No No No Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
county level. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
